WW 







miimmm 



111 if! 

II ill iiliiiHl 




IIP 
I 




■ 



4 




IHil 

1 

jjijilpli 

will- 

in 
111 



0° 






p/ **% 




;C 















^ -Ki 












*«. 












-<"\ 









? X 







< 









"» A 








^ + 



■ 



+■>■* 



























s 



, 



























^ 













^. 


















\^ 






























































AN 



INTRODUCTION 



THE STUDY 



PHILOSOPHY. 



OUTLIKE TREATISE 



< 



LOGIC. 



BY 



REV. E. V.'GEKHART, D.D., 

PRESIDENT OF FRANKHN AND MARSHALL COLLEGE. 



I am the Truth.— Christ. 




PHILADELPHIA: 
LINDSAY & BLAKISTON. 

1858. 






THE LIBRARY 
OF CONGRESS 

WASHINGTOH 



Entered, accord ng to Act of Congress, in the year 1857, 
BY LINDSAY & BLAKISTON, 

In the Clerk's Office of the District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania. 



PHILADELPHIA: 
C. SHERMAN & SON, PRINTEES, 

19 St. James Street. 



TO 

THE MEMORY 

OP 

FKEDERICK AUGUSTUS RAUCH, 

WHO FIRST LED THE AUTHOR INTO THE 
REGIONS OF THOUGHT 



IS DEDICATED, 

IN TOKEN OF A PUPIL'S 

UNCHANGING GRATITUDE AND VENERATION. 



PREFACE. 



It has been generally assumed by leading philosophers 
that there is no neecessary internal connection between 
sound metaphysical speculation and the person of Jesus 
Christ. Metaphysics in general, or any particular system of 
philosophy, and the Christian Religion, are, it is held, dis- 
tinct and different spheres of thought, and are, in conse- 
quence, not determined by a common principle, though, like 
the circumferences of contiguous circles, they touch and 
may even intersect each other. Were Christ but a single 
individual, and the Christian Religion co-ordinate with any 
of the other religions of the world, there would be pro- 
priety in the assumption. But if Christ be the generic 
man as well as a single individual ; if He possess all the 
attributes, original wants and tendencies of perfect huma- 
nity ; if besides He be the real union of the human with 
the divine nature ; and if as such He be the all-pervading 
principle of a system of religion which is absolute ; — then 
Christianity as a whole must answer to every distinctive 
attribute of man, to the deepest tendencies of the reason, 
and to every law of thought j and Christ must, at the 
same time, be the principle of every form of speculation or 

1* 



VI PREFACE. 

every system of thought that really conforms to, and satis- 
fies, the demands of the reason. For it would involve a 
positive contradiction, to presume that different systems of 
truth, which meet the same general conditions of the 
human mind, can originate in mutually exclusive prin- 
ciples. 

To believe in Christ as the Word made flesh and in 
Christianity as the absolute world-religion, and to hold 
this belief with logical consistency, requires us to assume, 
therefore, that true philosophy and Christianity are not to 
be divorced, but are internally and necessarily connected. 
Though distinct systems, the one starting with the intui- 
tive beliefs of the reason, and proceeding according to the 
subjective laws of thought, the other starting with a fact of 
supernatural revelation and then unfolding itself from it as 
from a germ, according to the objective law of organic 
growth, they are nevertheless not separable much less con- 
tradictory ; but both presuppose the same fundamental 
necessity in human nature, the necessity to believe and to 
know involved in the relation of subject and object, and 
both follow and embody the same order or method in the 
process of development. The method of thinking which 
determines every branch of true philosophy corresponds to 
the objective order of life unfolded iu Christianity. And 
as Christ is the principle of Christianity, it follows that He 
is Himself the highest concrete form of the method of 
thinking which must underlie and pervade every process 
of legitimate ratiocination. 



PREFACE. Vll 

Whilst the author has no doubt in his own mind of the 
truth of the general principle here laid down, it is with 
great diffidence that he submits a short Introduction to 
Philosophy which is based upon it; for he is fully alive 
to the difficulties involved in the solution of the problems 
that have arisen at every step of his progress. Indeed at 
his own instance he would scarcely have ventured upon the 
work. In undertaking it, he was influenced, in a great 
measure, by the judgment of his friend, Doctor Schaff. 
Aware of my intention to publish an Outline Treatise on 
Logic, he, at different times, suggested to me to write an 
Introduction to this Science, or to the study of philosophy 
in general. To these suggestions was added the want of a 
suitable text-book for this department of a college course, 
the sense of which I had long felt in my experience as a 
Teacher j particularly the want of a book that would pro- 
ceed consistently on the assumption of an inward harmony 
between logical thinking or legitimate metaphysical disqui- 
sition and the Keligion of Jesus Christ. Under these cir- 
cumstances, I have been led to attempt a concise discussion 
of the general subject. Though I do not flatter myself that 
all the questions preliminary to the study of the various 
branches of philosophy have been discussed, or that any of 
them have been answered to the entire satisfaction of 
scholars, yet the work is an earnest inquiry into the relation 
of Christ to scientific thinking ; and under this view it is 
offered as an humble contribution to the cause of Christian 
philosophy. 



Vlll PREFACE. 

As the work is designed primarily for Colleges, I have 
been guided in the preparation of it, as regards the order 
of thought and external plan, mainly by my judgment of 
the wants of students. This design, however, will not in- 
terfere with its use by those generally who take an interest 
in philosophic studies. As regards manner, it was my only 
aim to write in a simple, compact, and perspicuous style. 
The needless use of technical terms has been avoided. In 
using them when necessary, the same sense has, as nearly 
as possible, always been attached to them. 

My idea of an Introduction adapted to the wants of 
students did not allow me to refer, in the course of discus- 
sion, except when it was unavoidable, to conflicting opinions 
and theories. To do so properly would have given it a 
polemical cast to a degree that, in my judgment, would 
not be either desirable or advantageous. A positive and 
direct method of treatment is preferable. If the positions, 
the train of reasoning, and the conclusions be true, they 
will find access to the mind of the reader in virtue of 
their own self-authenticating power. My silence should, 
therefore, not be construed into a want of due respect for, 
or a want of a sense of great indebtedness to the profound 
thinkers who have started with different principles and ela- 
borated different theories. 

The Outline Treatise on Logic is a free, and somewhat 
amplified, translation of a German work by Dr. Beck, 
originally published in Stuttgart, in 1845. As I lay claim 
only to a patient endeavor to reproduce the original under 



PREFACE. IX 

an English form, it will be no violation of modesty to say 
a few words touching its merits. 

The design of Dr. Beck was to prepare an Outline 
Treatise as a text-book, which should include such matter 
only as it is necessary for a student in a Gymnasium or Col- 
lege to study, and to pursue such a method in elaborating 
the material as would itself discipline the mind to logical 
thinking. The book testifies to his eminent success. Be- 
ginning with certain fundamental principles, he advances 
from them step by step, making each position depend logi- 
cally on that which has preceded it, and evolves a complete 
system that excludes nothing which the successful learner 
must know, and includes nothing which he can fail to 
know without interfering with a clear comprehension of the 
whole. The Treatise is profound, scientific, comprehensive, 
and brief; and, therefore, possesses rare value as a text- 
book. For the value of a text-book, especially in philosophy, 
depends not so much upon the amount of matter which it 
contains, as upon being so constructed that the student is 
required to think, to think closely and systematically, and 
to remember accurately, in order to succeed at all in mas- 
tering the subject. Pursuing the study of Logic in this 
way his mind passes through a process of efficient logical 
training whilst acquiring a knowledge of the Science. 

A word or two in regard to its brevity. — Whilst a good 
text-book is the basis of instruction and an important aid 
to both Pupil and Teacher, it is not the exclusive, nor yet 
the principal, agent in the work of thorough education. 



X PREFACE. 

That is to be found in the Teacher himself. The class- 
room is not the place where he is to ascertain simply what 
the class has learned, though this is an important part of 
his duty — for education does not consist in gathering and 
treasuring up the thoughts of others ; — but it is the place 
particularly of instruction and mental discipline, where the 
Teacher should discuss, unfold, and illustrate the subject 
of study in his own way ; for thus most effectually may he 
awaken the interest of his pupils, incite them to earnest, 
independent thought, and draw out and mould all the 
powers of the mind. This constitutes the chief work of an 
educator. To perform it well, he needs a text-book that 
will assist him in teaching, require the pupil to think and 
to learn, and at the same time facilitate the exercises of re- 
citation. The unusual brevity combined with the compre- 
hensiveness of this Treatise is therefore to be regarded not 
as a great deficiency, but as one of its peculiar merits. 
The abstruse discussions which it omits, especially the 
numerous subtle modifications of the syllogistic formula, 
it is well for the Teacher or more mature scholar to be 
familiar with, but they are remote from the immediate 
and practical wants of the learner. 

In relation to Whateley's Logic and other works of kin- 
dred character, it may be proper to say, that I do not ig- 
nore nor depreciate their merits ; but as they differ on the 
points just mentioned from Dr. Beck's Treatise, they do 
not render the publication of it in the English language 
superfluous. 



PREFACE. XI 

With no desire but to aid in advancing the interests of 
Science and Religion, I submit this volume to my fellow- 
laborers in the work of higher education, and to the scien- 
tific community in general, in the hope that, in some mea- 
sure at least, it may be adapted to promote the end which 
it has in view. 

E. V. G. 
Franklin and Marshall College, 
Lancaster, Pa., Dec. 1857. 



CONTENTS, 



INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF 
PHILOSOPHY. 

PAGE 

§ 1. Preliminary View of the General Subject, . . 27 

CHAPTER I. 

THE REASON. 

I 2. The Reason denned, 31 

§ 3. The Reason an Organic Entity, ... 32 

§ 4. The Relation of the Reason to the Body, . . 34 

g 5. The Relation of the Reason to God, . . 37 

I 6. The Office of the Reason, . . . .40 

§ 7. The Reason believes, .... 42 

§ 8. The Activity of the Reason, . . . .46 

§ 9. The Reason knows, .... 48 

CHAPTER II. 

CONSCIOUSNESS. 

1 10. The Objects of the Reason, . . . .52 
g 11. The Consciousness of Self, or Self-Consciousness, 54 
§12. The Consciousness of the World, or World-Con- 
sciousness, ..... 57 

2 13. The Consciousness of God, or God-Consciousness, . 62 

2 



XIV CONTENTS. 

PAGE 

g 14. The Necessity and Unity of Consciousness, . 65 

£15. The Relation of Faith to Consciousness, . . 68 



CHAPTER III. 

THE NATURE OF PHILOSOPHY. 

$16. The Conception of Philosophy, . . .72 

\ 1Y. The Form of Philosophy, ... 73 

\ 18. The Matter of Philosophy, . . . .74 

The Necessity of Being, ... 75 

The Generality of Being, . . .76 

§ 19. The Matter of Philosophy, arising under a threefold 

inquiry, . . . . .78 

The First Inquiry, corresponding to Concep- 
tion, . . . . .78 

The Second Inquiry, corresponding to Judg- 
ment, . . . . .79 

The Third Inquiry, corresponding to Reason- 
ing, . . . 81 
$ 20. Correspondence of the Form to the Matter of Philo- 
sophy, . . . . . .83 

I 21. The Nature of Philosophy denned, . . 84 

§22. Recapitulation, . . . . .86 



CHAPTER IV. 

A TRUE SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY. 

I 23. The Conditions of true Philosophy, . . .88 

SECTION I. 

THE PRINCIPLE OF PHILOSOPHY AND THE POSITION OF 
THE REASON. 

§ 24. What is the First Principle of Philosophy ? .90 

I 25. What is the Relative Position of the Reason? . 91 



CONTENTS. XV 

FAOE 

26. The first two Conditions in their Relation to Philo- 

sophy, ..... 93 

27. The Relation of Philosophy to Supernatural Reve- 

lation, ..... 96 

28. Recapitulation of the Argument, . . .99 

SECTION II. 

THE RELATION OF THE REASON TO THE OUTER WORLD, 
OR OF SUBJECT AND OBJECT. 



29. Fourfold Solution of the Philosophical Problem, 

Realism, .... 

Idealism, .... 
Absolutism, .... 
Dualism, .... 

30. Modifications of the Four Systems, 

31. Criticism of the Four Systems, 

32. Correspondence of Christology to Philosophy, . 

33. Fourfold Solution of the Christological Problem, 

Ebionism, .... 

Gnosticism, .... 
Eutycheanism, .... 
Nestorianism, 

34. The Philosophical and Christological Systems com 

pared, .... 
Realism and Ebionism, . 
Idealism and Gnosticism, 
Absolutism and Eutycheanism, . 
Dualism and Nestorianism, . 

35. Conditions of the True Solution, 

Conditions of the Philosophical Problem, 
Conditions of the Christological Problem, 
The two Series compared and resolved, 

36. The True Solution of the Problem, 

Solution of the Christological Problem, 



101 
102 
103 
104 
105 
107 
109 
110 
111 
112 
113 
115 
116 

117 
119 
119 
120 
120 
122 
123 
124 
125 
127 
129 



Solution of the Philosophical Problem, . 131 



XVI CONTENTS. 

PAGB 

§ 37. Solution of the Problem illustrated, . . 134 

$ 38. Conclusion of the Whole Argument, . . 137 

CHAPTER V. 

LOGIC AND ITS RELATIONS. 

. 141 
SECTION I. 

THE OBJECT OF LOGIC. 

40. The Laws of Thinking, ... 142 

41. Laws of Thinking in their Relation to the Reason 

illustrated, ..... 144 

42. The Science of Logic denned, . . .148 

Science of the Generic Form of Thinking, 149 
Science of Deductive Reasoning, . 152 

SECTION II. 

RELATIONS OF LOGIC. 

43. Relation of Logic to Philosophy, . . 154 

Logic the Plastic Power, . . . 155 

Logic the Subjective Condition, . 156 

Logic an Essential Element, . .156 

44. Province of Logic in Relation to Philosophy, . 157 

1. Necessity of a Fundamental Judgment, . 158 

2. Necessity and Order of a Process of Reason- 

ing, . . . . .160 

3. Necessity of a Conclusion, . . 161 

45. The Harmony of Logic and True Philosophy, . 166 

46. Relation of Logic to the Sciences, . . 170 

True Relation, . . . .173 

False Relation, .... 175 

True Relation illustrated, . . .177 

47. Relation of Logic to Theology, . . . 178 



CONTENTS. XV11 

PAGE 

In what sense Theology transcends Logic, . 179 
In what sense Theology does not transcend 

Logic, .... 
Theology Logical in its Principle, 
Theology Logical in its Method and Con 

elusions, .... 
General Conditions of True Theology, 

48. Eelation of Logic to Language, 

Philosophy of Language, 
Objective Logic and Language, 
Subjective Logic and Language, 

49. The Necessity of the Science of Logic, 

Grounded in Moral Evil, or Sin, 
Grounded in the Nature of the Reason, 

50. The Study of Logic, 

A Logical System of Logic, 

The Logical Study of a Logical System, 



182 
184 

185 

187 
188 
189 
194 
197 
198 
199 
202 
203 
204 
208 



AN OUTLINE TREATISE ON LOGIC. 
INTRODUCTION". 

I 1. Logic, 213 

I 2. The Object of Logic, .... 213 

I 3. Pure and Applied Logic, . . . .214 

\ 4. The End of Logic, . . . . 215 

I 5. The Relative Position of Logic, . • .216 

g 6. Pure Logic, ..... 217 

PART FIRST. 
THE DOCTRINE OF ELEMENTS. 

7. Division, . . . . . .219 



XV111 CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER I. 

THE FUNDAMENTAL LAWS OF THINKING. 

PAGE 

I 8. The Laws of Thinking, . . . 220 

I 9. The Law of Identity, . . . .220 

\ 10. The Law of Contradiction, . . . 222 

I 11. The Law of the Excluded Third, . . .222 

\ 12. The Law of the Rational Ground, . . 223 

CHAPTER II. 

CONCEPTIONS. 

§ 13. Definition of a Conception, . . . 225 

SECTION I. 

A CONCEPTION AS IT IS IN ITSELF. 

\ 14. A Conception in General, . . . .226 

1. The Contents of a Conception. 

§ 15. Contents of a Conception defined, . . . 226 

\ 16. Essential and Accidental Attributes, . . 227 

£ 17. Simple and Compound Conceptions, . . 228 

2. The Extent of a Conception. 

\ 18. Extent of a Conception defined, . . 229 

§ 19. Genus, Species, and Individual, . . . 229 

3. Comparison of the Contents and Extent of a Conception. 

I 20. The Reciprocal Relation, ... 230 

| 21. Variation in the Extent of a Conception, . . 231 

\ 22. Addendum. — Distinctness and Accuracy, . 232 

SECTION II. 

COMPARISON OF CONCEPTIONS. 

\ 23. Points of Comparison, .... 233 



CONTENTS. XIX 



PAGE 



1. Identity and Non-Identity. 

$ 24. Identical Conceptions, .... 233 

$25. Non-Identical Conceptions. — Affinity and Difference, 234 

2. Agreement and Opposition. 

$ 26. Agreement and Opposition, . . . 236 

\ 27. Contradictory and Contrary Opposition, . 236 

3. Subordination and Go-ordination. 

\ 28-9. Subordinate Conceptions, . . 238 

$ 30. Co-ordinate Conceptions, . . . 238 

| 31. Art of .Classification, .... 240 

CHAPTER III. 

JUDGMENTS. 

I 32. Judgments, . . . . . 241 

SECTION I. 

A JUDGMENT AS IT IS IN ITS OWN NATURE. 

$ 33. Definition of a Judgment, .... 241 

1. Quality. 

I 34. The Quality of Judgments, . . . 242 

£ 35. A Judgment Affirmative or Negative, . . 243 

2. Quantity. 

I 36-7. The Quantity of Judgments, . . 244 

3. Relation. 

g 38. The Relation of Judgments, . . .246 

$39. Categorical Judgments, . . . . 246 

$ 40. Hypothetical Judgments, .... 247 

§ 41. Disjunctive Judgments, . . . 248 

§ 42. Addendum. — Partitive Judgments, . . . 250 



XX CONTENTS. 



4. Modality. 

* PAGE 

43. The Modality of Judgments, . . .251 

44. Problematical, Assertory, and Apodictical Judg- 

ments, ...... 252 



SECTION II. 

COMPARISON OF JUDGMENTS. 

§ 45. Comparison of Judgments, . . . 253 

1. Identity and Difference. 

\ 46. Identical Judgments, .... 253 

§ 47. Different Judgments, .... 254 

2. Agreement and Opposition. 

$ 48. Agreement and Opposition, . . . 255 
$ 49. Contradictory Opposition, . . . 255 
g 50. Contrary Opposition, .... 256 
§ 51. Inferences from Contradictory and Contrary Oppo- 
sition, . . - . . . 257 
\ 52. Subcontraries, ..... 258 

3. Co-ordination and Subordination. 

\ 53. Co-ordination and Subordination, . . . 259 

§ 54. Inferences, . . . . . 260 

4. Transposition. 

\ 55. Conversion, ...... 262 

$ 56. Contraposition, . . . . . 263 

| 57. Addendum. — Propositions, .... 263 

CHAPTER IV. 

REASONING, OR THE SYLLOGISM. 

I 58. Reasoning, ..... 266 



CONTENTS. XXI 
SECTION I. 

ESSENTIAL NATURE OF REASONING. 

TAQE 

\ 59. The Principle of Reasoning) . . . 267 

§ 60-1. Three Judgments in Reasoning, . . 267 

. 268 

SECTION II. 

FUNDAMENTAL FORMULAE OF REASONING. 

I 63-4. Formulae of Reasoning, . . . 269 

1. Categorical Reasoning. 

| 65-6. Categorical Reasoning, .... 271 

\ 67. The Principle of Categorical Reasoning, . 272 
\ 68. The First Particular Rule, . . . .273 

I 69. The Second Rule, . . . . 274 

I 70. The Third Rule, 275 

g 71. The Fourth Rule, . . . . 276 

§ 72. The Fifth Rule, 277 

1 73. The Figures of a Syllogism, ... 278 

2. Hypothetical Reasoning. 

§ 74-5. The Law of Hypothetical Reasoning, . . 280 

§ 76-7. Two Modes of Hypothetical Reasoning, . 281 

§ 78. A Hypothetical Syllogism, pure or mixed, . . 283 

3. Disjunctive Reasoning. 

2 79. A Disjunctive Syllogism, . . . .284 
§ 80. Two Modes of Disjunctive Reasoning, . . 285 
\ 81. Rules for Disjunctive Reasoning, . . . 286 
§ 82. The Validity of Disjunctive Reasoning, . 286 
§ 83. Addenda. — 1. Partitive Reasoning, . .287 
I 84. 2. The Dilemma, . . . 288 
I 85. A Valid Dilemma, ..... 289 



XX11 CONTENTS. 

SECTION III. 

VERBAL EXPRESSION OF REASONING. 

I 86. The Syllogism, .... 



PAGE 



1. The Simple Syllogism. 

I 87. Complete Simple Syllogism, . . .292 

\ 88. Incomplete Simple Syllogism, . . . 293 

I 89. Enthymemes, . . . . .293 

\ 90. Contracted Syllogism, .... 294 
\ 91. Immediate Syllogisms, .... 295 

2. The Compound Syllogism. 

\ 92-3. Compound Syllogisms, Complete or Incomplete, 298 

\ 94. The Syllogistic Series, . . . .299 

\ 95. Prosyllogism and Episyllogism, . • . 299 

\ 96. Progressive and Retrogressive Series, . . 300 

\ 97. Incomplete Compound Syllogisms, . . 302 

I 98. The Sorites, . . . . .302 

g 99. Analytical Sorites, .... 303 

100. Synthetical Sorites, . " . . .304 

101. Hypothetical Sorites, .... 305 

102. The Epichirema, . . . . .306 



PART SECOND. 
THE DOCTRINE OF METHOD. 

I 103. Method, ..... 308 
§ 104. Union of Cognitions, .... 309 

I 105. External and Internal Union, . . . 310 

\ 106. The Logical Method, . . . .310 

I 107. System, . . . . . 311 

\ 108. Science, . . . . „ . .311 



CONTENTS. 



XXlll 



109. Analysis and Synthesis, 

110. System an Organic Unity, 

111. Construction of a System, 

112. Office of Method, . 



PAGE 

312 
313 
314 
315 



CHAPTER I. 



OF DEFINITION. 



§ 113. Logical Definition, 

§ 114. Office of Definition, 

§ 115. Fundamental Principle of Definition, 

§ 116. First Rule for Definition, . 

§117. Proof of a Correct Definition, 

§118. The Second Rule, . 

§119. The Third Rule, 

§ 120. The Fourth Rule, . 

§ 121. Nominal and Verbal Definition, 

§ 122. Analytical and Genetic Definition, 

§ 123. Thorough and Complete Definition, 

& 124. Description. — Explanation. — Location, 



316 
316 
318 
318 
319 
321 
321 
322 
323 
324 
325 
326 



CHAPTER II 



OF DIVISION. 



125-6. Logical Division, 

127. Office of Logical Division, 

128-9. Elements of Logical Division, 

130. Collateral Divisions, 

131. Subdivisions, 

132. Fundamental Division, 

133. Order of Division, 

134. First Rule for Division, 

135. Second Rule, 

136. Third Rule, . 

137. Fourth Rule, 



328 
329 
330 
331 
332 
333 
335 
335 
336 
337 
337 



XXIV 



CONTENTS. 



I 138. Fifth Rule, 

§ 139. Partition and Nominal Division, 



PAOE 

338 

339 



CHAPTER III. 



140-1. Nature and Necessity of Proof, . 


. 340 


142. Form of Proof, 


341 


143. Elements of Proof, 


. 342 


144. Validity of Proof, 


343 


145. The Order of Proof, 


. 344 


146. Direct and Indirect Proof, 


345 


147. Indirect or Apagogical Proof, 


. 346 


148. Use of Apagogical Proof, 


347 


149. Objective and Subjective Proof, . 


. 348 


150. Probability, .... 


349 


151. Analogy, .... 


. 350 


152. Induction, .... 


352 


153. Analogy and Induction, . . 


. 353 


154. First Rule for Argumentation, 


354 


155. Second Rule, 


. 355 


156. Third Rule, .... 


355 


157. Fourth Rule, 


. 356 


158. Fifth Rule, .... 


357 


159. Fallacies, .... 


. 358 



AN INTRODUCTION 



STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 



INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY. 



§1. • 

PRELIMINARY VIEW OF THE GENERAL SUBJECT. 

Philosophy, according to the etymology of the 
word, is the love of wisdom — the natural tendency 
of the human mind to know the truth. This 
tendency awakes spontaneously, is active with 
greater or less intensive force in every age of 
the world, and leads from time to time to certain 
definite results. These form a succession of sys- 
tems of received truth. Some of them are based 
the one upon the other, each succeeding system 
being a more full development or a different appli- 
cation of the same method of thinking. Others 
are in conflict, and mutually destructive. Yet all 
of them, whether contradictory or harmonious, 
are in some measure in affinity ; for they possess 



28 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY. 

certain essential elements in common. They 
represent the earnest efforts of the reason to 
satisfy its inmost longings — its longings to know 
the varied objects arresting its attention, in their 
ground, in their mode of existence, and in all 
their connections. They are therefore to be re- 
garded each as a part of a continuous process 
going on in the sphere of thought. The general 
result of this process at any given period is 
philosophy, namely, that which the reason has 
wrought out and holds for truth ; the word being 
used to express both the cause and the effect — 
the tendency to know the truth, and scientific 
knowledge itself. 

The organ of philosophy is the reason. The 
reason philosophizes. It assumes a point of ob- 
servation, and then endeavors to solve the pro- 
blems of philosophy in the light of its position 
and according to the laws of thought. The cha- 
racter of the inquiry is thus determined by the 
reason itself, as well as by the objects whose na- 
ture it investigates. "What is the reason ? what 
is the right point of observation ? and what are 
the laws of thought according to which an in- 
quiry must be conducted? are, therefore, ques- 
tions of fundamental importance. The answer 



PRELIMINARY VIEW OF THE GENERAL SUBJECT. 29 

possesses the force of a plastic power that moulds 
the whole structure of philosophy. 

The reason does not only inquire into the na- 
ture of the objects by which it is surrounded. It 
inquires also into itself — into its own nature, sus- 
ceptibilities, powers, and relations. This gives 
rise to the Science of the Soul, or Psychology. 
And it inquires into its fundamental operations 
and laws of thought. This gives rise to the 
Science of Logic. Philosophy includes Logic; 
the one is the general, the other the particular ; 
the one the trunk, the other a branch. Hence, a 
system of Logic is always connected with some 
corresponding system of philosophy, which exerts 
upon it a determining influence. 

As the reason is the organ of philosophy, a 
correct view of the reason conditions a correct 
view of the nature of philosophy ; and as philo- 
sophy embraces logic, a sound philosophy is in 
order to a true conception of logic — of its nature, 
peculiar province, and necessary relations. 

An Introduction to the study of Logic and 
Philosophy does not construct a particular system 
either of the one or of the other, but it unfolds 
and establishes the general principles upon which 
a true system of both may be constructed. It 

3* 



30 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY. 

designs to lead the earnest inquirer into the 
boundless field of thought, to give him the true 
point of observation, make him acquainted with 
the different classes of objects that lie within the 
compass of his vision, point out the errors to 
which he is exposed, and imbue him with a 
sound method of thinking, in order that he may 
be prepared to carry forward independent re- 
searches, and come into possession of a scientific 
knowledge of truth as regards both the object 
and the subject of thought. 

The relation of the reason to philosophy and 
of philosophy to logic, suggests the natural order 
of discussion. The whole subject may accord- 
ingly be treated in five chapters, as follows : 1. 
The Reason ; 2. Consciousness ; 3. The Nature 
of Philosophy ; 4. A True System of Philosophy ; 
and 5. Logic and its Kelations. 



CHAPTER I. 

THE REASON. 

§ 2. 

THE REASON DEFINED. 

The word reason has various senses. It is 
sometimes used as synonymous with understand- 
ing, or as denoting a particular faculty of the 
mind. Employed in its more general sense, it 
signifies the immaterial or spiritual part of man's 
constitution, as distinguished from that which is 
material, or the body. We say : man is endowed 
with reason; meaning that reason is something 
which is peculiar to man, and distinguishes him 
generically from all lower orders of creation. In 
this general sense, we propose to use the word. 

The human reason is an order of created spirit 
existing in vital union with a material body. The 
principle of its activity the reason bears in itself; 



32 THE REASON. 

but this activity is in and through the organs of 
the body. The body, in turn, conditions and mo- 
difies the normal activity of the reason. In man, 
therefore, the reason and the body constitute a 
unity ; they are one ; not that they are identical ; 
the reason and the body, spirit and matter, differ 
in kind. Nor are they combined, or conjoined 
externally, as though either one could have an 
existence independently of union with the other. 
But both enter into and make but one human 
constitution ; as the life-power in a tree and its 
gross material, make but a single vegetable 
growth. 

All sound and consistent philosophic inquiry 
proceeds upon this twofold conception of man. 



§ 3. 

THE REASON AN ORGANIC ENTITY. 

As an order of created spirit, the human reason 
is an organic entity. 

It is an entity ; that is, it possesses objective 
existence. It is a real being, and has its own 
qualities or attributes, which distinguish it gene- 



THE REASON AN ORGANIC ENTITY. 33 

rically from the essence and attributes of matter. 
These qualities reveal themselves as the imme- 
diate facts of self-consciousness. The reason may 
know itself as it is. But it does not exist because 
it manifests itself in self-consciousness; on the 
contrary, it manifests itself in self-consciousness 
because it is a real spiritual being. 

The reason is an organic entity. It is a living 
being. Like the body, the reason begins to be 
in a state of involution ; all its attributes are in it 
potentially as in a germ ; and it comes to be it- 
self actually by a process of evolution, which goes 
forward according to the law of its own life. 

The law of rational life is a necessity in the 
constitution of the reason, according to which it 
begins to be as a whole, composed of many un- 
developed members. Manifold faculties and sus- 
ceptibilities are comprehended potentially in one 
principle of life. As these faculties are gradually 
unfolded, their functions and relations are deter- 
mined by the force of this principle, which is 
common to them all. Thus one principle, or 
germ of the reason, unfolds a variety of powers 
or members ; and these in the common possession 
of one life, and in their common relation to its 
principle, constitute one objective totality, or an 
organic whole. 



34 THE REASON. 

§ 4. 

THE RELATION OP THE REASON TO THE BODY. 

The incipient and progressive development of 
the reason depends upon the normal development 
of the body. As the body of a child grows, the 
capacity of sensation is unfolded ; and sensation 
becomes the medium through which suitable ob- 
jects from without first excite, then draw out and 
nourish, the latent energies of the reason. These 
suitable objects are the parent, the family, or the 
teacher; not the body simply, nor the contact of 
body with body ; but the tuitional power of rea- 
son itself breathing in looks, words, and manners, 
upon the rational nature of the child, and affect- 
ing it through the sensations of a material organ- 
ism. It is the developed reason, active through 
the body, which is the indispensable condition of 
the incipient activity of the undeveloped reason. 
The reason kindles the reason ; the one acting, 
the other acted upon; but both possible only 
through the body. 

The peculiar qualities of the reason, however, 
its laws of life and fundamental ideas, are what 
they are independently of the human body ; that 



RELATION OF THE REASON TO THE BODY. 35 

is, they do not in any sense originate in sensation 
or derive their nature from it. The reason, as an 
organic entity, has a being of its own as really as 
the human body, and is as distinct in its essential 
attributes from the body, as the essential attri- 
butes of the body are distinct from those of a 
vegetable or mineral. The body and the affec- 
tions of the body, or sensation in general, consti- 
tute but the condition of excitation, on which the 
development of the ideas and laws of the reason 
depend. These ideas and laws are not, therefore, 
impressed upon the reason from without, but are 
unfolded from within; just as the laws of the 
human body, the development of which depends 
upon food and drink, light, air, &c, being its con- 
ditions, are not impressed upon it by the vege- 
table or mineral kingdom, but are unfolded from 
the principle of its own life, and constitute its 
specific attributes. 

A condition denotes a subordinate relation of 
an object to a germ or to an organism. That is 
a condition, the presence and influence of which 
are necessary, not that something else may obtain 
existence and its essential attributes, but that it 
may unfold and perfect itself. An organism un- 
folds and perfects itself in virtue of its intrinsic 



36 THE REASON. 

energy, but by means of certain objects brought 
into contact with it, which it appropriates and as- 
similates to its own nature. A, for example, is 
the condition of B, when the presence of A is 
necessary, in order that B may develop itself ac- 
cording to the law of its own being. B, however, 
does not derive its being and essential attributes 
from A ; these belong to the constitution of B, 
but remain in a latent state — or, if B is deve- 
loped, the law of its life cannot continue to be 
normally active — until the relation of A to B, as 
its condition, is established and continued. The 
relation being established, B becomes active nor- 
mally, and develops its qualities from itself, but 
in the process of development it appropriates the 
properties of A, and transforms them into the 
elements of its own nature. 

The distinction to be made between the reason 
as it is in itself and its necessary outward condi- 
tions, is very important. The reason develops its 
essential qualities from its own being; it is an 
organic entity; but depends for its normal de- 
velopment and vigor upon proper excitation and 
nourishment from without through the senses. 
Outward objects do indeed modify its ideas and 
laws ; still these ideas and laws are emphatically 



THE RELATION OP THE REASON TO GOD. 37 

its own. The principle and the condition of de- 
velopment are plainly two essentially different 
things. Fatal errors arise in philosophy from 
confounding them. 



§ 5. 

THE RELATION OF THE REASON TO GOD. 

Though the being and essential attributes of 
the human reason are independent of sensation 
and the body, yet its original ground is not in 
itself, nor is it sufficient for itself. An order of 
created spirit, it has its original ground in, that 
is, it derives its being from, the Creator, God, a 
personal, self-existent, absolute Being. Hence, a 
sense of dependence on a Supreme Power is one 
of its first manifestations. Divine rays give a 
distinct coloring to the intellectual firmament as 
the sun approaches the horizon. And when the 
full orb lays open the fresh field of consciousness, 
one of the first objects clearly seen is the every- 
where present but mysterious and infinite power 
of the Godhead. Or, to drop the figure, when a 
man begins to know and to think consistently, 

4 



38 THE KEASON. 

the idea of God is implied in, and interwoven 
with, all his notions and every train of thought. 
The reason refers itself spontaneously to God ; in 
other words, it falls back or rests upon Him, if 
not in a true yet in a false way, as an objective 
basis that imparts order and validity to all the ac- 
tivity which it puts forth. 

Thus, whilst the normal development of the 
reason depends, especially in its incipient stages, 
upon the functions of the body, a lower stratum 
of existence, as its condition, the being and ac- 
tivity of the reason are nevertheless subordinate 
to the Creator, from whom it derives its suffi- 
ciency; just as the human body itself, whilst de- 
pending on the presence of the lower material 
world as the condition of its development, and 
possessing a life strictly its own and specifically 
different from surrounding objects, is, neverthe- 
less, subordinate to the reason and derives its 
sufficiency from it. For the capacities and powers 
of the body can be duly employed, or rather the 
idea and design of the body can be fully actual- 
ized, only under the sustaining and directing 
power of the mind. 

The relation of the reason to God is, therefore, 
analogous to the relation of the human body to 



THE RELATION OF THE REASON TO GOD. 39 

reason. The life of the human body is geneti- 
cally different from the life of the vegetable ; the 
life of the reason is generically different from the 
life of the body ; and the being of God is essen- 
tially different from the being of the human reason. 
But the vegetable is subordinate to the wants of 
the human body ; the human body is subordinate 
to the ideas of reason ; and the reason is subordi- 
nate to the will and plan of God. Hence, the 
human body appropriates the vegetable to itself, 
and thus transforms it into the elements of a 
higher constitution. The reason appropriates the 
body to itself; that is, it pours its own spiritual 
light over the body, and transfers it, as it were, 
from a lower to a higher sphere, by using the 
bodily powers in giving outward form to thoughts, 
and accomplishing the higher purposes of human 
life, thus connecting these powers with rational 
action and rational ends. And in like manner 
does the Creator appropriate the human reason 
to Himself; in other words, the reason, in order 
to be true to itself, must hold itself spontaneously 
and consciously in subordination to God ; or 
rather, it knows and wills itself to be appre- 
hended of God, and held by Him in communion 
with Himself. He pours His own uncreated light 



40 THE REASON. 

upon the reason, which, though active in the 
sphere of the natural, He binds to the sphere of 
the supernatural, thus connecting it with divine 
plans and divine ends. 

The result of these inquiries exhibits the rela- 
tive position of the reason, not as it is in the pre- 
sent state of man, but as it is in its normal state. 
The introduction of moral evil has disturbed its 
normal relations and perverted its activity. The 
actual position of the human reason is not now, 
consequently, what it was originally, — a fact that 
cannot be denied or ignored without giving a 
false direction to psychological investigations. 
In order, however, to get a true conception of the 
Nature of Philosophy and the Province of Logic, 
to which this discussion is preliminary, it is ne- 
cessary to understand the relative position of the 
human reason in the original constitution of hu- 
manity. 



§ 6. 

THE OFFICE OF THE REASON. 

"We are now prepared to institute an inquiry 
into the office of the reason. 



THE OFFICE OF THE REASON. 41 

The office of the reason may be said to be 
threefold : 1. To believe ; 2. To do, or to be ac- 
tive ; and 3. To know. 

These manifestations do not succeed each other 
separately ; they are rather different forms of one 
life in process of unfolding itself. To believe 
implies activity and some perception of an object, 
more or less clear, and this perception is some 
degree of knowledge. To do, or to be active, 
implies a being or entity which is active, and an 
object upon which the activity is directed. To 
know is a rational activity, assuming that there 
is a person who knows, and an object that is 
known. Hence, to believe, to do, and to know, 
as predicates of the reason, are rather in eacb 
other than separate from and successive to eacb 
other. There is an objective order, however, in 
which these manifestations of one life, stand, 
which determines the subjective order in a system 
of thought. That order is the one now stated. 

It is not entirely consistent, however, with phi- 
losophical accuracy to say that the office of reason 
is threefold. The division is reducible; for, to 
believe and to know, are only different forms of 
rational activity. It would be correct to say, there- 
fore, that the office of reason is twofold: 1. To be- 

4* 



42 THE REASON. 

lieve, and 2. To know. But even these two ulti- 
mate forms must not be thought of as separate 
from each other. They are at bottom two general 
attributes of one act ; for knowledge rests on be- 
lief as its basis and is pervaded by it ; and belief 
is properly the incipient stage of knowledge. 



§7. 



THE REASON BELIEVES. 

The human reason begins to be in a state of 
involution. The process of evolution is slow and 
gradual. At first the reason dawns; then be- 
comes brighter ; and, finally, is entirely above the 
horizon. Consciousness, which is the proper 
state of the developed or developing reason, is in 
consequence at first dark or confused ; then it be- 
comes more distinct ; and finally is clear, distin- 
guishing accurately between self and the world, 
and between different objects in the world. 

Now, in every stage of development there is 
one form of rational activity which precedes all 
others: the reason assumes itself and its objects 
to be. This is the first act, or rather it is implied 



THE REASON BELIEVES. 43 

in the whole process of growing consciousness, 
and is a necessity grounded in the nature of 
things. Being is in order to its attributes or ma- 
nifestations, and not the reverse. Life is in order 
to its activity. Substance is in order to its acci- 
dents. The reason is in order to consciousness. 
The reverse order can never have place. The 
activity or manifestations of a living entity are 
never the basis or ground of its life. To suppose 
the manifestations of a being to be in order to 
the being itself, or the phenomenal to be in order 
to the metaphenomenal, as at all possible, throws 
all thinking into confusion : it is an evident ab- 
surdity. Thinking must always proceed upon 
the assumption : a thing is, therefore, it is active 
or manifests itself. Thinking must proceed upon 
this assumption, because such is the constitution 
of the reason which thinks, and such is the con- 
stitution of every object upon which the reason 
thinks, whether created or uncreated. God is, 
therefore He creates and upholds the universe. 
The relation of the reason to consciousness and 
of belief to knowledge, corresponds, therefore, to 
the relation of all being to its manifestations or 
phenomena ; of life to its activity ; and of God to 
all forms of revelation. 



44 THE REASON. 

Accordingly, the first act of the reason presup- 
poses the existence of the reason : the first degree 
of consciousness assumes that the reason is, which 
puts forth an act of consciousness. The assump- 
tion enters into the nature of consciousness as its 
principle ; and every form of expression of con- 
sciousness in language exhibits the presence and 
force of this principle. We say, for example, I 
see ; I see the moon ; I hear ; I hear the music. 
Such an expression of consciousness assumes two 
things : 1. That self which sees through the eye, 
is: J see; and 2. That the object which makes 
an impression or affects the reason through sen- 
sation is also : I see the moon.- Otherwise the ex- 
pression is utterly meaningless. How could a 
child say : I see the moon ; if its rational nature 
did not spontaneously assume both itself and the 
object to be ! And the assumption is as neces- 
sary for the learned philosopher as for the child. 
For neither the existence of self nor of the world, 
can be established by a process of logical proof. 
The first step in a demonstration would involve a 
begging of the question at issue. The simplicity 
of a child is greater wisdom, than the labored 
reasoning of a skeptic in an attempt to prove 



THE REASON BELIEVES. 45 

what the constitution of his nature does not per- 
mit him to doubt. 

Thus both the expression of consciousness, or 
language, as well as the relation of consciousness 
to the reason, establish the position, that reason 
assumes itself to be in the first and every act of 
consciousness. And it assumes the world to be, 
or to have an existence, in the first and every act 
of consciousness of the world. 

It is as expressing this first form of the ac- 
tivity of the reason, that we use the word belief, 
and say : it is the office of the human reason to 
believe; that is, it must hold that to be true 
which it does not comprehend, or which it does 
not know to be true from reasoning or from logi- 
cal proof. With this assumption, which the reason 
makes intuitively, all reflection and legitimate 
metaphysical inquiry begin. Without it, every 
effort at reasoning is self-contradictory. Belief 
is in order to knowledge, and in order to logical 
thinking. 



46 THE REASON. 

§ 8. 

THE ACTIVITY OP THE REASON. 

The activity of the reason is implied in all that 
has thus far been said of its normal development. 
It is implied also in all that follows relating to 
knowledge. Yet it is in place to speak of the 
reason as active, or of its impulse to do, in a sepa- 
rate section. 

The reason is active before it can be said to 
know. In its first stages of development, it has 
a dark sense of itself, of the world, and of God, 
then a confused perception, but not such a clear 
conception as may properly be called knowledge. 
A clear conception of itself and of that which is 
not itself, is consequent upon the process of de- 
velopment advanced to its higher stages. The 
development of the reason is, accordingly, the 
subjective condition of knowledge ; for it is the 
developed reason, not the undeveloped reason, 
which knows. And knowledge, strictly speak- 
ing, is the result of the activity of the reason, not 
the cause. We do not account for the activity of 
a person by the fact that he knows — a fact that 
is only the evidence or manifestation of activity, 



THE ACTIVITY OF THE REASON. 47 

— but we account for his knowledge by the fact, 
that the reason is active normally. For the ac- 
tivity of the reason we account on the ground of 
an inner impulse which is part of its nature. 
This impulse determines the general activity of 
the reason — a process unfolding its manifold 
powers. It also determines its activity in some 
given particular direction. A man does not 
apply himself to the study of sculpture because 
he understands and appreciates the art. But he 
possesses a natural talent, which, either awaken- 
ing of itself under the stimulus of a proper de- 
velopment, or awakened by the influence of some 
special outward occasion, directs his attention to 
this department of the Fine Arts, and impels him 
to concentrate his efforts upon it. A thorough 
knowledge and appreciation of sculpture is thus, 
not the ground, but the consequence of the study 
and practice of the art ; and the study and prac- 
tice of the art is determined, not by knowledge, 
but by an innate tendency of the reason. 

Knowledge, however, reacts upon the reason. 
It does not awaken the reason. It does not im- 
part any essential attributes to the activity of the 
reason. But it modifies its activity. Knowledge 
may stimulate the reason to greater and higher 



48 THE REASON. 

activity, and nourish all its powers. Just as hun- 
ger impels a man to eat, whilst the taste of food 
sharpens and strengthens his appetite. Observa- 
tion and experience may serve also to perfect any 
particular form of activity. A given degree of 
knowledge and skill indicates the point to which 
the genius of a sculptor has been drawn out, and 
qualifies him at the same time to put forth 
greater and better efforts than any he had put 
forth before. "Whilst, therefore, knowledge in 
general, or any particular form of knowledge, is 
the effect of the activity of the reason, knowledge 
in turn produces an effect upon the reason by 
modifying, strengthening, and perfecting its ac- 
tivity. 



§ 9. 

THE REASON KNOWS. 

To know implies a distinction which is to be 
made between subject and object. The subject 
is that which feels or knows, the Ego, or _T, and 
may belong to any order of spiritual or rational 
being. The object is that which is known, and 
embraces all orders and classes of existence: 



THE REASON KNOWS. 49 

God, angels, man, the animal, the vegetable and 
mineral kingdoms, in short, God and the universe. 
Subject and object, now, are correlative concep- 
tions, and can be understood each only in the 
light of the other. 

That is a subject which in feeling or thought 
lies under, and is thus affected by or takes hold 
of something else. The something else is in each 
case the object. That is an object, then, which 
lies before or presents itself to a thinking and 
feeling being. The object, relative to the sub- 
ject, exists independently of the subject; it has 
a nature of its own, and is, therefore, superior 
under this view to the subject. The subject, re- 
lative to the object, is dependent upon the object; 
the possibility of feeling or thinking depends 
upon the subject, but that which the subject feels 
or thinks is determined by the object ; it is, there- 
fore, subordinate to the object. The state of the 
subject is according to the object, but the state of 
the object is according to itself. 

To illustrate the relation, we will take the pro- 
positions: I see the tree; I know the character 
of Washington. The subject is I, or self; the 
object, the tree. In seeing, self is affected by the 
tree through sensation. The possibility and qua- 

5 



50 THE REASON. 

lity of seeing depends on self; but the possibility 
of seeing the tree, depends on the existence and 
presence of the tree. The tree is a tree whether 
seen or not ; but the act of seeing the tree cannot 
be without the tree. The object, relative to the 
subject, is thus independent of the subject and 
superordinate to it. The subject, relative to the 
object, is dependent upon and subordinate to it. 
The object determines, the subject is determined. 
The tree determines self according to what the 
tree is ; whilst self, capable of seeing, yields to 
being determined as to what it sees. When, 
therefore, I say : I see a tree, I, as the subject, 
subordinate myself to the tree, which, as the ob- 
ject, determines me, as to my sensation and con- 
ception, according to what it is independently of 
the act of seeing. So, too, as regards the second 
proposition. The character of Washington is 
what it is whether I know it or not ; and I pos- 
sess the capacity of knowing whether Washing- 
ton lived or not. But when I know his character, 
I as the subject, lay hold of it as the object, and 
am determined, as to the matter or contents of 
my knowledge, by it, according to what it is in it- 
self. 

In both cases, the proposition implies that the 



THE REASON KNOWS. 51 

existence of the object is as certain as that of the 
subject. Here lies a principle in the relation of 
subject to object — of thought to being, — which is 
of fundamental importance to positive philoso- 
phy, a principle that will be more fully unfolded 
in another part of this work. 

The human reason, now, is a subject in rela- 
tion to that which it believes and upon which it 
thinks. That which lies before it, or of which 
it thinks, is the object. The reason lays hold of 
the object, and is determined by the object as to 
the matter of its conceptions and ideas. The 
object, thus apprehended by the activity of the 
reason, comes to exist in the reason. "When the 
object exists in the reason as it exists in itself, 
the reason knows. To know, then, is to possess 
an object in idea as it is in reality; or it is the 
subjective existence of an objective entity. The 
reason holds the object in itself. The object is 
known, and the reason knows ; the one determin- 
ing the contents or matter and the other the form 
of knowledge. Human knowledge is, therefore, 
a union of the reason and its object or objects ; 
in which union the object receives an ideal form 
from the reason, and the reason receives its con- 
tents or the matter of knowledge from the object. 



CHAPTEE H. 

CONSCIOUSNESS. 

§ 10. 

THE OBJECTS OF THE REASON. 

The objects of the human reason may, in the 
first place, be regarded as -twofold: itself and 
that which is not itself; or -the ego and the non- 
ego. The non-ego includes the external visible 
world, or the order of existence lying around 
man ; and God, or the absolute Being from whose 
creative power all things are derived. The non- 
ego must, therefore, be subdivided. Thus the 
objects of the reason become threefold : self, the 
external world, and God. 

But this mode of statement is objectionable. 
It sets self, the world, and God, side by side, as 
if they were co-ordinates; or rather, it seems to 
take self as the centre of things, the point of ob- 



THE OBJECTS OF THE REASON. 53 

servation, from which the division is made, whilst 
in reality self is a relative entity. The ground 
and centre of things is God. God is, therefore, 
the true point of observation from which a cor- 
rect division of knowable objects is to be made. 
Under this view, the division is, in one sense, the 
same as before, namely, threefold : God, self, and 
the world, these being the primary facts of con- 
sciousness to which the mass and endless variety 
of human knowledge are reducible. But the in- 
ternal relation is different. God is the absolute 
entity, to whom self and the world are referred 
as created things, and in the light of whom alone 
these can be truly known. Thus the unity of 
human knowledge finds its last principle in God. 
To each of these primary facts of conscious- 
ness, or knowable objects, man sustains an imme- 
diate relation ; that is, nothing intervenes be- 
tween himself and the object as the condition 
upon which his knowledge depends; but he 
knows in virtue of a direct correspondence be- 
tween himself and the object of knowledge. 



54 CONSCIOUSNESS. 

§11. 

THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF SELF, OR SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS. 

The immediate object of the reason may be 
self, viewed in the totality of its constitution, or 
as comprehending the soul and the body: the 
soul with all its attributes, and the body with all 
its powers and functions. Or, using the term 
soul in a narrower sense, self comprehends body, 
soul, and spirit. 

Self, viewed as the object of the reason, is, 
therefore, 

1. The body, namely, that part of man's consti- 
tution by which he stands in immediate connec- 
tion with the outer world. This connection exists 
through the medium of the senses, the eye, the 
ear, the taste, &c, which as organs of the body 
adapt man to acquire a knowledge of the world, 
and appropriate it to the satisfaction of his wants. 

2. The soul, that is, the higher or immaterial 
part of man, in its immediate relation to, and as 
directly affecting and affected by, the body. Like 
the body, the soul, too, possesses its peculiar 
powers or organs, such as perception, conception, 
judgment, &c, through which it is adapted to its 



CONSCIOUSNESS OF SELF, ETC. 55 

own sphere of action — to know through the 
senses, to reflect on itself, and to use what it 
knows. 

3. The spirit, that is, the higher or immaterial 
part of man, in its immediate relation to and as 
directly apprehending God and supernatural ob- 
jects. Like the soul and the body, the spirit is 
endowed with powers or organs of its own, adapt- 
ing it to the sphere of the supersensible — the in- 
finite — the absolute. The ruling organ of the 
spirit is faith. Faith is to the spirit, what the 
eye or the ear is to the body, or the judgment is 
to the soul. And through the spirit, faith is to 
the soul and the body, what through the body the 
ear is to the soul and the spirit. 

Body, soul, and spirit do not cohere externally, 
but are the constituents of one concrete organic 
whole. The spirit pervades and is active in the 
faculties of the soul and in the members of the 
body ; and the body through sensation modifies 
the conceptions of the soul and the loftiest views 
of the spirit.* 

* According to \ 2, we use the word reason to denote the im- 
material part of man under both aspects — in its relation to the 
sensible and the supersensible spheres of existence. 



56 CONSCIOUSNESS. 

Self is, accordingly, neither a single nor a com- 
pound entity, but a mysterious unity. As such it 
is, under every aspect of its being, its own object. 
Man knows himself. Subject and object, that 
which feels and is felt, which thinks and is 
thought of, are identical. Thus, being both the 
object that is known, and the subject which 
knows, self determines both the matter and the 
form of knowledge. This is self-consciousness. 
In its incipient stage it is but a sense of self. 
Then it becomes a clear conception or a know- 
ledge of self as an existence. As self-conscious- 
ness advances, it begins to be not only a know- 
ledge that self exists, but a knowledge also of 
what self is. In its higher and last stages, self 
exists subjectively as it does objectively ; or the 
reason holds self in idea as it is in reality. 

But as self is related by its constitution to the 
world and to God, self-consciousness cannot be 
developed normally, much less can it become 
complete, by itself. Self-consciousness can be- 
come complete only as unfolded with the know- 
ledge of God as the ground, and the knowledge 
of the world as the condition of self. 



57 



§ 12. 

THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE WORLD, OR WORLD- 
CONSCIOUSNESS. 

"With the sense and the consciousness of self 
arise the sense and consciousness of the external 
world as something different and separate from 
self. The development of the reason and, conse- 
quently, of self-consciousness depends, as we have 
seen (§ 4), upon the normal development of the 
body ; and the normal development of the body 
depends upon a variety of outward natural con- 
ditions. This state of dependence is not acci- 
dental, but belongs to the constitution of man ; 
for he is not an isolated being. He begins to be 
under certain necessary relations to the external 
world; and his whole nature can unfold itself 
normally only under the influence of these rela- 
tions. The reason being thus active sponta- 
neously and acted upon from without, or active 
and passive at the same time, a sense of self and 
of the external world awake simultaneously ; the 
one implies and presupposes the other. The 
incipient stage of self-consciousness is, in conse- 
quence, also the incipient stage of world-con- 



58 CONSCIOUSNESS. 

sciousness ; or self-consciousness and world-con- 
sciousness are but two forms of human conscious- 
ness — two branches growing out of one living 
trunk. 

It follows that the external world is, like self, 
an immediate object of the reason ; that is, no 
third entity intervenes between self as the subject 
and the external world as the object of know- 
ledge. There is an internal correspondence be- 
tween man as a sensuo-rational being, and the 
external world as a knowable object; and his 
sense and conception of the external world as an 
objective entity, different from himself, spring 
directly out of this reciprocal relation. In other 
words, the knowledge of the existence of the 
outer world is neither the result of reflection nor 
a conclusion derived from any process of reason- 
ing. On the contrary, man has a certain know- 
ledge of its existence before he begins to reflect; 
and this knowledge constitutes the basis upon 
which all reflection rests, and upon which every 
inductive process of investigation into the nature 
and laws of the world, must proceed. 

Here we are confronted by the sceptical theory 
that the immediate object of the reason is, not 
the external world itself, but only the sensations 



THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE WORLD, ETC. 59 

which we have of it. The theory proceeds upon 
a dualistic view of human nature, body and soul 
being regarded, not as integral parts of an or- 
ganic unity, but as in some sense separate orders 
of being, which are held in juxtaposition in some 
uudeflnable way. Hence, in an inquiry into the 
relation of man to the outer world in knowledge, 
the body seems to intervene as another something 
that does not belong essentially to either. 

This species of dualism involves a confusion of 
subject and object, an integral part of the subject 
being taken for the object. It involves also a 
confusion of condition and object. The outer 
world is the object; and sensation is the subjec- 
tive condition of a knowledge of it. The body 
is the organ of the reason — that by which self 
is directly connected and holds communion with 
sensible realities. 

That the theory is both unphilosophical and 
false follows both from the nature of man consi- 
dered as a whole, and from the nature of sensa- 
tion considered by itself. 

If body and soul enter into the constitution of 
man as essential parts of a living organic whole, 
the senses must be regarded, in the discussion of 
world-consciousness, not as belonging to the ob- 



60 CONSCIOUSNESS. 

ject, but as belonging to the subject. Whilst the 
body and the soul are specifically different, and 
we must therefore distinguish between them, we 
dare not separate them and hold them asunder as 
if they were not vitally one. The body with all 
its sensations is a part of self, no less than the 
reason with all its faculties. Hence a person re- 
fers seeing, an activity of the body, to himself, no 
less than thinking, an activity of the reason ; both 
activities being predicates of the same persona- 
lity. "We say : I see a horse, and, / think of 
God. The one is no less a spontaneous, natural, 
and true form of expression than the other. Phi- 
losophical accuracy does not' require us to say : 
the eye sees a horse, or, my eye sees a horse, as if 
the eye were itself the subject, or a separate sub- 
ject from the personality which puts forth the act. 
That sensation is not the immediate object of 
consciousness follows also from the nature of sen- 
sation itself. A simple sensation is a change in 
the state of the sense, or an affection of the sense ; 
or, call it an impression made upon an organ of 
the body and through it upon the mind. Accept 
either form of definition, and two things are im- 
plied: a subject in which the change takes place, 
and an object which in some way produces the 



ETC. 61 

change: a subject affected, and an object affecting: 
a subject receiving an impression, and an object 
making an impression. ~We cannot think of the 
one without thinking of the other also. The two 
things are correlative, as really as father and son. 
The very conception of sensation always implies 
the existence of something outside of the sense 
which excites it or causes the sensation ; that is, 
it implies the existence of an object. This is the 
only meaning of the word. An object is that 
which lies before or against, and affects or im- 
presses, the sense and the reason. To say, there- 
fore, that not the external world but sensation 
itself is the immediate object of consciousness, 
involves a confusion of thought and a contradic- 
tion of terms. Sensation is but the first and 
lowest form of the activity of one indivisible 
being, under which the reason comes into imme- 
diate contact with the order of sensible things 
which lies around and outside of it. 

Under this form of activity, a knowledge of 
the outer world is acquired. To acquire such 
knowledge implies an idea of its objective exist- 
ence, and the power of transferring it in concep- 
tion to the sphere of thought. It is transferred 
by the reason in virtue of sensation as the ncccs- 

6 



62 CONSCIOUSNESS. 

sary condition upon which the activity of the 
reason depends. Thus transferred, the reason 
holds its object, the outer world, in its own 
sphere. And this knowledge is true and perfect 
in proportion to the correspondence of the world 
as it is in idea to the world as it is in reality. 



§ 13. 

-THE CONSCIOUSNESS OP GOD, OR GOD-CONSCIOUSNESS. 

The human reason is not an ultimate entity ; 
but in feeling and thought refers itself intuitively 
to God as its ground. § 5. What does this rela- 
tion involve ? 

The original ground of a being is that from 
which a being derives its existence and nature. 

The relation is necessary. The being is what 
it is, both in itself and in its relation to other 
things, only in virtue of its ground. 

The relation is fundamental. It is the first 
relation in the order of nature; and the basis, 
therefore, of all other relations. All other rela- 
tions are possible only in consequence of this. 

The relation is reciprocal. The ground deter- 
mines the nature and relations of the being ; and 



THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF GOD, ETC. 63 

the nature and relations of the being demand the 
determining force of the ground. 

The relation is immediate. Nothing intervenes 
between the ground and the being as a condition 
upon which the nature of the being depends. 
The being has the condition of its existence in 
the ground only. 

There is, in consequence, an inward adaptation 
of the activity and attributes of a being to its 
ground, an adaptation that lies in the essence of 
the being, and is more intimate than the adapta- 
tion of a being to any other relation or to any 
other object. 

As the relation of the reason, an order of 
created spirit, to God, the absolute Creator, is 
that of a being to its original ground, it involves 
the particulars which have now been stated. 

The relation of the human reason to God is 
necessary. The reason is what it is because of 
God who has given it being. Hence it cannot 
put forth a normal act of self-consciousness with- 
out recognizing or implying the existence of God. 
God is ; therefore the reason is. God is, and the 
reason is from God ; therefore the developed rea- 
son has an idea of God, and must have an idea of 
God. 



64 CONSCIOUSNESS. 

The relation is fundamental. The first in the 
order of its being and activity, the reason sustains 
other relations in virtue of this as their basis. 
Hence the idea of God underlies all other ideas. 
A true idea of self and of other objects is pos- 
sible only when it rests in a true idea of God. 

The relation is reciprocal. God determines the 
nature of the reason ; He determines its relation 
to Himself, to itself, and to the world ; and the 
nature, the relations, and the office of the reason, 
demand the determining influence of God with 
inward necessity. 

The relation is immediate. The reason refers 
itself to God under all the forms of its activity in 
virtue of its nature ; that is, no third entity inter- 
venes between the reason and God from which 
the idea of God is derived. If the reason be but 
normally developed, the idea is evolved out of its 
own being as an original element, or an imme- 
diate fact, of consciousness. 

There is, in consequence, an inward adaptation 
of the essence and laws of the reason to God. 
And God alone meets the first and deepest want 
of man in all the spheres and relations of life. 

These principles must follow from a correct 
idea of creation. God, a personal infinite Spirit, 



NECESSITY AND UNITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS. 05 

is the Creator, and man, a sensuo-rational being, 
is His creature. That is to say, God is the 
ground of the reason of man, and the reason is 
grounded in God. Thus He is immediately be- 
fore man as an object upon which His spirit fixes 
its eye ; and the spirit seeks to attain to a con- 
ception of Him corresponding to what He is in 
Himself. 



§ 14. 

THE NECESSITY AND UNITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS. 

The mass of human knowledge being reducible 
to three primary elements, self, the world, and 
God, we have unfolded a threefold consciousness : 
self-consciousness, world-consciousness, and God- 
consciousness. A threefold consciousness arises 
from a threefold relation in which the reason 
stands in virtue of the constitution of man. The 
threefold relation is necessary ; it is not the result 
of will or choice, nor a consequence of know- 
ledge, but it springs directly out of what man is 
as a part of the universal whole, the creation of 
God. 

Hence the threefold consciousness which is de- 
6* 



66 CONSCIOUSNESS. 

termined by this threefold relation, is necessary 
also. It is not optional with the reason whether 
it will have any primary ideas or not, nor whether 
it will have but one or two, for example, the idea 
of self and of the world, but not the idea of God. 
It has them before volition to the contrary is 
possible, because the law of human life operates 
spontaneously and with irresistible force from the 
moment of birth; and once unfolded no amount 
of resolution or effort can ever root them out. 
The sceptic himself has them. If he had them 
not — if he had not the idea of the world, for in- 
stance, he could not doubt its reality ; as little as 
a sane man could disinherit* his son, if he did 
not believe himself to be a father. So too with 
the atheist. It is only because a man has the 
idea of God, that he can pronounce that idea a lie, 
and argue against God's existence. An atheistic 
system, paradoxical as it may sound, is neverthe- 
less built on the idea that God is; true, in the 
way of negation and opposition ; yet a man can- 
not deny that of which he has no idea, nor op- 
pose that which he does not suppose to exist. 
The possibility of a negative always depends 
upon the assumption of a positive. 

The ideas of God, of self, and the world, are 



NECESSITY AND UNITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS. G7 

necessary ideas, accordingly, in the strongest and 
deepest sense of the term. They are elements 
which are interwoven with the whole mass of 
human knowledge, and, in some way or other, 
lie at the foundation of every system, whether of 
truth or error. 

But they are not separate or separable ideas. 
The reason has not three kinds of consciousness, 
externally related. The original elements of con- 
sciousness, like the constituents of man's being, 
make a unity. There is but one consciousness, 
branching out, however, into three directions, in 
obedience to the threefold fundamental relation 
immanent in man's constitution. With the sense 
of self, awakes the sense of the world and of God. 
And with the idea of self arises the idea of the 
world and of God. Hence these primary ideas 
also imply each other reciprocally. The idea of 
self implies the idea of the world ; and the re- 
verse. The idea of God implies the idea of self; 
and the reverse. Implying each other, they con- 
dition the process of development. The idea of 
God, though fundamental to other ideas and to 
all true knowledge, is unfolded and becomes 
clear and full in the degree that the idea of self 
and the world is unfolded at the same time. 



68 CONSCIOUSNESS. 

There cannot be a true idea of God and a false 
idea of self, as there can be no true idea of self 
and a false idea of God. So there can be no full 
development of God-consciousness and but a par- 
tial development of self-consciousness. The de- 
velopment of the one goes forward in necessary 
connection with the development of the other. 
For primary ideas are internally related as parts 
of a whole, and thus necessitate the unity of con- 
sciousness ; self-consciousness, world- conscious- 
ness, and God-consciousness being but different 
manifestations of human consciousness. 



§ 15. 

THE RELATION OF FAITH TO CONSCIOUSNESS. 

"We must recur to a principle discussed in § 7. 
The existence of the reason is in order to its de- 
velopment. The development of the reason is in 
order to consciousness. And the existence of 
any object is in order to a manifestation and to a 
consciousness of that object. That is to say, the 
reason is before it can be active or know ; and a 
knowable object is before the reason can know it 
through its phenomena. We need not attempt 



RELATION OF FAITH TO CONSCIOUSNESS. 69 

anything more than a simple statement of the 
principle ; for it is self-evident, though frequently 
ignored in systems of philosophy. The principle 
is a fundamental law of the objective order of 
things ; and to this fundamental law the activity 
of the reason conforms spontaneously in con- 
sciousness. 

"When, therefore, I say : I know myself, I know 
the outer world, I know God, the reason neces- 
sarily assumes three other propositions to be cer- 
tainly true, namely, I am, the outer world is, and 
God is. This necessary assumption is an intui- 
tive belief — a belief, because it holds that for 
truth which is seen as such without proof, and 
intuitive, because it springs directly from the 
nature of the reason. Consciousness accordingly 
is grounded in the principle of faith. It implies 
the certain existence both of object and subject. 
The reason does not believe in the existence of 
an objective entity in consequence of a know- 
ledge of it ; but the reason knows it to exist, and 
may know what it is, in consequence of a belief 
in its existence. 

The relation of faith to consciousness, is the 
relation of a life-power to its immediate opera- 
tion; there is, therefore, no succession of the 



70 CONSCIOUSNESS. 

latter to the former, wliicli is perceptible to the 
understanding. 

As belief is in order to consciousness, and con- 
sciousness is threefold, it follows that a threefold 
consciousness is grounded in a threefold belief — 
in the belief that self is, that the outer world is, 
and that God is. The primary ideas are but the 
forms under which these intuitive beliefs of the 
reason arise in consciousness. The idea of self, 
for example, is the form under which the intui- 
tive belief that self is, comes to view in con- 
sciousness during the process of normal develop- 
ment. So, too, of the idea of the world and of 
God. As man is a unity, these several beliefs 
are reducible to one principle or power, that is 
active in and pervades the three fundamental re- 
lations in which he stands. 

The endless variety and all possible degrees ot 
human knowledge are comprehended in a three- 
fold consciousness. A threefold consciousness is 
reducible to three primary ideas which the reason 
evolves out of itself. These primary ideas are 
the forms under which the necessary beliefs of 
the reason come to view. And these beliefs are 
but one principle active in different relations. 
The whole compass of human knowledge is thus 



RELATION OF FAITH TO CONSCIOUSNESS. 71 

reducible to the power of one principle, which is 
faith ; — a principle in man that not only the 
mysteries of religion, but all philosophy, every 
department of science, and every process of logi- 
cal proof or mathematical calculation presuppose. 
There is no room, therefore, for a consistent 
system of negative philosophy. To construct a 
system at all, the reason must assume some pro- 
position as fundamental, that is, receive it as a 
primary truth; but in making the assumption, 
and yet holding that the certain existence of an 
object cannot be known, or that the reason can- 
not receive anything as true without a demon- 
stration, the system contains two self-contradic- 
tory positions; and is, in consequence, self- 
destructive. But a positive philosophy may be 
consistent throughout. It may be true both to the 
objective nature of things, and to all the demands 
of the reason. 



CHAPTEK in. 

THE NATURE OF PHILOSOPHY. 

§ 16. 

THE CONCEPTION OE PHILOSOPHY. 

The first impulse of the human reason is to 
believe ; then it becomes an effort to know in the 
strength of its belief, or of -its intuitive primary 
ideas; that is, to form a conception of its objects, 
or to hold single things in the sphere of thought 
as they exist in reality. 

This incipient knowledge, however, does not 
by itself satisfy the deeper demands of the reason. 
It only prepares the way for a higher kind of 
knowledge. It serves to unfold the impulse of 
the reason to know according to a twofold order 
of law : first, according to the laws which under- 
lie and determine the essential nature and rela- 
tions of being ; and secondly, according- to the 



THE FORM OF PHILOSOPHY. 73 

laws which determine the activity of the reason 
or the laws of thinking. Thus we get the con- 
ception of Philosophy ; which is the deepest and 
most comprehensive form of knowledge. 



§ IT. 

THE FORM OF PHILOSOPHY. 

Philosophy as a form of knowledge implies a 
peculiar relation of subject and object, of that 
which knows and that which is known. The 
subject is the human reason, or that which thinks. 
The reason thinks, or is active, from a necessity 
of its nature, impelling it to approach, inquire 
into, and reproduce its object according to its in- 
tuitive ideas and its own laws. 

These intuitive ideas are the inner forms of ob- 
jective existence which the reason in the process 
of normal development evolves out of itself; or 
that in the conscious subject answering to the 
nature of the object. The laws of the reason are 
each a necessity determining the manner of its 
activity ; and are called the laws of thinking. It 
cannot think of any object but in conformity to 

these laws. 

7 



74 THE NATURE OF PHILOSOPHY. 

Freely obeying the impulse to know, the reason 
finds the counterpart or prototype of its intuitive 
ideas in its objects, and reproduces them or gives 
them an existence in itself, the process of repro- 
ducing them, or of giving the object a place in 
the subject, being determined by the laws of 
thinking. Philosophy derives its form accord- 
ingly from the ideas and laws of the human 
reason. 



§ 18. 

THE MATTER OF PHILOSOPHY. 

The matter of philosophy is the object of the 
reason reproduced according to the laws of think- 
ing. As constituting the matter of philosophy 
the object of the reason is being; not a single 
thing, nor a class of things, nor even various 
classes of things in their reciprocal relations, but 
being as such, that is, being in its necessity and 
generality. For the reason does not only assume 
that there is an objective existence, but that this 
objective existence is an organic order of things 
resting on an absolute ground, in virtue of which 
the organic order is what it is. 



TUB MATTER OF PHILOSOPHY. 75 



The Necessity of Being. 

The necessity of being consists in this, that it is 
itself and cannot be anything but itself. Neces- 
sity is absolute or relative. 

An absolute necessity — absolute, from ah and 
solvere, to be loose or free from everything but 
itself — is predicable of a being that, grounded in 
itself, is not determined nor conditioned by any- 
thing but itself. Such necessity holds only in 
God. 

A relative necessity — relative, from re and ferre 
to bear or carry back to something else — is predi- 
cated of a being that is derived ; the necessity of 
its nature and relations being determined by that 
from which it is derived. Such necessity holds 
in every created object. 

Philosophy has to do with being, both in its 
relative and its absolute necessity ; but it always 
seeks to resolve the relative into the absolute, or 
to know the relative as determined by the abso- 
lute ; for it is the tendency of the reason to re- 
duce all its objects to their ultimate ground, and 
from this to deduce their nature, essential attri- 
butes, and relations. 



76 THE NATURE OE PHILOSOPHY. 

The Generality of Being. 

The generality of being is that which underlies 
and identifies all particular entities and pheno- 
mena in every objective sphere. In virtue of this, 
individuals are reducible to species, species to 
genera, genera to more comprehensive genera; 
or genera are reducible to classes, classes to 
orders, and orders to kingdoms or grand divisions. 

The objective is susceptible, however, of still 
farther reduction. In every objective subordi- 
nate sphere or grand division of being, the less 
general is successively reducible to the more 
general, until it resolves itself into that which is 
most general and comprehensive, and therefore 
common to all the individuals belonging to the 
given division. And all spheres or grand divi- 
sions of created being, whether rational or irra- 
tional, are in turn reducible to that which is 
deeper and broader than themselves — to that con- 
sequently which is common to and pervades all 
created objects. 

In virtue of a common principle which is thus 
discoverable in these innumerable objects, they 
constitute, when taken as a whole, a unit, or the 
universe, which in all its departments and single 



THE MATTER OF PHILOSOPHY. 77 

parts is the embodiment and expression of the 
wisdom, power, and goodness of the Creator. 
These attributes are again reducible to the Divine 
Will ; which, as it brought the universe into ex- 
istence out of nothing, has left its impress no less 
upon the worm or a blade of grass than upon the 
noblest man or the most exalted angel. 

The process of generalization recedes thus from 
the lowest through ever widening circles, until 
the reason is able to hold all circles of entities, 
whether organic or inorganic, material or imma- 
terial, natural or moral, each in its co-ordinate 
and subordinate relations to others, under one 
most comprehensive conception. Until the rea- 
son can comprehend each circle of entities, or 
sphere of being, in its relation to its principle 
and to all others, or until it can comprehend all 
spheres of being, each in its relation to the rest 
and to an absolute principle, which pervades 
them all in common, its deepest wants are not 
satisfied ; for it is the tendency of the reason not 
only to reduce each object and sphere of being to 
its ultimate ground, but also, what is its correla- 
tive act, to discover the identity of all specific 
differences, or to determine the unity in the 
greatest multiplicity. 



78 THE NATURE OF PHILOSOPHY. 

Necessity and generality do not cohere but in- 
here in being. They are not separable attributes. 
The one is the correlate of the other. Necessity 
is general, and generality is necessary. Implying 
each other, they are but different aspects of a 
unity ; and in their union may be said to consti- 
tute the law of beins;. 



§ 19. 

THE MATTER OF PHILOSOPHY ARISING UNDER A 
THREEFOLD INQUIRY. 

The matter of philosophy as including the ne- 
cessity and generality of being, arises under a 
threefold inquiry : what ? why ? how ? correspond- 
ing to the threefold fundamental activity of the 
reason: conception, judgment, and reasoning. 

The First Inquiry, corresponding to Conception. 

What? or what is it ? The understanding seeks 
to bound off each object from all others; and thus 
forms a definite conception of it. This concep- 
tion includes all its essential, in distinction from 
its accidental attributes; and at the same time 
excludes the attributes which are essential to other 



THE MATTER OF PHILOSOPHY, ETC. 79 

objects. "With a correct answer to this form of 
inquiry any particular investigation of philosophy 
begins. For the reason seeks first of all to dis- 
tinguish the object of investigation accurately 
and clearly from every other. Without such 
distinction any attempt at inductive or deductive 
reasoning involves thought in confusion. 

The Second Inquiry, corresponding to Judgment. 

Why ? or why is it ? The reason inquires 
spontaneously : "What is the principle or ground, 
and what is the end or design of the object ? To 
have a definite conception of an object does not 
suffice. It strives to know the nature of things. 
To know the nature of a thing is to refer it to its 
proximate generality, or to know it as the indi- 
vidualization of some general law or principle. 
Anything short of this is not satisfactory. The 
perception of an oak simply as an isolated object 
possessing solidity, size, and form, is only condi- 
tional to an inquiry into the nature of the oak — 
into that which is more general than itself. For 
the general constitutes the nature of the particu- 
lar. The nature of the oak is that of the tree ; 
the nature of the tree that of the plant ; and the 
nature of the plant that of an organism. Each 



80 THE NATURE OF PHILOSOPHY; 

is a modification of what is more general than 
itself. The reason forms, therefore, on the one 
hand, a conception of the single oak, and on the 
other, seeks to know it as a tree ; then seeks to 
know the tree as a plant, and the plant as an or- 
ganism ; for only when it refers the individual to 
the species, and the species to the genus, does it 
see clearly why the essential attrihutes of the in- 
dividual are what they are. It knows that which 
underlies the single object and determines it to 
be itself. This is its nature. 

Thus to refer the individual to the particular, 
and the particular to the general, is to judge. 
Judgment consists in distinguishing the particu- 
lar from the general, and holding both together 
as a whole. When the particular is the subject, 
the general is the predicate ; and judgment is 
inductive ; as, The lily is a flower. When the 
general is the subject, the particular is the predi- 
cate ; and judgment is deductive ; as, God is holy. 
A regular scries of inductive judgments is retro- 
gressive ; the reason looks at each conception 
successively in the light of one that is deeper and 
more general, thus running back until it forms a 
judgment whose predicate cannot in turn be re- 
cognized as a particular and taken as the subject 



Till: MATTER OF PHILOSOPHY, ETC. 81 

of another more general judgment. This predi- 
cate then becomes the ultimate and most satisfac- 
tory answer to the question, Why ? 

The Third Inquiry , corresponding/ to Reasoning. 

How? or how is it? An inquiry into the ne- 
cessity of a thing is associated with another. The 
reason has an idea of mode of being, of manner 
of development, or of a way in which a thing 
comes to be what it is, and of a relation which 
one thing sustains to another, as well as of a 
ground principle from which it is unfolded. For 
simple existence implies a mode of existence, de- 
velopment a manner of development, and succes- 
sion an order of succession. Both enter into the 
nature of a tiling. And the demands of reason 
are not met until it has a knowledge of both as 
united in its object. Hence when philosophy in- 
quires: Why? or what is the ground principle? 
What is the necessity of a thing? it inquires also: 
How? or what is its mode of existence or acti- 
vity? What is its manner of development, or 
the order of succession? Or how does it come 
to be what it is ? 

These two forms of inquiry are not identical ; 
neither are they separable ; but one implies the 



82 THE NATURE OF PHILOSOPHY. 

other. The matter of philosophy does not arise 
accordingly under three separate questions which 
are mechanically connected ; but it arises under 
a threefold form of one inquiry of the human rea- 
son, each form presupposing, in order to a correct 
and complete answer, the necessity of an answer 
also to the other two. 

This last form of inquiry corresponds to and 
calls forth an act of reasoning. The reason draws 
a conclusion. In answer to, what ? it acquires a 
definite conception of a given particular. In 
answer to, why ? it discovers the necessity of the 
particular, or the general in which the particular 
is grounded. In answer to how ? it discovers the 
manner in which the predicate of the general 
becomes the predicate of the particular. As the 
question, how? implies the question, why? and 
vice versa, so does an act of reasoning, or a con- 
clusion, imply an act of judgment. The reason 
must distinguish the particular from the general 
before it can ascribe the same predicate to both. 
And an act of judgment is subordinate to and 
completes itself in an act of reasoning. Com- 
prehending the particular under the general, the 
reason seeks to ascribe the same predicate to 
both, that is, to identify their attributes : a result 
that is reached by the process of reasoning. 



83 



§ 20. 

CORRESPONDENCE OF THE FORM TO THE MATTER OF 
PHILOSOPHY. 

The fundamental operations and laws of the 
reason determine the threefold inquiry into the 
objective nature of being. And through this 
legitimate process the reason gives form to philo- 
sophy. 

The matter of philosophy arises from the na- 
ture of being, the object of thought; and it arises 
in the development of the form. The form is not 
developed without the matter, and the matter is 
not developed without the form. Philosophy is 
the concretion, or union, of these two elements 
in its inception and at every stage of its progress. 

Philosophy being a concretion of form and 
matter, it implies a necessary correspondence of 
these two different elements. The matter reci- 
procates the demands of the form. And this re- 
ciprocal relation in philosophy rests in a reciprocal 
relation between the constitution of the subject 
and that of the object. The reason which thinks, 
and being which is thought of, correspond to 
each other. The essence and laws of being reci- 
procate the primary ideas and laws of the reason. 



84 THE NATUKE OF PHILOSOPHY. 

Hence the object, the essential nature of being, 
suffers no violence when reproduced and held in 
idea according to the laws of thought ; and the 
subject, the human reason, suffers no violence 
when the matter of its scientific knowledge is 
determined entirely by the nature and laws of 
being. On the contrary, the nature of being is 
in itself adapted to and demands a reproduction 
under a form which the laws of thinking deter- 
mine. Under no other form can its objective 
nature be known. And the deepest wants of the 
reason are not fully met until it comes into pos- 
session of a knowledge the matter of which is at 
all points determined by the essence and laws of 
being. 

The union of form and matter in philosophy 
is, therefore, to be regarded as in perfect har- 
mony with the intrinsic demands of subject and 
object, of reason and being, the laws according to 
which the subject thinks being complemental to 
the laws according to which the object exists. 



§ 21. 

THE NATURE OF PHILOSOPHY DEFINED. 

The matter of philosophy arises, as we have 
seen, under a threefold inquiry. The result of 



THE NATURE OF PHILOSOPHY DEFINED. 85 

this inquiry, conducted according to the laws of 
thinking, is a scientific knowledge of the essen- 
tial nature and relations of the object of reason. 
This is philosophy. The object may be the rea- 
son itself. Philosophy then becomes the science 
of the reason — a particular branch of philosophy ; 
and as such, is required to determine what the 
reason is, why it knows, how it knows, and solve 
all the problems which arise under these general 
questions. 

Or the object may be the outer world, the visi- 
ble creation as a whole, or any part of it, as the 
earth, the vegetable or animal kingdom, or any 
subordinate division. Philosophy then becomes 
the science of nature, of the earth, of plants or 
of animals, or Natural Science, Geology, Botany, 
Zoology, and so forth. 

But the object may also be the universe viewed 
as an organic totality, including the reason, the 
outer world, as well as all possible orders and 
forms of existence. This is philosophy as such, 
or philosophy taken in its widest sense ; and may 
be defined to be the science of being. As the 
Science of Being, philosophy is required to deter- 
mine the necessity and generality of the universal 
order of things: the relation of each single thing 



86 THE NATURE OP PHILOSOPHY. 

to the subordinate order of existence in which it 
inheres, the relation of one subordinate order to 
another and to all others, and the relation of all 
orders or systems of things to their common 
ground. 

Fundamental to the solution of these problems 
is the position of the human reason itself. What 
is the relative position of the human reason in 
the universal system of things ? "What is its re- 
lation to itself and to all knowable objects? 
With the solution of this problem, any particular 
system of philosophy, in order to be legitimate, 
whether true or false, must begin. The solution 
becomes the principle that permeates and modi- 
fies every investigation, and . determines the cha- 
racter of all its results. 



§ 22. 

RECAPITULATION. 

Defining philosophy to be the Science of 
Being, we have three elements which enter into 
its nature : 

1. Its form, which is derived from the human 
reason. The reason knows, and can know only, 



RECAPITULATION. 87 

according to its primary ideas, and laws of 
thought. Its knowledge of objective existence 
assumes shape and order therefore under its own 
moulding power. Hence philosophy is Science 
in the highest sense of the word. 

2. Its contents or matter, which is derived 
from, and determined by, the nature of the ob- 
ject. Subject and object, or the reason and its 
objects, are not identical, unless the object be the 
reason itself; but even here we must distinguish 
between the objective nature of the reason as a 
being and the laws of thought according to which 
it becomes conscious of itself. The matter of 
philosophy is not, therefore, the ideas of the 
human reason, but being as it is in itself, repro- 
duced under the formative influence of these 
ideas. 

3. The legitimate union of form and matter. 
This depends upon a correspondence or recipro- 
city of subject and object, or of the laws of think- 
ing and the laws of being. To know a thing 
according to the laws of thought is to know it 
also according to its own nature. 

Philosophy is, therefore, being as it is in itself, 
or the necessity and generality of being, existing 
under a form which is determined by the ideas 
and laws of the human reason. 



CHAPTEK IV. 

A TRUE SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY. 

§ 23. 

THE CONDITIONS OF TRUE PHILOSOPHY. 

The nature of philosophy is the nature of true 
philosophy ; though, strictly speaking, there is no 
room for the distinction between true and false 
philosophy. For philosophy is true philosophy, 
in the nature of the case. If it be not true as to 
form and matter, it cannot properly be called 
philosophy ; it is only a system of vain specula- 
tion, or philosophy "falsely so called." Yet as 
there are many false systems of speculation which 
pretend to be true philosophy, it is necessary and 
proper to endeavor to draw the line of distinction 
between a true and a false system. 

As philosophy is the product of thinking, and 
thinking is the activity of reason, it follows that 



THE CONDITIONS OF TRUE PHILOSOPHY. 89 

a true system of philosophy hinges on the true 
position of the human reason. As the reason 
sustains a relation to itself, to the world, and to 
God, and has in consequence a fixed relative posi- 
tion in the objective order of the universe, it must 
occupy a place corresponding to this threefold 
relation in a true subjective system of thinking. 
To determine the true position of the human reason 
becomes, therefore, the fundamental problem in 
philosophy. This resolves itself into three pri- 
mary questions : 

1. What is the first principle of philosophical 
thinking ? 

2. What is a true conception of the human 
reason ? 

3. And what is the relation of reason to the 
outer world, or of reason to its objects ? 

A true system of philosophy presupposes a cor- 
rect answer to these three questions, each answer 
being a necessaiy condition upon which the evo- 
lution of truth by the reason depends. 

As the first two questions are very intimately 
related, we will consider them together. The 
third we will consider separately. For the sake 
of clearness we shall therefore conduct the dis- 
cussion of the subject of the present chapter in 



90 A TKUE SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY. 

two sections ; the first section treating of the first 
two conditions, and the second section, of the 
third condition of true philosophy. 



SECTION I. 

THE PRINCIPLE OF PHILOSOPHY AND THE 
POSITION OF THE REASON. 

§ 24. 

WHAT IS THE FIRST PRINCIPLE OF PHILOSOPHY? 

The first principle of philosophy is not the 
human reason ; for it is not the common centre 
or ultimate ground of the universal whole. 
Though a scientific knowledge of the universe to 
the degree that it is attainable, is its own legiti- 
mate product, as the acorn is the product of the 
oak, yet, objectively considered, the reason is but 
a part of the universal whole ; it is a subordinate 
order of created being ; and must, therefore, to 
be true to itself and its relations, have a concep- 
tion of itself corresponding to its objective subor- 
dinate relation to the absolute ground of all 
things. This absolute ground is God, the Crea- 



THE RELATIVE POSITION OF THE REASON. 91 

tor alike of the outer world and of the human 
reason. 

God is, therefore, the first principle of philoso- 
phy, whom the reason must know in order to a 
true scientific knowledge both of itself and of all 
other orders of being. For it can be laid down 
as an axiom, that what is the ultimate ground of 
the objective order of things must constitute the 
first principle in a valid subjective system. 
Otherwise any system of philosophy is destitute 
of truth ; it is nothing but a web of abstract spe- 
culation woven by an arbitrary imagination, and 
producing more confusion than unthinking igno- 
rance itself. 



§ 25. 

WHAT IS THE RELATIVE POSITION OF THE REASON? 

An answer to the first question, prepares the 
way for an answer to the second. 

As the author of the human reason is God, the 
reason must be referred to God as the ground 
from which it derives its being and attributes. 
It cannot be known from itself; no more than a 
tree can be known without a conception of the 



92 A TRUE SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY. 

vegetable kingdom. A true idea of the reason 
depends accordingly upon a true idea of God. 
The nature of philosophy itself drives us to this 
conclusion. Philosophy proceeding according to 
the laws of thinking, always refers a species to its 
genus, an effect to its cause, a consequence to its 
ground, and determines a conception of the latter 
by that of the former. In reflecting on itself the 
reason must proceed according to the same order. 
It is a particular species of created spirit. God 
is the infinite creative Spirit. On the same prin- 
ciple, therefore, that reason refers a particular to 
a general and a consequence to a ground, must it 
refer itself to God ; and on the same principle 
that a conception of a vegetable is conditional to 
a conception of a tree, or a conception of a 
ground to that of its consequence, is a true idea 
of God, the Creator, conditional to a true idea of 
the human reason. 

To admit the principles of a sound Theism, 
and yet seek to evolve a true idea of reason from 
itself only, and refuse to view it in the light of 
its absolute ground, is in effect to make it, in- 
stead of God, the common centre of all orders of 
being and thus violate the very laws of thinking, 
conformity to which all philosophy presupposes. 



THE FIRST TWO CONDITIONS, ETC. 93 



§ 26. 

THE FIRST TWO CONDITIONS IN THEIR RELATION TO 
PHILOSOPHY. 

Taking a true idea of God as the first prin- 
ciple, and determining the idea of the reason and 
of its relative position by the idea of God, a true 
system of philosophy becomes possible. The 
ultimate ground of the reason and of the uni- 
verse, is then the point of observation from which 
the reason views itself, the outer world, and God. 
Reason is held consciously in its normal subordi- 
nate relation to God, w T ho is the first principle of 
philosophy. In other words, the position which 
God holds and the human reason holds in idea, 
corresponds to the position which God and the 
human reason hold respectively in reality. Rea- 
son may then go forth on its high mission, roam- 
ing through the illimitable regions of objective 
existence, and everywhere, to the extent that it 
can answer its inquiries, come into possession of 
the truth. The true philosopher — to take an apt 
illustration — is like the astronomer who, contrary 
to the apparent position of the earth, believes the 
sun to be the centre of the planetary system ; the 



94 A TRUE SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY. 

real centre of the objective order of nature be- 
comes the point of departure in the science of 
nature, the earth being regarded but as a subor- 
dinate orb, upon which the light of the sun 
shines directly and its rays are reflected also from 
innumerable other worlds. Although his abode 
is upon the earth, yet as he takes the sun to be 
the principle of his system and knows the rela- 
tive position of the earth, he can make correct 
observations upon the heavens from a subordi- 
nate sphere and construct a true system of astro- 
nomy. He knows the true relative position of 
the earth because he knows the central relation 
of the sun. Astronomy, or a true science of the 
heavens, then becomes possible. 

A true system of philosophy depends, there- 
fore, upon a correct Theology. The reason must 
know God before, properly speaking, it can 
know itself or the outer world scientifically. If it 
does not know God or has a false idea of God, it 
cannot know itself truly, nor can it form a cor- 
rect conception of its relative position. A false 
system of philosophy follows as a necessary con- 
sequence. Taking itself as the centre of its sys- 
tem of thinking, it stands in a false relation to 
God and to all other objects of thought. Its 



ETC. 95 

views are distorted. It looks at everything under 
a false aspect. The system may proceed strictly 
according to the laws of thinking ; it may he logi- 
cal throughout; yet the final results will he false, 
because the point of observation is false. 

A false philosopher is like the man who be- 
lieves the earth, the orb on which he lives, to be 
the centre of a system of worlds, because the sun, 
moon, and stars apparently revolve around it. 
With this idea, as the principle of his system, he 
may make careful observations upon the heavens 
and conduct his calculations strictly according to 
the laws of Mathematics, yet all his deductions, 
his views of his own position, of the position of 
the sun, the real centre of things, and his views 
of the relative position of every star, must be 
false. To say that the earth must be the point of 
observation and the centre of a rational system 
because it is the place of his actual abode, passes 
for nothing with every scientific naturalist. An 
observer cannot know the relative position of the 
earth, just because he does not know nor acknow- 
ledge the central relation of the sun. The paral- 
lel holds good throughout. To say that because 
philosophy is the product of thinking, the reason 
must ignore the central relation of God and start 



96 A TRUE SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY. 

with its own hypotheses of itself and its objects, 
thus making itself a subordinate order of exist- 
ence, the centre of its system of ratiocination, 
can possess no force for a consistent scientific 
theist; for it involves the very absurdity with 
which the man is chargeable who presumes to 
make scientific observations upon the heavens, 
on the assumption that the earth, and not the 
sun, is the centre of the planetary system. 



§ 27. 

THE RELATION OF PHILOSOPHY TO SUPERNATURAL 
REVELATION. 

It is necessary to advance a step further. 
Another question arises : How shall we obtain a 
true idea of God ? The question demands a so- 
lution ; for it involves the sine qua non of philo- 
sophy. Nature or the outer world is indeed a 
revelation of God ; but the history of man proves 
incontrovertibly, that, left to his own powers, he 
derives a false conception of the Supreme Being 
from his observations upon nature. Nature does 
not suffice. 



SUPERNATURAL REVELATION. 97 

The human reason, or man himself, is a higher 
revelation than nature ; but we have already 
shown how, on the principle of a theistic view of 
the universe, the nature of philosophy itself de- 
mands a reference of reason to its original 
ground; the reason cannot even form a correct 
conception of reason but in the light of a true 
idea of God ; much less can it form a true idea 
of God, the Infinite Creator, from itself, that is, 
from its imperfect conception of a finite spirit, or 
from the reflections of its own uncertain, flicker- 
ing light. 

In addition to this, we must make due account 
of the presence of moral evil or sin, which has 
enfeebled, darkened, and disordered the whole 
human constitution. However clear and consis- 
tent the intuitions of man were in his original 
and normal condition, they are now nothing 
more than the confused utterances of a being 
struggling in his weakness to extricate himself 
from painful contradiction, and reaching out un- 
ceasingly to lay hold of the absolute Good, but 
always grasping the shadow instead of the sub- 
stance. That there is a God sounds continually 
from the profoundest depths of human rationa- 
lity; but to the question: What is God? there 

9 



98 A TRUE SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY. 

comes forth, no satisfactory response. The human 
reason was originally like a quiet, placid lake, 
that reflects a beautiful and true image of the 
sun ; but now, lashed into foam by the winds and 
casting up mire and dirt from beneath, the reflec- 
tions are indeed innumerable, but all are dis- 
torted and delusive. 

Hence we assume the necessity of a revelation 
different from and higher than that which nature 
and man afford — the necessity of a supernatural 
revelation in order to a true idea of God; not 
only the necessity, but without further argument, 
we assume the fact also. There is a supernatural 
revelation, exhibiting the divine, the human, and 
the natural, each as it really is in itself, and all in 
their objective reciprocal relations to each other. 
That revelation is at hand in the person of Jesus 
Christ. The Christian Religion is a system of 
various facts constituting one harmonious whole ; 
but the meaning of all, from the creation down 
to the resurrection, and the final consummation 
of all things, culminates in Himself. Yery God 
and very man in one person, He reveals a true 
idea of God — of His attributes and works ; and 
a true idea of man — of his constitution, his fall, 
his wants, his capacities, and his relations to him- 



SUPERNATURAL REVELATION. 99 

self, to the world, and to God. A correct con- 
ception of creation — of the material and imma- 
terial — depends on a true idea of God and His 
infinite attributes. Christ as God reveals God; 
God as the Creator; and in consequence, also, 
the relation of spirit to matter and of matter to 
spirit. Christ as man reveals man, as to body, 
soul, and spirit ; reveals him as he was, originally 
right, pure, and in possession of truth, capable of 
knowing as he was known ; and reveals him as 
he is now, depraved and ignorant, yet salvable, 
that is, susceptible, through Him, of being re- 
stored to a position in which he can attain to 
true and boundless wisdom. In Him, as in a 
polished mirror, man may see man, may see him- 
self, in all his normal objective relations. It is in 
Christ, therefore, that the true idea of God and 
of man appears to the eagle eye of reason. Christ 
becomes, accordingly, the first principle of all 
legitimate metaphysical inquiry. A correct Theo- 
logy depends upon a sound Christology. 



§ 28. 

RECAPITULATION OF THE ARGUMENT. 

To sum up the results of the argument : A true 
system of philosophy must take the absolute 



100 A TRUE SYSTEM 0E PHILOSOPHY. 

ground of the objective universe as its principle. 
The origin of the universal whole is the true 
point of departure in a subjective system. As 
that absolute ground is God, reason must possess 
a true idea of God ; and as it is the reason which 
produces philosophy, the reason must possess a 
true idea of its relative position in the universal 
whole ; both ideas being essential to the validity 
of the final results of inductive or deductive ra- 
tiocination. A true idea of God is not derived 
from nature nor evolved out of man's being; nor 
is a true idea of the reason and its relations deve- 
loped from the reason ; but the truth in regard to 
both is brought to light alone in Jesus Christ, 
who is the organic union of God and man, and 
therefore, the most perfect revelation both of the 
human reason or of humanity, and of God, the 
absolute ground of all things. 

It follows that valid metaphysical inquiry de- 
pends upon a belief in and a knowledge of 
Christ; that is, if the human reason start with 
the idea of God, and of itself, which is revealed 
by and in Christ, it becomes possible, so far forth 
at least, to unfold a true philosophy. If this idea 
be ignored or rejected, the first essential condi- 
tions are wanting, and the very possibility of a 



SOLUTION OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEM. 101 

true philosophy is out of the question. No logi- 
cally consistent metaphysician can take any posi- 
tion short of this who believes that Jesus Christ 
possesses sufficient claims to be regarded as the 
Author of the only true Religion, as the Son of 
God, the Word made flesh. 



SECTION II. 

THE RELATION OF THE REASON TO THE OUTER 
WORLD, OR OF SUBJECT AND OBJECT. 

§29. 

FOURFOLD SOLUTION OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEM. 

What is the relation of the human reason to 
the outer world, or of the subject to the object of 
thought ? A correct answer to this question con- 
stitutes the third essential condition of a true sys- 
tem of philosophy. 

The history of philosophy has developed two 
radical, and mutually exclusive methods, by 
which the problem has been sought to be solved. 
These may be united and disappear in a third ; 
or both may be acknowledged but not united, 
and give rise to a fourth. The history of philo- 



102 A TRUE SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY. 

sophy lias thus developed a fourfold solution of 
the general question. 

Realism. 

The first solution is Eealism or Sensationalism. 
The outer or material world addresses the senses, 
and these convey their impressions to the mind. 
The reason receives its ideas, not from within, 
but from without. We know those things ac- 
cordingly with which we are brought into contact 
by the senses. The ground or source of know- 
ledge is sensation, or a sensible experience of ob- 
jects. 

This is the theory. The outward world is ex- 
alted beyond measure and the human reason is 
depressed. Wrong is done in two directions. 
The material object is assigned a place that is too 
high, and the thinking subject a place that is too 
low. There is a false subordination of the human 
reason as a thinking subject to the outer world as 
a real object. 

The principle of Realism is susceptible of va- 
rious modifications according to the degree that 
reason is falsely subordinated; and we get as 
many varying systems of philosophy, all embody- 
ing, however, the same principle. The false sub- 



SOLUTION OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEM. 103 

ordination may be so slight as to render a 
system of Realism almost reconcilable with the 
truth ; or it may be so great as to negate any es- 
sential difference between spirit and matter; and 
we get a gross form of materialism — a result to 
whicb Hobbes developed the methodology of 
Bacon. 

Idealism. 

The second is Idealism. The ground or source 
of knowledge is the reason itself. Our know- 
ledge of things is derived from within, not from 
without; that is, from intuitive ideas. These 
ideas only are certainly known ; and become the 
principle and measure of knowledge. Thus out- 
ward objects do not determine what is known of 
them, but they can be known only according to 
the a priori ideas and judgments of the reason. 

The subject is thus unduly exalted and the ob- 
ject unduly depressed. Idealism involves, accord- 
ingly, a false subordination of the real object to 
the thinking subject. The reverse of Realism. 
Wrong is done to both ; for the reason demands 
the object as the material of knowledge, and the 
object must be known according to its own na- 
ture in order to be subordinate to its true end. 

Idealism varies according to the degree in 



104 A TRUE SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY. 

which the real object is subordinated in a false 
way to the thinking subject. It may admit the 
reality of the object, but determine the knowledge 
of it by the a priori ideas of the reason; or it 
may subordinate the object to such a degree as to 
deny the reality of its existence altogether. 

Absolutism. 

The third is Absolutism, and becomes Pan- 
theism when developed to its ultimate logical 
results. From a false subordination of the think- 
ing subject to the real object, philosophy reacts 
to a false subordination of the object to the sub- 
ject; but as both subject and object are primary 
facts of consciousness, each view is extreme and 
cannot sustain itself to the exclusion of the other. 
As it is the innate tendency of the reason to re- 
duce multiplicity to unity, both exclusive systems 
give way to a third, which seeks to unite subject 
and object in an absolute principle. Subject and 
object or the reason and the outward world are 
taken to be identical as to their essence, but dif- 
ferent as to form of being. They are but dif- 
ferent manifestations of one principle. 

Absolutism does violence to the thinking sub- 
ject and to the real object. Both are subordi- 



SOLUTION OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEM. 105 

nated in a false way to their absolute ground. In 
order to avoid a false subordination of either one 
to the other, it identifies them with each other 
and with their common ground, and thus destroys 
their essential difference. 

Referring all forms of existence to one absolute 
principle by which they are pervaded and deter- 
mined, Absolutism becomes Pantheism. The 
absolute principle is God. The various parts of 
the universe may be regarded as so many mem- 
bers of the Divine Being, and we have what may 
be called gross Pantheism. Or a distinction is 
made between the material, outward parts of the 
Universe, and the general life-principle that 
moves in and sustains the universal whole. This 
life-principle is then regarded as God, and we get 
speculative Pantheism. 

Dualism. 

The fourth is Dualism. There is no false sub- 
ordination of subject to object as in Iiealism, or 
of object to subject as in Idealism, nor are sub- 
ject and object identified and subordinated in a 
false way to an absolute principle as in Absolu- 
tism or Pantheism ; but there is an undue eleva- 
tion both of subject and object. Their essential 



106 A TRUE SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY. 

difference is magnified, and the necessary internal 
connection subsisting between tbem disappears. 
Subject and object are held asunder as being in 
irreconcilable opposition. Each is in conse- 
quence referred to a principle of its own. There 
are, therefore, two opposing absolute principles. 
The reason derives its ideas from itself; and it 
admits the object to be, but not to be a source of 
true knowledge. As there is no internal and ne- 
cessary connection but an irreconcilable opposition 
between them, the influence of the outward ob- 
ject is unfavorable to pure and true scientific 
knowledge. Hence the reason strives to free 
itself from the influence of the outer world, and 
to fall back upon the resources of its own nature. 
Knowledge becomes pure and true in proportion 
as this separation is widened. 

Dualism exists under various modifications ; 
but it does not fall in with our plan to trace them 
out. We have only given the general principle 
of the system. 

Dualism resembles Idealism ; because both sys- 
tems derive true ideas from the human reason, 
yet they differ widely in their relations to the 
outer world. Idealism begins with a subordina- 
tion and ends in an utter negation of the outer 



MODIFICATIONS OF THE FOUR SYSTEMS. 107 

world. Dualism holds the reality of the outer 
world, but maintains the necessary antagonism of 
it to the pure activity of reason, and therefore 
regards its influence to he unfavorable to truth. 
Hence a conflict ensues which intensifies the ex- 
istence both of the thinking subject and the real 
object. 



§ 30. 

MODIFICATIONS OF THE FOUR SYSTEMS. 

"When any one of these four systems of think- 
ing is held with logical consistency by itself it 
of course excludes all the rest ; yet if developed 
to its last results it passes over into the opposite 
theory. The extremes meet. There is a certain 
affinity in opposite errors corresponding to the 
unity of truth. This affinity arises from the rela- 
tion of error to truth. Truth is positive ; error 
is negative. There is but one truth ; but it pos- 
sesses different elements and exists in various re- 
lations, all of which, however, make one harmo- 
nious whole. Each element or relation presents 
an aspect to the human reason under which it 
may be viewed. A valid philosophy views truth 



108 A TRUE SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY. 

under all its aspects and combines them into an 
ideal unity. But each aspect of truth may also 
be viewed by itself; and when viewed by itself it 
becomes the point of departure for an erroneous 
system of thought. The different false systems 
which thus arise, are opposed to each other, yet 
they are connected by the secret bond of truth 
which underlies them. Their connection is a dis- 
tortion of the beautiful homogeneity of the dif- 
ferent elements of truth ; yet though a distortion 
it is real ; and because real no system of error can 
long stand alone, but will in the progress of its 
development become associated with a collateral 
one, or run into its opposite. , Two or more sys- 
tems may also exist in forced or mechanical con- 
junction, and produce an eclectic or mongrel phi- 
losophy. 

Varying systems may also be built upon the 
same one-sided view of the truth ; the one in- 
cluding certain non-essential elements, and the 
other excluding them. Or the same modifying 
non-essential elements may be embodied in radi- 
cally different systems. Hence to understand the 
precise character of a false system, we must know 
both the fundamental principle upon which it is 
based and the accidental elements which it com- 



CRITICISM OF THE FOUR SYSTEMS. 109 

bines. Yet, however numerous these modifica- 
tions of false systems of philosophy may he, they 
are all reducible to one of the four fundamental 
principles which we have stated. No other false 
fundamental principle is possible. 



§ 31. 

CRITICISM OF THE FOUR SYSTEMS. 

These fundamental principles rest each on an 
essential truth ; hut the truth is held from a false 
point of observation and in false relations. An 
essential truth held in conjunction with radical 
error, becomes a false principle which vitiates the 
whole system built upon it. 

Eealism holds the reality of the object or of 
the outer world : this is an essential truth ; but 
subordinating the thinking subject to the outer 
world in a wrong way, the truth becomes a false 
principle. 

Idealism, on the contrary, holds the reason to 
be the ground and source of knowledge: another 
essential truth ; but subordinating the object to 
it and determining the existence and nature of 
the object only by the intuitive ideas of the reason, 
this truth likewise becomes a fake principle. 

10 



110 A TRUE SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY. 

So with Absolutism. That subject and object 
both exist, and that there is a necessary internal 
connection between them, is essentially true ; but 
that they are only different homogeneous mani- 
festations of an absolute principle to which they 
are reducible, is radically false. 

The truth and falsity of Dualism are just the 
reverse. It holds what Absolutism or Pantheism 
denies : the intrinsic difference, as to essence, of 
subject and object, or of the reason and the outer 
world. This is true. But it holds, too, what is 
false : the direct antagonism of the pure reason 
to the outer world, which does violence to their 
internal connection, and necessitates an ultimate 
reference of subject and object to two absolute 
eternal principles. 

Each system starts thus in an hypothesis that 
combines essential truth with radical error. 



§ 32. 

CORRESPONDENCE OP CHRISTOLOGY TO PHILOSOPHY. 

These different systems of false philosophy cor- 
respond to as many systems of error in the sphere 
of Christology. A false philosophy and a false 



CIIRISTOLOGICAL PROBLEM. Ill 

Christology are concentric circles. Both turn 
upon the same one-sided method of thinking; 
which, whether applied to the reason, the world, 
or Christ, leads to results intrinsically the same. 
This position we propose to establish. 

"We shall endeavor to trace the correspondence 
between the erroneous systems of Christology and 
those of philosophy. In this way we design to 
exhibit more clearly the nature of the method of 
thinking which is common to the fundamental 
systems of false philosophy; to define more ac- 
curately the conditions which must be met in a 
true solution of the problem under discussion; 
and to determine the nature and necessity of the 
principle upon which that solution rests. Whilst 
it is only in the light of truth that error can be 
properly understood ; yet error, on the other 
hand ; serves by its contradiction to bring out 
and define the opposite truth. 



§ 33. 

FOURFOLD SOLUTION OF THE CIIRISTOLOGICAL PROBLEM. 

Christology has to do with the question : "What 
is the relation of the divine to the human nature 



112 A TRUE SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY. 

in the person of Christ ? The efforts of the rea- 
son to solve the question scientifically, have given 
rise to two primary false systems of Christology, 
the one starting with the human and the other 
with the divine nature as its principle. From 
these two mutually exclusive systems there is a 
twofold reaction. In the one case, the reason 
resolves the two natures into one, and thus iden- 
tifies them ; in the other, it asserts the reality of 
both, but holds them in mere juxtaposition. The 
history of Theology has, accordingly, developed 
four fundamental systems of false Christology. 

Ebionism. , 

The first system of false Christology is Ebio- 
nism. It lays stress on the outward, the visible 
and tangible, upon that which addresses the 
senses and the common understanding of men, 
and conforms to the natural order of things ; but 
undervalues the invisible, incomprehensible, and 
supernatural, which is accessible only to faith. 
Christ is a real man both as to body and soul ; 
but he is not the true God. His personality is 
human and only human. 

Ebionism is susceptible of various modifications 
according to the degree in which the divine is 



CIIRISTOLOGICAL PROBLEM. 113 

subordinated to the human nature of Christ ; and 
is known by as many different names, for ex- 
ample, as Arianism, Socinianism, and Unitarian- 
ism. It may depress the divine to such a degree 
as to eliminate it altogether ; or it may admit the 
presence and power of a supernatural influence 
in so high a sense that the admission seems to be 
almost equivalent to an affirmation of His proper 
Godhead. But the principle which underlies 
each modification is the same : an undue subor- 
dination of the divine to the human, or a false 
position of the human nature in its relation to 
the divine. 

Ebionism, in Theology, corresponds to Kealism 
in philosophy. The same method of thinking 
pervades both. They are in reality the same sys- 
tem, varying only according to the nature of the 
object upon which the system lays hold. 

Gnosticism. 

The second is Gnosticism — a method of think- 
ing that has given rise to a great variety of par- 
ticular systems of philosophy and theology, all of 
which, however, are reducible to one common 
principle, namely, a false subordination of tlie 
natural to the supernatural, or of the human to 
10* 



114 A TRUE SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY. 

the divine. The supernatural being of Christ is 
His only true and real being. He may be re- 
garded as belonging to an order of celestial ex- 
istence which is inferior only to the absolute, self- 
existent Source of all things : or He may be a 
being who is co-equal and co-eternal with God, 
the Father. In either case, it is the supernatural, 
not the natural or human, which constitutes the 
proper being of Jesus Christ. His human nature 
is, therefore, not essential to His constitution, but 
an accidental or temporary medium of His work 
on earth ; or it is an expedient adopted to secure 
the ends of God's moral government ; or it is no 
real existence at all, but only a transient appear- 
ance or phantasm agorial accommodation to the 
human senses. Whichever view may be taken 
of the human nature, does not matter; its rela- 
tion to the divine nature is the same in principle, 
which is, that the human nature is not intrinsi- 
cally necessary to the reality of His being or the 
validity of His work. The human is depressed 
and the divine is elevated in such a sense as to 
do violence to the reality of the human. 

Gnosticism corresponds to Idealism. The same 
principle working out the same results in two dif- 
ferent spheres of thought : a false subordination 



CHRISTOLOGICAL PROBLEM. 115 

of the object to the subject — in the one case, of 
the outer world to the human reason, in the 
other, of the humanity to the divinity of Christ. 
Both systems turn on one pivot. 

Eutycheanism. 

The third is Eutycheanism — from Eutyches, an 
abbot at Constantinople, who became the histori- 
cal organ of the theory, in A. D. 448. Neither 
the human nature nor the divine nature as such 
constitutes the true being of Christ ; but the in- 
carnate Word, who is the blending or flowing 
together of two natures into one. Hence the es- 
sential attributes of proper humanity are not to 
be distinguished in Him from the essential attri- 
butes of the Godhead. Christ possesses but one 
nature made up of two originally different, but 
now confused elements, the divine, in some sense, 
assimilating the human to itself. 

This Christological method of thought can be 
traced through the previous and subsequent his- 
tory of the Church. It comes to view under one 
or another aspect, and receives different appella- 
tions, according to circumstances. With its mo- 
difications, however, we have nothing to do here. 
We are concerned only with the general principle 



116 A TRUE SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY. 

of Eutycheanism, which is identical with that of 
Absolutism or Pantheism in philosophy. Euty- 
cheanism and Absolutism are each a reaction 
from the violence done by the two primary false 
systems in Christology and philosophy to a neces- 
sary category of thought which demands a syn- 
thesis of the two natures, or of subject and object. 
But the reaction instead of holding the two na- 
tures or elements in a connection that is con- 
sistent with the integrity of both, destroys their 
essential difference, and results in a merging or 
commingling of both elements into one essence. 

Nestorianism., 

The fourth is Nestorianism — from Westorius, a 
bishop of Constantinople during the first half of 
the fifth century, whose name, whether justly or 
not, has become identified with dualistic Christo- 
logy. It is necessary to maintain the integrity of 
the human nature in Christ and avoid the com- 
mingling of attributes. Hence stress is laid, not 
on the connection but on the essential difference 
of the two natures. The human and divine being 
both distinct and separate are not in organic 
union, but in outward conjunction. The distinct 
attributes of both are not referable to a common 



THE SYSTEMS COMPARED. 117 

centre, but the divine attributes are referable to 
the divine nature and the human attributes to 
the human nature. Thus the two natures stand 
asunder but co-operate in the work of redemp- 
tion. 

The method of thinking in Christology de- 
noted by Nestorianism is the counterpart of Dual- 
ism in philosophy. As subject and object have 
each an independent existence in the one, so have 
the divine and human in the other. TsTestorian- 
ism and Dualism are each a reaction from the 
violence done by the Eutychean and Pantheistic 
tendencies to a necessary category of thought, 
which demands a proper analysis of the two na- 
tures, or of subject and object. Both magnify 
the essential difference of integral elements and 
set aside their inward necessary connection. 



§ 34. 
TnE rniLOSOPUICAL AND christological systems 

COMPARED. 

All false systems of Christology are reducible 
to these four — to Ebionism, Gnosticism, Euty- 
cheanism, and Nestorianism. These are funda- 



IIS A TRUE SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY. 

mental. But as there is a certain affinity in op- 
posite errors, each one, like its corresponding 
system in philosophy, generally exists in combi- 
nation with some elements belonging to another. 
Thus Ebionism and Gnosticism may each be as- 
sociated with Nestorian tendencies; as Realism 
and Idealism may each be associated with Dua- 
listic tendencies. 

Any one system may also pass over into its op- 
posite. Ebionism may pass over into Gnosticism; 
and vice versa. The full development of the one 
causes a reaction in favor of the other. So does 
the extreme of Realism become the transition to 
Idealism ; for they are the opposite poles of the 
same error. The wire of thought bends in the 
process until the ends meet in a circle. So, too, 
of the other systems. The last consequences of 
Eutycheanism call forth a reaction in favor of 
!N"estorianism ; and a full-grown Absolutism or 
Pantheism may awaken a tendency towards 
Dualism. The reason cannot rest long in any 
position that ignores any primary fact or postu- 
late of consciousness or of Revelation. 

There is, however, a more important resem- 
blance between the philosophical and the Chris- 
tological systems. Of this resemblance we have 



THE SYSTEMS COMPARED. 119 

spoken already, but we wish to trace it more defi- 
nitely. 

Realism makes the outer world the source of 
knowledge through sensation, and does violence 
to the higher claims of the reason. Ebionism 
takes the humanity of Christ as its basis, and does 
violence to the higher claims of His divinity. 
Thus both systems start in the lower, the out- 
ward, the sensible element, and set aside the rea- 
lity of the higher, the inward, the supersensible 
or ideal element — the element that is not acces- 
sible to the senses or to the common understand- 
ing. Realism and Ebionism are but one method 
of thought — a fact that history frequently illus- 
trates. Realistic or sensational philosophy is 
generally associated with Ebionitic or Unitarian 
tendencies in Theology. In virtue of the law of 
reaction, however, one extreme system in philo- 
sophy may coexist, not with the corresponding, 
but also with the opposite system in Theology. 
A realistic or sensational philosophy, under this 
view, is favorable to Ebionism or to Gnosticism — 
to low views of the divinity, or to low views of 
the humanity of Christ. 

Idealism makes the reason the only source of 
knowledge, and denies the determining influence, 



120 A TRUE SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY. 

or the reality, of the outer world. Gnosticism at- 
taches reality and virtue only to the divine nature 
of Christ, and ignores or denies the reality of his 
human nature. Both systems find their principle 
in the higher, the inward, the ideal or supersen- 
sible element, and set aside the reality of the 
lower, the outward, the finite, and sensible. 
Idealism and Gnosticism are but one method of 
thought. Of this fact the history of philosophy 
and Theology likewise offers numerous illustra- 
tions. 

Absolutism or Pantheism resolves the reason 
and the outer world into one principle, and ig- 
nores their essential difference. Eutycheanism 
blends the human nature with the divine — the 
divine nature is the proper being of Christ ; and 
denies an essential difference of attributes. Both 
systems identify the lower and the higher, the 
outward and the inward, the sensible and the 
supersensible or ideal — identify that which is, 
and that which is not, accessible to sense and the 
understanding ; and ignore or set aside the es- 
sential difference between them. Absolutism 
and Eutycheanism rest in one method of thought. 

Dualism admits the reality of the reason and 
the outer world as determining forces, but holds 



TUB SYSTEMS COMPARED. 121 

them, in irreconcilable opposition; and denies 
their necessary connection. Eestorianism admits 
the reality of both natures in Christ, but holds 
them asunder; and in consequence denies their 
real union. Both systems assume the antago- 
nism of the outward and the inward, of the sen- 
sible and the supersensible or ideal — the antago- 
nism of that which is, and that which is not, 
accessible to the understanding ; and do violence 
to the necessary connection subsisting between 
them. Dualism and Nestorianism are the expo- 
nents of but one method of thought. 

Here we have apparently four methods of 
thought underlying four sets of parallel systems. 
But upon a closer view we find that these me- 
thods possess common characteristics, and are 
therefore not essentially different. They are all 
one-sided. Each method lays hold of one fact, 
or postulate, and suppresses another which is no 
less certain and real ; in philosophy it is a fact or 
a postulate, of consciousness, and in Christology, 
a fact or a postulate, of revelation. And they 
are all arbitrary. Each method is based not 
upon the whole constitution of the objective order 
of things with which it is concerned, but springs 
from the human will as influenced by education, 

11 



122 A TRUE SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY. 

by the spirit or reactionary tendency of the age, 
or by accidental circumstances. 

These four false methods are, therefore, at 
bottom but one false method. The method of 
thought which underlies the fundamental systems 
of false philosophy, is identical with the method 
of thought which underlies the fundamental sys- 
tems of false Christology. The mutually exclu- 
sive philosophical systems and the parallel Chris- 
tological systems are all of them but so many 
different expressions of one error. 

It is but a postulate to affirm, on the other 
hand, that a sound Christology and a sound philo- 
sophy are grounded in the same method of think- 
ing. The Christological problem and the philo- 
sophical problem are but one problem. 



§ 35. 

THE CONDITIONS OF THE TRUE SOLUTION. 

The philosophical problem under discussion — 
the relation of the human reason to the outer 
world, or of the subject to the object of thought 
— includes two primary facts of consciousness, 
namely, the reality of the reason and the reality 



CONDITIONS OF THE TRUE SOLUTION. 123 

of the outer world. The reason is, and the world 
is. From these two primary facts two others fol- 
low as postulates, namely, the necessary inward 
connection, and the essential difference between 
the reason and the outer world. The constitu- 
tion of the reason corresponds to the constitution 
of the world ; but the distinctive attributes of the 
reason cannot be predicated of the outer world, 
and the distinctive attributes of the outer world 
cannot be predicated of the reason. They are 
connected but different entities. 

There are, accordingly, four essential condi- 
tions which must be met by a true solution of 
the philosophical problem : 

1. A true solution is required to hold the 
human reason, or the subjective, as a veritable 
entity, possessing determinative force in itself. 

2. It is required to hold the outer world, or the 
objective universal whole, as a veritable entity, 
possessing, like the reason, determinative force in 
itself. 

3. It is required to hold the reason and the 
outer world, subject and object, as two distinct 
orders of being. They are not identical. 

4. It is required to hold the reason and the 
outer world as inwardly and necessarily con- 



124 A TRUE SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY. 

nected. They are not in irreconcilable antago- 
nism. 

The Christological problem — the relation of 
the divine to the human nature in the person of 
Christ — includes two primary facts of superna- 
tural revelation, namely, the reality of the human 
and the reality of the divine nature of Christ. 
Christ is very man and very God. From these 
two primary facts two others follow as postulates, 
namely, the necessary inward connection and the 
essential difference between the two natures. 
The constitution of the humanity is created in 
the likeness of the Godhead ; but the distinctive 
attributes of the Godhead cannot be predicated 
of the humanity, and the distinctive attributes of 
the humanity cannot be predicated of the God- 
head. They are inwardly connected, but the one 
remains the creature and the other the Creator. 

Hence there are also four essential conditions 
which must be met by a true solution of the 
Christological problem : 

1. A true solution is required to hold the 
human nature of Christ as a reality — as possess- 
ing the peculiar attributes of humanity. 

2. It is required to hold the divine nature as a 
reality — as being coessential and coequal with 



CONDITIONS OF THE TRUE SOLUTION. 125 

the Father — as possessing the proper attributes 
of the Godhead. 

3. It is required to hold the two natures as two 
different orders of being, the one as the finite and 
relative, and the other as the infinite and abso- 
lute. There may be no confusion of essence. 

4. It is required to hold the two natures in in- 
ward connection and harmony. There can be no 
contradiction between them. 

Here we have two series of conditions which 
are to be met by the required solution, the one 
by the solution of the philosophical and the other 
by the solution of the Christological problem. 
On the basis, however, of the comparison insti- 
tuted in § 34, these two series are reducible to 
one. 

1. The outer world is to philosophy what the 
human nature of Christ is to Christology. The 
required solutions must, therefore, be consistent 
with the reality of the lower, the outward, the 
sensible existence. 

2. The human reason, with its ideas and laws 
of thought, is to philosophy what the divine na- 
ture, with its infinite perfections, is to Christo- 
logy. The required solutions must therefore bo 

11* 



126 A TRUE SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY. 

consistent with the reality of the higher, the in- 
ward, the supersensible existence. 

3. The difference between the outer world and 
the reason is to philosophy what the difference 
between the humanity and the Godhead of Christ 
is to Christology. The required solutions must 
therefore be consistent with the essential differ- 
ence between two distinct orders of existence, the 
lower and the higher, the outward and the in- 
ward, the sensible and the supersensible. 

4. The connection between the outer world 
and the reason is to philosophy what the connec- 
tion between the two natures of Christ is to 
Christology. The required solutions must there- 
fore be consistent with the internal harmony be- 
tween two different orders of existence, the lower 
and the higher, the outward and the inward, the 
sensible and the supersensible. 

The necessary conditions which must be met 
by a true solution of the philosophical problem 
are thus identical, scientifically considered, with 
those which must be met by the solution of the 
Christological problem. But these four different 
conditions common to both questions are not 
separable conditions, or externally related ; they 
imply or lie in each other; any one cannot exist 



THUE SOLUTION OF THE PllOBLEM. 127 

where the others do not; they are, therefore, re- 
ducible to one threefold condition, which may be 
stated in a single expression : The solution of the 
twofold problem must be consistent with the rea- 
lity, the connection, and the difference of the 
sensible and the supersensible order of existence, 
or of that which is, and that which is not, ac- 
cessible to sense and the understanding. 

Summing up the results of the argument, we 
find that the different fundamental systems of false 
philosophy and false Christology are grounded 
in one method of thought; that the philosophi- 
cal and the Christological problem are but one 
problem ; and that the conditions which must be 
met by the solution of this one problem under its 
two aspects is but one threefold condition. Two 
things follow by necessary consequence : the true 
solution of the philosophical and the true solu- 
tion of the Christological problem are but one 
solution ; and the solution of the problem under 
its two aspects is grounded in but one principle. 



§ 36. 

THE TRUE SOLUTION OF THE r-ROBLEM. 

The question: What is the relation of the 



128 A TRUE SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY. 

divine to the human nature in the person of 
Christ? is therefore the same, in principle, as the 
question : What is the relation of the reason to 
the outer world, or of the subject to the object of 
thought ? But the terms of the first are broader 
and more comprehensive than those of the second. 
Considering the Christological question scientifi- 
cally, the divine nature occupies in it the place 
of the subject in the philosophical question, and 
the human nature the place of the object. The 
divine nature is the absolute reason, the highest 
subject of which pure thought can be predicated; 
it apprehends and assumes the human. The 
human, or humanity, is the serisuo-rational object, 
the head of outward objectivity or of the sensible 
creation, in which the import or meaning of all 
lower orders of the sensible creation reach their 
highest form of expression. It is apprehended 
by and assumed into union with the divine. The 
terms of the Christological question are therefore 
most comprehensive. 

The terms of the philosophical question are 
limited. The human reason is a finite, created 
subject; and the outer world is but a part of that 
order of sensible objects to which man as the 
highest form of its expression belongs. The terms 



TRUE SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM. 120 

of the philosophical question are therefore less 
comprehensive. They are both particular. 

Hence the relation of the first to the second 
question is that of a general to a particular. The 
solution of the philosophical is concluded under 
that of the Christological problem. It is a sound 
Christology, therefore, that becomes the prin- 
ciple upon which the profound and difncult pro- 
blem in philosophy must and can alone be solved. 

Solution of the Christological Problem. 

A true solution of the Christological problem 
has been wrought out scientifically, and is to be 
viewed as the result of the unavoidable and long- 
continued conflict of truth with error in the his- 
tory of the Church. "We will endeavor to state it 
in a few words both positively and negatively. 

The relation of the divine to the human nature 
of Christ is neither Ebionitic nor Gnostic, neither 
Eutychean nor Nestorian, but personal and or- 
ganic. 

Christ has two natures, both real entities, 
neither one merely ideal or imaginary, the one 
truly divine the other truly human, each distinct 
from the other but not separate nor separable ; 
but the divine apprehends and assumes the 



130 A TRUE SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY. 

human, without mixture or change, into union 
with itself, thus sanctifying it, and giving it a 
higher form of existence. Belated thus, not by a 
force holding them together from without, but 
by the supernatural power of the Holy Ghost 
working from within, the two natures constitute 
but one personality. 

Each nature holds its due relative position. 
No wrong is done in this respect to either. 
There is no false subordination of the divine to 
the human, as in Ebionism, nor of the human to 
the divine, as in Gnosticism. Yet there is a real 
assumption of the human by the divine, so that 
the two become one whole. The Word was made 
flesh. Of one personality the unmixed peculiar 
attributes of humanity and the peculiar attributes 
of divinity are predicable with equal propriety. 

Nor is any wrong done to their essential differ- 
ence. The human is not absorbed by or trans- 
muted into the divine, nor does their union form 
a being of whom the proper attributes of huma- 
nity cannot be predicated, as in Eutycheanism. 
The human is really and only human, and the 
divine is really and only divine. Each nature 
preserves its integrity. 

On the other hand, however, the two natures 



TRUE SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM. 131 

are not sundered in violation of their necessary 
inward connection, as in Nestorianism ; but, in 
virtue of a new creation, they exist as the consti- 
tutive parts of one person. The person of Christ 
is neither a singleness nor a composition, but an 
organic unity. A sound Christology excludes 
the errors, and includes the truth, of every false 
system, on the basis of a new and higher prin- 
ciple. 

Here, then, we find the solution of the philoso- 
phical problem. 

Solution of the Philosophical Problem. 

The relation of the divine to the human nature 
in the person of Christ exhibits the relation of 
the human reason to the outer world. The rea- 
son and the world are distinct entities, belonging 
each to a peculiar order of existence and possess- 
ing peculiar attributes ; the one spiritual, the 
other real; the one the subject, the other the ob- 
ject ; but reciprocally dependent, each entity de- 
manding the other for its own completion ; the 
one thinking, the other thought of; the one 
knowing according to its intuitive ideas and laws, 
the other known according to its objective nature ; 
and constituting in scientific knowledge or philo- 



132 A TRUE SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY. 

sophy an organic union, in which the reason and 
the world are neither sundered nor identified, hut 
each continues to he itself truly, whilst in virtue 
of their necessary reciprocal connection they form 
one complete whole. 

This general view includes several particulars. 
The reason is not subordinated to the outer world, 
as in Realism, but holds its proper and relatively 
independent position as the thinking subject, de- 
riving its forms or categories of knowledge and 
its laws of thought from itself. 

The outer world is not subordinated to the rea- 
son, as in Idealism, but maintains the reality of 
its objective existence. Though apprehended 
under the a priori ideas of the reason and shaped 
by them in the sphere of thought, it is what it is 
independently of these ideas ; and as such deter- 
mines the matter or contents of true knowledge. 

The human reason and the outer world are not 
resolved into one principle of which they are but 
two different forms of development, as in Abso- 
lutism or Pantheism; but they are, as to their 
essence, intrinsically different, the thinking sub- 
ject and the real object each possessing essential 
attributes which the other does not. 

Nor yet are the reason and the world held 



TRUE SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM. 133 

asunder antagonistically, as in Dualism ; but there 
is an internal connection subsisting between 
them, in virtue of which the reason demands the 
outer world as the matter of its knowledge, and 
the outer world is susceptible of assuming form 
in the sphere of thought according to the ideas 
and laws of reason. 

The source of knowledge accordingly is neither 
the human reason to the exclusion of the outer 
world, nor the outer world to the exclusion of the 
human reason. But the actual source is found, 
under one view, in both ; in the reason as evol- 
ving the categories of thought out of itself and 
determining the proper form of knowledge ; in 
the outer world as the object corresponding in its 
nature to the categories of thought and deter- 
mining the matter of knowledge ; in both as re- 
ciprocally necessary and complemental. Or, we 
may say, the source is in the human reason sus- 
taining a true and actual relation to its objects ; 
the one being the formative principle and inter- 
nal condition, and the other, the necessary mate- 
rial and external condition of scientific knowledge. 

12 



184 A TRUE SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY. 

§ 37. 

THE SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM ILLUSTRATED. 

As there is an internal correspondence between 
sensuo-rational life and the constitution of the 
lower spheres of existence, we can find a forcible 
illustration of the true relation of the reason to 
the outer world, in the human body or in the 
animal kingdom. "We will refer first to an ana- 
logy in the human body. 

Seeing presupposes the eye which sees and the 
light which is seen; the one being the subject 
and the other the object of sight. The construc- 
tion and capacities of the eye are nicely adjusted 
to the light, just as the constitution and laws of 
the reason correspond to the outer world; and 
the nature of light is perfectly adapted to the 
receptivity and form of the eye, just as the mate- 
rial world is adapted to the intuitions and laws 
of the reason. The eye cannot see without the 
light, and the light cannot be seen without the 
eye ; just as the reason cannot know without an 
object, and the object could not be known if there 
were no reasou. Sight originates, therefore, in 
the eye sustaining its true actual relation to the 
light; and must be regarded as the legitimate 



THE SOLUTION ILLUSTRATED. 135 

product of two factors, the one being the source 
and the other the material and outward condition 
of vision. 

So, too, with the bee. The little insect builds 
its comb with mathematical precision, fills the 
cells with honey, and seals them hermetically. 
The honeycomb presupposes two things : the 
mysterious constitution and laws of bee-life, and 
the nectar and farina of flowers which the bee 
seeks instinctively and appropriates to itself; the 
one unconsciously evolving the plan of the comb 
out of itself and determining its form according 
to subjective laws, and the other constituting the 
objective material which the bee reproduces as 
the matter of the comb. The instinct of the bee, 
or its innate impulse, demands the nectar and 
farina as its objects; without them its wonderful 
powers would consume themselves. The nature 
of the nectar and farina, on the other hand, is 
preadapted to the wants of the bee and suscep- 
tible of being wrought into a new form deter- 
mined altogether by a higher constitution ; but, 
without the bee, these susceptibilities of the nec- 
tar and farina would not be unfolded and trans- 
formed into a beautiful comb. The comb, 
accordingly, is the product of two forces inter- 



136 A TRUE SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY. 

penetrating each other organically, in which the 
polar relation of the bee to its corresponding ob- 
jects is actualized as a concrete fact. 

So is true philosophy a result, or concrete fact, 
in the sphere of rational life, implying, on the 
one hand, a subjective formative principle, the 
human reason, and on the other, a real objective 
order of things, the outer world. These sustain 
to each other a polar relation. The intuitive ideas 
of the reason presuppose and demand the existence 
of the outer world as it is in itself, just as the life 
of the bee calls for the existence of nectar and 
farina ; and the laws of being which underlie and 
determine the outer world correspond to and sa- 
tisfy the intuitive ideas of the reason, just as the 
nature of nectar and farina is adapted to the 
wants and the design of bee-life. When the re- 
ciprocal demands of this polar relation are met, 
the outer world is subjected to a process of repro- 
duction according to the laws of thinking; and 
the result is the legitimate union of both in a 
system of truth. 

Thus, on the basis of a principle which the per- 
son of Christ reveals and actualizes, under its 
highest and most perfect form, we develop the 
true relation of the human reason to the outer 



CONCLUSION OF THE ARGUMENT. 137 

world. The thinking subject and the real object 
do not stand in an irreconcilable antagonism, but 
in virtue of a reciprocal adaptation they become 
one, not absolutely or pantheistically but organi- 
cally, in a true system of philosophy. This or- 
ganic solution excludes the errors, and includes 
the truth, of the false fundamental systems which 
we have reviewed. 



§ 38. 

CONCLUSION OF THE WHOLE ARGUMENT. 

In order to determine the essential conditions 
of a true system of philosophy we have endea- 
vored to unfold a correct answer to three primary 
questions : What is the first principle of philoso- 
phical thinking? "What is the relative position 
of the human reason ? and, What is the relation 
of the human reason to the outer world ? As- 
suming the universe to be a creation, and the 
person of Christ to be a perfect revelation of the 
natural and the supernatural, we have reached 
the following conclusions : 

1. The necessary fundamental principle of all 
philosophy is a true idea of God as conditional 
12* 



133 A TRUE SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY. 

to a legitimate conception of the reason, or of 
any subordinate being, or of any part of the uni- 
verse. 

2. The human reason, a created spirit, cannot 
determine a true conception of itself from itself, 
and cannot consistently conduct any process of 
thought on the assumption that it is the ultimate 
source of truth, but must refer itself to God, its 
Creator, the proper ground and law of its being, 
and determine a true conception of itself by a 
true idea of God. 

3. The relation of the human reason to the 
outer world, or the true relation of the subject to 
the object of thought, is exhibited in its highest 
and most complete form in the relation of the 
divine to the human nature in the person of 
Christ. 

As the three primary questions arise from one 
fundamental question (vide § 23), these different 
answers are reducible to one answer. The true 
idea of God is revealed in Jesus Christ, who is 
very G-od. The true nature of man or the proper 
subordinate position of the reason, is revealed in 
Christ, who is very man. He is both the ground 
and the perfect ideal of humanity. And the true 
relation of the reason to the outer world is re- 



CONCLUSION OF Till] ARGUMENT. 139 

vealed in Christ, who is the organic union of God 
and man. Thus we find the first principle of phi- 
losophy, the relative position of the human rea- 
son, and the relation of the reason, the subject, to 
the outer world, the object of thought, exhibited 
in the person of Christ. The person of Christ is, 
therefore, the concrete resolution of all the fun- 
damental problems in philosophy — the highest 
revelation of God, of man, of the world, and of 
their necessary reciprocal relations. The organic 
union of God and man, He is the absolute ground 
of the objective universal whole and the subjec- 
tive centre of all possible forms of knowledge. 
Or, under another view based upon the correspon- 
dence of Christology to philosophy (§ 36), Christ 
is God, the absolute reason by whose creative 
energy and according to whose eternal ideas the 
universe was called into being and continues to 
exist, in organic union with man, the head of the 
terrestrial creation, the perfection and culmina- 
ting point of all lower and sensuous orders of ex- 
istence. He is, therefore, the solution of the 
broadest and most comprehensive problem, and 
must be the ultimate principle upon which alone 
every other problem in theology or philosophy 
can finally be solved. 



140 A TRUE SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY. 

Starting with the fundamental ideas which the 
person of Christ reveals, and proceeding logically 
or according to the laws of thinking, it becomes 
possible to develop a true system of philosophy. 
But every system which either formally sets aside 
Christ or quietly ignores Him, is, as to its prin- 
ciple, a mere arbitrary hypothesis, which runs out 
necessarily, if unfolded to its last consequences, 
into a direct contradiction of some primary belief 
of the reason with which the system itself set out 
— a fact that the history of ancient and modern 
philosophy abundantly corroborates. For the 
profoundest thinkers of the world, who have pro- 
secuted the study of philosophy without regard 
to Christ as the determining principle, but with 
patient research, and have reared systems that 
display extraordinary discipline and compass of 
thought and will stand as monuments of genius 
for ages to come, have nevertheless not been able 
to reach a result which authenticates itself as the 
truth either to the natural or to the Christian 
consciousness. 



CIIAPTEE V. 

LOGIC AND ITS RELATIONS. 

§ 39. 

THE NATURE OF LOGIC. 

The nature of philosophy involves the nature 
of logic ; for thinking, the activity of the reason 
by which a system of philosophy is produced, 
implies, as we have seen, the existence of certain 
laws according to which the reason thinks. Of 
these laws and their relation to the categories of 
thought, the reason seeks to become conscious, 
and thus gives rise to the Science of Logic. It 
is with the laws of the reason accordingly that 
Logic has to do. They a're its object and deter- 
mine its nature. But as the reason is the organ 
of philosophy and determines its form, logic sus- 
tains also an internal relation to a true system of 
philosophy and to every branch of science. 

We will, therefore, consider the general subject 



142 LOGIC AND ITS RELATIONS. 

of this chapter in two sections: the one treating 
of the object of logic, and the other, of its rela- 
tions. 



SECTION I. 

THE OBJECT OP LOGIC. 

§ 40. 

THE LAWS OF THINKING. 

The laws of the reason exist and operate prior 
to consciousness. For the human reason, as we 
endeavored to show in §§ 3 and 4, is not a mecha- 
nism or an instrument, nor a mass of powers, nor 
yet a simple power, but an organism, a living, 
spiritual entity, possessing a life-principle and es- 
sential attributes which are its own specifically, 
and distinguish it from every other order of 
being. This life-principle operates with deter- 
mining force and according to its own nature. 
Hence, as in any other living organism, the reci- 
procal relation of its members and powers to each 
other and their common relation to the life-prin- 
ciple, as well as its modes of being and activity, 
are not a consequence of development nor im- 



THE LAWS OF THINKING. 143 

pressed from without by contact or connection 
with anything else, but unfolded from within and 
determined in all their peculiarities by what the 
reason is in itself as an order of spirit in union 
with a material body. 

What, then, is a law of the reason ? It is not 
simply an order of sequence in which one parti- 
cular state or act of the mind uniformly calls 
forth or follows another ; it is not a category of 
thought which the developed reason invents for 
its own purposes and convenience ; but it is a ne- 
cessity which determines the order and the form 
of thought. This necessity is not external and 
mechanical, but internal and organic — not an ac- 
cidental but an essential quality belonging to the 
very constitution of the human spirit ; and deter- 
mines its activity no less in its incipient and 
lowest than in its last and highest stages of deve- 
lopment. 

Or, we may say, the laws of thinking are each 
a living power latent in the germ of the reason, 
which begin to operate with a self-determining 
force so soon as the conditions of a normal deve- 
lopment are present. They are not, therefore, 
the result of will or a consequence of reflection ; 
but they exist anterior to and are operative in all 



141 LOGIC AND ITS RELATIONS. 

volition and reflection. They are antecedent to 
an order of sequence in knowledge and underlie 
all categories of consciousness. When developed 
in virtue of these inner vital forces, the reason 
reflects upon itself and becomes conscious of them 
as a part of its own constitution. Then it predi- 
cates them of itself as being each a necessity or 
law underlying and controlling its own activity — 
a law according to which the activity of the rea- 
son is and must be conducted in order to consti- 
tute rational and true thinking. 



§ 41. 

THE LAWS OF THINKING IN THEIR RELATION TO THE 
REASON ILLUSTRATED. 

The laws of thinking bear a relation to the 
human spirit like that which the laws of vege- 
table life sustain to the plant, the laws of animal 
life to the animal, or the laws of the human body 
do to the growth and activity of the body. There 
is that in the constitution of the eye, for example, 
which, on the one hand, necessitates its spherical 
form, the relative position and density of the dif- 
ferent humors, the susceptibility of the retina, 



THE LAWS OF THINKING ILLUSTRATED. 145 

and the variable diameter of the pupil ; and, on 
the other, peremptorily forbids the compression 
of the organ, the contact of a solid substance 
with the sclerotic coat, or the introduction of a 
needle through the pupil. This general necessity 
is the law of the eye ; and becomes a particular 
necessity as determining the function of each part 
of the eye. "We may speak therefore of the law 
or of the laws of the eye, according as we con- 
sider the general necessity determining its capa- 
cities and functions as a whole, or the particular 
necessities determining the form and function of 
each particular part ; the particular being but a 
branching out of the general. Seeing, accord- 
ingly, does not form these laws for its use, but 
these laws are anterior to and operate in the nor- 
mal activity of the eye. The act of seeing im- 
plies the previous existence of these laws ; and is 
possible only in virtue of implicit obedience to 
them. If the eye sustain a serious injury it can- 
not see ; that is, if any primary law be violated, 
the eye suffers and ceases to be itself; its activity 
is abnormal and deceptive, or is entirely sus- 
pended. 

Or to take the human body. There is that in 
the nature of the body, which, lying back of all 

13 



1-16 LOGIC AND ITS RELATIONS. 

development and phenomena, determines the con- 
formation, position, and functions of the brain, 
the heart, lungs, liver, five senses, etc. — a general 
necessity underlying and branching off into va- 
rious particular necessities, that imperatively 
require each organ to be active thus and so, and 
absolutely prohibit any deviation from or inter- 
ference with the predetermined functional action, 
under a penalty of suffering or death, which is 
ever inflicted with inflexible rigor. There is no 
sense, therefore, in which any law of the body is 
derived or results from the action of any one or 
all the organs of the body, or from the symmetry 
and perfection of the whole system. But the har- 
mony of the body, an organic totality made np 
of many interdependent parts, and the special 
purpose which each organ subserves, are the con- 
sequence and the direct expression of a law, or of 
a system of laws, which is active with determining 
force in the embryo, that is, even before the child 
begins to be as an individual and the proper func- 
tions of its various organs are established. 

A similar and equally forcible analogy may be 
seen in the plant. 

The laws of the eye in their relation to the eye, 
and the laws of the body in their relation to the 



THE LAWS OF THINKING ILLUSTRATED. 147 

body, illustrate the laws of thinking in their re- 
lation to the activity of the reason. There is 
that in its nature, for example, which necessi- 
tates a conception in order to a judgment, and a 
judgment in order to reasoning ; which necessi- 
tates a subject of thought and the predication of 
some state or quality of the subject, or the recog- 
nition of an object and some relation between 
the subject and object, or the connection of every 
predicate with its subject to be either positive or 
negative, in order to the existence of a judg- 
ment ; and necessitates the recognition of a par- 
ticular as concluded under a general conception, 
in order to the possibility of a rational conclusion. 
This general necessity is the law of the reason; and 
becomes a particular necessity in each particular 
relation. "We speak, therefore, of the law or of 
the laws of thinking according as we designate 
the general necessity underlying the activity of 
reason, or the particular necessities which de- 
termine particular forms of activity. Such an 
internal necessity accordingly is .not imposed 
upon the reason by experience, nor determined 
by volition ; just as the act of seeing does not call 
into existence the laws of the eye, or as the 
growth and functions of the body do not origi- 



148 LOGIC AND ITS RELATIONS. 

nate physiological laws. But all judgment, ex- 
perience, and volition are rendered possible by 
the spontaneous force of this necessity which 
exists in the being of the reason; just as vision 
presupposes and depends upon the laws of vision, 
or as the development, health, and vigor of the 
body imply the regular operation of certain 
organic forces which lie in the constitution of the 
body. 



§ 42. 

THE SCIENCE OF LOGIC DEFINED. 

To discover, unfold, and define these laws, to 
exhibit their internal relation to the categories of 
thought, and their determining force upon every 
kind of investigation or connected discourse, is 
the office of Logic. It is the Science of formal 
truth in distinction from material truth ; that is, 
the science of the form which all legitimate 
thinking, and in consequence also all true know- 
ledge, whether strictly scientific or not, must 
assume. 

This view of the Science of Logic lies in the 
etymology of the term. Logic, derived from the 



SCIENCE OF LOGIC DEFINED. 1-19 

Greek Xoyoq, first reason, then word, is the word. 
A single word is a form of expression — a form 
through which a single thought or conception 
gains suitable utterance. It is the body of a con- 
ception. A conception is the soul of a word. 
But a conception is only one element of the 
thinking process. The laws of the reason, which 
pervade all conceptions and judgments, give to 
these conceptions and judgments a common cha- 
racter, and unite them as parts of a whole. 
Thinking possesses thus a generic form — a form 
common to every particular process of thinking. 
This generic form is the word. The science of 
the word, the generic form of thinking, in dis- 
tinction from a word, or a particular form, is 
Logic ; or that which unfolds the nature of the 
process in which thinking as such consists. 

Logic is abstract or concrete. As the science 
which has to do with the laws of the reason, or 
with the process of thinking as such, irrespec- 
tive of application to any object of thought, it is 
abstract; like pure mathematics which treats of 
the laws and formula* of magnitude or quantity, 
without relation to matter. But as the laws of 
reason are immanent in the activity of the reason 
reproducing its object, logic becomes eoncret in 
13* 



150 LOGIC AND ITS RELATIONS. 

every scientific system; just as the principles of 
pure mathematics become concrete in a system 
of astronomy. 

According to § 20, the constitution of the 
human reason corresponds to the objective order 
of the universal whole. The universal whole, 
comprising different divisions and innumerable 
classes of being, is finite and relative, and springs 
from a creative act of the infinite and absolute. 
The will of God, the absolute Being, is the law 
for each part of relative existence. That law, as 
expressed in a class, determines the nature of the 
species, and as expressed in a species, determines 
the nature of the individual. The order of objec- 
tive being is, therefore, first the absolute, then 
the relative or created whole, then a department 
of the created whole, a class, and so on. The 
individual rests in the species, the species in the 
genus ; the creature in the will and power of the 
Creator. 

To this objective order of being the subjective 
process of thinking corresponds. It begins with 
the most general, then passes to the less general, 
then to the less general still, and so on to the 
particular and the singular. It determines the 
particular from the general ; not the general from 



SCIENCE OF LOGIC DEFINED. 1&1 

the particular. This is the subjective order 
always. There is accordingly but one legitimate 
process of thinking, and that is deduction. In- 
duction is not a co-ordinate, but a subordinate 
process ; and may very properly be called a spe- 
cies of deduction. Induction passes, it is true, 
from the known to the unknown particulars ; or 
from a sufficient number of known particulars 
belonging to an object it concludes upon the 
general nature of the object itself. But the in- 
ductive process always assumes a general prin- 
ciple from which it derives its validity ; namely, 
that a given number of particular phenomena 
belonging to an object — to an individual, or a 
class, — being known, we know the general 
nature of the object itself. If this principle be 
false, the result of every process of induction is 
false also. The general principle, now, holds the 
place of the major proposition in a process of 
induction. The particular phenomena as predi- 
cated of the object, determine the minor, The 
object is subjected to an analysis in order to esta- 
blish the number and character of phenomena. 
The result of the induction is an inference drawn 
from the known phenomena by means of the 
general principle. The inference is broader, in- 



152 LOGIC AND ITS RELATIONS. 

deed, than the known particulars ; it pertains to 
the general nature of the object. But the object 
is itself a particular, a particular class of being. 
The inference pertains really to the general 
nature of a particular class, and is grounded in 
the assumed principle — a principle which is 
much more general than the result of the induc- 
tion. 

"We may add, that there are other still more 
general principles which lie back of the one 
upon which the process of induction is based. 
In the empirical sciences, for example, it is 
always assumed that the outward object exists, 
that it possesses a general nature, and that sensa- 
tion is veracious. 

Taking this view of the correspondence be- 
tween the laws of the reason and the constitution 
of the universal whole, all legitimate reasoning is 
to be regarded as deductive ; and Logic is in con- 
sequence to be defined as the Science of Deduc- 
tive Reasoning — a definition that is not in con- 
flict with the one given before, but exhibits the 
science under a different aspect. 

Those who profess to start absolutely with cer- 
tain particular phenomena ascertained to be true 
by careful investigation or experiment, and from 



SCIENCE OF LOGIC DEFINED. 153 

these to draw a general conclusion, refusing, at 
the same time, to accept any general proposition 
as true which is not an induction from known 
facts, either impose upon themselves, or make a 
wilful attempt to impose upon others. Whilst 
they quietly assume, whether consciously or not, 
a general truth ; and, sustained by it, proceed legi- 
timately from particulars to a general, or from 
the parts to a whole, they ignore their indebted- 
ness to the assumed general truth, and even pre- 
sume to deny its existence. Relatively the 
human reason does infer a general truth from a 
number of particular facts ; that is, in a subordi- 
nate case, and sustained by a true general prin- 
ciple, the inductive process is legitimate ; the 
result of the induction being, however, less 
general than the principle or principles by which 
the process is legitimated. But absolutely the 
reason concludes upon a particular from a 
general truth. It is so constituted that, in spite 
of all effort to contrary, it always pursues this 
order of thought. The reverse order, or the in- 
ductive method, regarded as an absolute method, 
or as co-ordinate with the deductive method, is a 
rational impossibility. The reason cannot think 
logically, whether it proceed from the whole to 



15 i LOGIC AND ITS RELATIONS. 

the parts, or from the parts to the whole, without 
an ultimate basis upon which it rests — an as- 
sumed general truth which, as a principle, deter- 
mines and legitimates the process. 

The history of any empirical science may be 
used as a satisfactory illustration. But we do 
not wish to extend the discussion by particu- 
larizing. 



SECTION IT. 

THE RELATIONS OF LOGIC. 

§ 43. 

THE RELATION OF LOGIC TO PHILOSOPHY. 

The relation of Logic to Philosophy is deduced 
from the nature of both. Philosophy is, on the 
one hand, a process of the reason reproducing its 
objects according to its own laws ; and, on the 
other,- the existence of objective being in idea, or 
under an ideal form. As such it is wrought out 
and moves forward only in the light of intuitive 
ideas, and in the strength of legitimate thinking. 

Logic is the science not of the reason, nor yet 
directly of the fundamental operations of the 



RELATION TO PHILOSOPHY. 155 

reason, but the science of legitimate thinking, 
that is, of the laws which lie in the constitution 
of the human reason, and are active in its fun- 
damental operations with determining force. In 
other words, it develops the internal necessities 
according to which the reason thinks. It sets 
forth these necessities in their relation to and 
influence upon conception, judgment, and reason- 
ing. And it determines what is, and what is 
not, a valid process of argumentation in every 
department of human knowledge. 

Logic is, therefore, the plastic power, or forma- 
tive principle, of Philosophy. According to 
§ 21, there are three things comprehended in phi- 
losophy: its form, its matter, and the union of 
both ; an organic union in the sphere of thought. 
The matter is determined by the nature of being; 
the form is given forth spontaneously by the 
ideas and laws of the reason. It follows that 
logic, or the science of legitimate thinking, 
sustains an internal and necessary relation to all 
scientific knowledge. It is a manifold force or 
power springing from the reason, under the spon- 
taneous operation of which, being as such, or the 
objective nature of being, assumes scientific form, 
or system, in philosophy. 



156 LOGIC AND ITS RELATIONS. 

Hence, logic is also the subjective condition, 
and an essential element of philosophy. 

It is the subjective condition. The human rea- 
son can lay hold of and reproduce its objects 
only by conforming to its own laws — not other- 
wise. Thinking must proceed according to the 
laws of thinking. Then only is it valid. It is 
valid because of implicit obedience to these 
subjective demands. That is to say, a process of 
legitimate reproductive thinking depends upon 
the plastic power of logic as a subjective condi- 
tion, without which every effort of reason must 
run into inevitable confusion and contradiction. 

It is an essential element. " Being the plastic 
power which is conditional to legitimate repro- 
ductive thinking, logic becomes an integral part 
also of philosophy. It enters into the nature of 
the philosophic process, and all philosophic 
results, just as the mysterious laws of the bee, or 
of bee-life, enter into and constitute a constituent 
of the honeycomb ; or as the principles of pure 
mathematics enter into and become a constituent 
of the Science of Astronomy. 

A system of philosophy is logical, not from 
convenience, or by any arbitrary arrangement, 
but of necessity. It is logical in its beginning, 



THE PROVINCE OF LOGIC. 157 

at every step of its onward movement, and in the 
possession of any truth which it may evolve. 
The reason may, indeed, disregard logic ; it may 
violate its own laws; and very often does it, 
either consciously or unconsciously; but such 
activity is not rational ; and reason does not, and 
cannot, come into possession of any truth philo- 
sophically. The results of the reason active in 
violation of itself, amount to nothing more than 
a tissue of absurdities. 



§ 44. 

THE PROVINCE OF LOGIC IN ITS RELATION TO 
PHILOSOPHY. 

The object of philosophy, or that on which it 
terminates, is the objective order of being, in its 
origin, in the modes of its subsistence, and in all 
its relations. Its end is the possession of mate- 
rial truth, or the evolution of this objective order 
in idea, and in a manner that is conformable to 
its own nature. 

The object of logic, or that on which it termi- 
nates, is the whole process of thinking as deter- 

] i 



l£>3 LOGIC AND ITS RELATIONS. 

mined by the constitution of the subject, the 
human reason, or that which philosophizes. Its 
end is the possession of formal truth, or the 
actualization of a process of thought which, in 
principle and method, corresponds to what the 
laws of the human reason themselves demand. 

The province of logic in its relation to philo- 
sophy, is accordingly of a threefold character. It 
pertains to the first premiss, or fundamental prin- 
ciple of reasoning ; to the process of reasoning 
itself; and to the conclusion or thesis which it is 
the design of a process of reasoning to establish. 

1. It belongs to the province of logic to deter- 
mine, in a general way, the necessity of funda- 
mental judgments or premises in order to a 
conclusion. Some of these are less, and others 
more remote. Logic determines the necessity of 
a major premiss in a simple syllogism. It deter- 
mines the necessity of a fundamental premiss, or 
of a more general judgment than that contained 
in the major proposition of a simple syllogism, in 
a given series of subordinate judgments in order 
to the validity of any one of them. To this fun- 
damental premiss the series is reducible. Logic 
also determines the necessity of an ultimate pre- 
miss, or of a most general and comprehensive 



THE PROVINCE OF LOdlC. 159 

judgment, to which all those premises which are 
fundamental to particular series of subordinate 
premises may be reduced, in order to the validity 
of their fundamental relation. For all legitimate 
thinking presupposes some ultimate proposition 
— some idea or general judgment — known, or as- 
sumed to be true, in which the process of thought 
begins, and on which the validity and force of the 
successive steps of the process depend. 

In obedience to the demands of logic, philo- 
sophy determines what the judgment or premiss is, 
from which it derives any conclusion. It deter- 
mines what the general judgment, or the prin- 
ciple, is, upon which a scientific system of truth 
is constructed. And it struggles to determine 
what is the most general and comprehensive 
judgment, or the first of all principles, in virtue 
of which every subordinate principle is true. 
The question, what? must be put according to 
the demands of logic, and is answered according 
to the demands of philosophy. Or, we may say, 
that the plastic power of logic requires a system 
of philosophy to have a fundamental principle — 
without it a pretended system cannot be a sys- 
tem, — whilst philosophy itself determines the 
matter of the principle, or what the fundamental 



160 LOGIC AND ITS RELATIONS. 

principle or hypothesis really is, from which, as 
a starting-point, a system of truth is unfolded. 

2, Assuming a general judgment or fundamental 
premiss, logic determines the necessity and order 
of a process of reasoning by which a conclusion 
is established. It then decides whether a given 
process of reasoning be valid or not. It does not 
decide whether the matter or contents of the 
reasoning be true. That depends upon the truth 
of the premises. It decides whether or not the 
reasoning possesses formal truth ; that is, whether 
it proceeds according to those innate laws of 
the human reason, conformity to which the 
nature of reasoning, as it is in itself, absolutely 
demands. The violation of any law of thinking 
turns a pretended train of reasoning into a 
nullity. Logic detects such violation, whether 
intentional or accidental, and distinguishes be- 
tween real thinking and a mere sophism or para- 
logism. 

A philosophical train of reasoning compre- 
hends and embodies the power of logic. Begin- 
ning with a principle, philosophy actualizes the 
determinations of logic in a systematic order of 
thought possessing material truth. Whilst the 
one merely exhibits the necessary conditions of a 



THE PROVINCE OF LOGIC. 161 

valid process of thought, the other is that valid 
process itself moving forward in a real way, 
step by step, from a fundamental principle to- 
wards a legitimate conclusion. Hence, as distin- 
guished from logic, philosophy determines, not 
the formal, but the material truth, or the con- 
tents, of a system. Strictly speaking, however, 
formal truth and material truth are organically 
one in a true system of thinking. Logic is the 
plastic power of a scientific system ; and a scien- 
tific system is the necessary form which the 
objective truth, apprehended and reproduced by 
the reason under the operation of its own laws, 
assumes in philosophy. Logic, or the necessity 
of formal truth, that is, the correspondence of 
any actual process of thought to the demands of 
the laws of thought, is therefore the essential 
condition of material truth in philosophy, and 
in all the particular sciences. Philosophy — to 
express the same thing in different language — is 
the logical reproduction of being, in its necessity 
and generality; and a particular science is the 
logical reproduction of a particular department of 
being or objective truth. 

3. Logic determines the nature and necessity 
of a conclusion as the completion of a process of 

] i ; - 



102 LOGIC AND ITS RELATIONS. 

reasoning. Without reaching a judgment that 
takes up and expresses the thought which the 
process unfolds from a fundamental conception, 
the process itself is incomplete, and of no force. 
Logic determines how this judgment or conclu- 
sion must follow from given premises, and w hat 
elements it must comprehend in order to be 
valid. In any given case, it decides whether the 
apparent conclusion is really a conclusion or not; 
that is, whether it possesses formal truth. It 
possesses formal truth when it follows necessarily 
by a valid process of deduction from a funda- 
mental principle or hypothesis. 

Logic does not decide the material truth of the 
conclusion; that is, whether the matter or con- 
tents of the conclusion be true or not. This it 
serves to do indirectly, but not directly. If the 
fundamental conception be true, and the process 
of reasoning valid, the conclusion must be true 
both as to form and matter. If the fundamental 
conception be false, and the process of reasoning 
valid, the conclusion is true as to form, but must 
be false as to its contents or matter. If the fun- 
damental judgment be true, but the process of 
reasoning not valid or sophistical, the conclusion 
cannot be true as a conclusion either as to form 



THE PROVINCE OF LOGIC. 1G3 

or matter; as, however, an illogical process of 
reasoning is altogether arbitrary, the matter of 
the conclusion may be true by accident; yet, the 
reason can have no certainty of its truth, because 
it does not follow from the fundamental judg- 
ment according to the laws of thinking. If the 
fundamental judgment be false, and the process 
of reasoning false also, the apparent conclusion is 
no conclusion at all ; the reason does not come 
into possession of any truth whatever, either as 
to matter or as to form, but is led into bewilder- 
ing confusion. 

The fundamental judgment or premiss is the 
sine qua non of the logical process ; and a true 
principle is the sine qua non of a true system of 
philosophy. True philosophy meets the absolute 
demand of logic by starting in a fundamental 
truth as its principle ; then actualizes the logical 
process in a scientific system, which is an organic 
whole composed of various parts or members, all 
of which are unfolded from and rest in the prin- 
ciple ; and embodies the necessary conclusion in 
the proximate results, and in the final result, in 
which this actual process of legitimate thinking 
becomes complete. The final result is the pos- 
session of the objective truth by the human 



164 LOGIC AND ITS RELATIONS. 

reason under a form which is determined by 
itself. 

A false system of philosophy is logical, and 
must be logical, as well as a true system. If not 
logical it is not a system. But a true system of 
philosophy cannot be illogical ; if illogical, there 
is no organic union of formal and material truth. 
The object does not exist in the sphere of 
thought according to the laws of thought; it 
cannot in consequence be said to exist properly 
in the sphere of thought at all. For objective 
truth can be reproduced by the reason only in 
accordance with the laws that determine its own 
activity. A true philosophy is therefore the 
living embodiment of a sound logic; just as a 
healthy, vigorous human body is the real actual- 
ization of a correct system of physiology. 

Instead of laying hold of an objective truth, 
however, the reason may project a creation of its 
own, a mere abstraction, that does not correspond 
to any entity in the sphere of being ; or it may 
take a single aspect of a truth, and hold it as the 
whole truth ; then proceed to think in obedience 
to the laws of thinking; and develop a system 
that is strictly scientific. A system thus deve- 
loped can be truly logical, but it cannot be truly 



THE PROVINCE OF LOGIC. 1G5 

philosophical. To meet the demands of philo- 
sophy, a system is required to meet the demands 
of logic: for logic is the subjective condition of 
philosophy ; but to meet the demands of logic, a 
system is not required to meet the demands of 
philosophy. A system may be truly logical, and 
yet be nothing more in reality than a fanciful 
theory or empty speculation ; because though 
starting in a hypothesis from which every part 
of the system, and its results, are legitimately 
developed, yet that hypothesis is not a funda- 
mental truth. 

It is not the province of logic accordingly to 
lay down what the premises must be in any 
train of thought, but simply to determine the 
necessity of premises; much less is it the pro- 
vince of logic to give forth the fundamental 
principle of a true philosophy, but simply to 
determine the absolute necessity of such a fun- 
damental principle, and to unfold the laws to 
which philosophy must conform in order to be 
itself. It is the province of philosophy to deter- 
mine its own premises, and also to discover, in 
the light of faith, that one principle of truth to 
which all other principles of truth are subordi- 
nate. The sphere of philosophy transcends the 



166 LOGIC AND ITS RELATIONS. 

sphere of logic ; yet, in its profoundest investi- 
gations, or in its highest flights, in its struggles 
to solve the most difficult problems, or in the 
triumphant display of its grandest results, it is 
sustained by the plastic power of logic, which it 
appropriates and incorporates organically as one 
of its essential elements. 



§ 45. 

THE HARMONY OP LOGIC AND TRUE PHILOSOPHY. 

The nature of the relation of logic to a system 
of philosophy, and the particular province of 
logic in this relation, imply a correspondence of 
the one to the other, a real harmony of both as 
to principle and method. This harmony can be 
but partial in Idealism or Realism, or any other 
one-sided system, but becomes complete in a 
consistent christological philosophy. 

A true philosophy must start, as we have 
shown (vid. § 24), in the absolute ground of the 
universal whole as its first principle. That abso- 
lute ground is God. The idea of God is an 
intuition of the reason — a primary belief which 



THE HARMONY OF LOGIC. 1(37 

is necessarily developed with the normal deve- 
lopment of the human reason. The constitution 
of the reason is such that it cannot but have an 
idea of God. (§ 13.) But, in consequence of the 
disordering power of moral evil or sin, the idea 
of God, which the reason gives forth of itself, is 
imperfect and unsatisfactory ; and the history of 
philosophy becomes a history of the fruitless 
struggle of the human reason to find out what 
the first principle of all knowledge is. This 
deepest want is met by the supernatural revela- 
tion of God in the person of Jesus Christ. 
Himself both God and man, He exhibits the true 
idea of the absolute ground of universal exist- 
ence, and the normal relative position of man, or 
of the human reason, the organ of philosophy. 
Philosophically considered, He is the union of 
the subjective and the objective — a primary truth 
which, we think, no believer in the Christian 
Religion can consistently refuse to hold. It fol- 
lows that the person of Christ, or the idea of God 
and of man which faith in Christ possesses and 
exhibits, is the first principle of true philosophy. 
(§ 28.) True philosophy cannot, therefore, begin 
with the result of a logical demonstration. It is 
an impossibility grounded in the very constitu- 



168 LOGIC AND ITS RELATIONS. 

tion of the human reason. It must begin in a 
belief that lies at the foundation of all other 
beliefs ; in the belief of a concrete self-authen- 
ticating fact which the reason embraces and 
holds without the aid of logical proof. 

Here precisely do we find the inward harmony 
of true philosophy and logic. The first law of 
logical reasoning is the necessity of a major pre- 
miss from which a conclusion is deduced ; and of 
a fundamental judgment, or a first principle, to 
which all subordinate premises are reducible. 
(§ 44, 1.) In the nature of the case, this fundamen- 
tal judgment must be assumed as true without 
proof. It cannot be established by argument. It 
is an intuition of the reason ; the intuition presup- 
poses and corresponds to an objective entity; and 
in virtue of this correspondence, the entity au- 
thenticates itself to the reason as true. To assert 
that this fundamental judgment can be esta- 
blished by logical reasoning, is a contradiction. 
It is to say that the fundamental judgment is not 
a fundamental, but a derived, judgment. But 
a derived judgment presupposes some other judg- 
ment from which it is derived, that is, an unde- 
rived or primary judgment, which would then be 
really the fundamental one. In being funda- 



HARMONY OF LOGIC AND PHILOSOPHY. 160 

mental it would not be the product but the source 
or basis of proof ; not a conclusion but an assump- 
tion or belief. Thus we return to the same posi- 
tion. "With such inevitable necessity do the laws 
of thinking carry every process of sound ratioci- 
nation back to a judgment, a principle, which the 
reason receives as certainly true, independently 
of any logical reasoning ; and from it derives all 
the force which any demonstration possesses. 

But to satisfy the deepest demands of Logic, 
the underived or fundamental judgment, with 
which all reasoning begins, must be absolute. 
It must be the most comprehensive of all judg- 
ments ; and under it all other judgments, which 
are severally fundamental to particular trains of 
reasoning, must be concluded as relative. Such 
an absolute judgment can be none other than a 
belief; a belief to which all other beliefs arc 
necessarily subordinate ; a belief from which 
other beliefs derive their self-authenticating 
power, and the processes of demonstrative reason- 
ing based upon them derive their validity. It is 
the nature of Logic, accordingly, to assume a 
major premiss, or a principle, before it proceeds 
to prove a conclusion ; and to assume an absolute 
principle, in other words, to adopt a primary 

15 



170 LOGIC AND ITS RELATIONS. 

belief, to which all relative principles are referred 
and subordinated, "before it allows any relative 
principle to stand as valid. To hegin a system 
of philosophy with the idea of God, which faith 
in Christ reveals, is therefore not only consistent 
with the principles of logic, but it is the very 
posture of the human reason which the plastic 
power of logic necessitates. Not religion and 
philosophy merely, but the laws of thinking 
demand just such an ultimate principle as the 
person of Christ reveals. The demands of a true 
system of philosophy flow from the demands of 
the reason. 



§ 46. 

THE RELATION OP LOGIC TO THE SCIENCES. 

The relation of Logic to philosophy, is its rela- 
tion to the Sciences ; for the Sciences are parti- 
cular branches of philosophy. A science is some 
particular department of objective being repro- 
duced, and held in idea, by the human reason, 
according to the laws of thinking. As in philo- 
sophy, therefore, so in a science ; there are three 
things essential to its existence : an object, or that 



RELATION TO THE SCIENCES. 171 

which is what it is independently of man's will ; a 
subject, or that which apprehends the object, and 
reproduces it according to the determinations of 
its own laws; and the organic union of object 
and subject in idea. The object determines the 
matter, or contents, of a science; the subject, its 
form; whilst the organic union of matter and 
form is the science itself, and rests upon the 
necessary correspondence of the human reason 
to its objects. 

The laws of thinking thus enter into a science, 
and determine its nature, as really as the object 
of which the science treats. It cannot exist 
without either. A science must be logical; it 
must conform to the laws of thought in its prin- 
ciple, method, and results. If not logical, if it 
violate the laws of thought, it is not, strictly 
speaking, a science ; it is no more than an arbi- 
trary arrangement of certain opinions, whether 
true or false. Just as a reputed science, without 
having any real corresponding object, is not a 
science ; for it lacks all reality. It is only a 
figment of the brain ; logical and beautiful it 
may be, but it is not even the shadow of an 
objective truth. 

As in philosophy in general so also in every 



172 LOGIC AND ITS RELATIONS. 

branch of it, this relation involves three parti- 
culars. Logic is the plastic power or formative 
principle of a science ; a living force which, pre- 
supposing the existence of an objective entity, 
determines the manner of its reproduction in the 
sphere of thought. 

Logic is the subjective condition; without it 
there can be no science. As science is the product 
of two factors, one of which is the human reason, 
it can be unfolded only when the human reason 
is active, according to its own laws. Illogical 
thinking cannot result even in certain know- 
ledge, much less in a science. 

Logic is an essential element of a science; a 
formative force which is taken up and incorpo- 
rated into a science as an integral part of it. In 
virtue of this element, a science is a system, 
namely, an organic whole made up of various 
parts or members, which are derived from, and 
pervaded by, a principle binding them all into a 
unity. Not an abstract, but a concrete system ; 
a system because wrought out according to the 
laws of thinking ; and concrete, because the le- 
gitimate union of the real and ideal, the matter 
and form of thought, in one organic totality. 

These three particulars are not three different 



RELATION TO THE SCIENCES. 173 

forces, but so many aspects of one subjective 
force, which, as a constituent, enters into and 
moulds a science spontaneously. It is the un- 
seen and silent but potent and resistless energy 
of the human reason, giving to its knowledge a 
shape which is after its own image. 

The relation of logic to a science is, therefore, 
not outward and formal, or mechanical, but in- 
ward and organic. A science developed and 
wrought out scientifically, is such a free union 
of the objective and subjective, of the real and 
ideal, of the ontological and the logical, that 
both constituent elements disappear in their 
separate character. The ontological in a science, 
is not identical with the object itself, as it exists 
in the sphere of being. The one, indeed, must 
answer to the other — the matter of a science to 
the objective entity. Otherwise it were devoid 
of all truth. But the object with its actual attri- 
butes and relations is one thing, and that object 
as apprehended and appropriated by the reason, 
thus becoming an element in scientific know- 
ledge, is a very different tiling. The one is a 
part of the real world as it is in itself, the other 
is a part of the ideal world, or of the real world 
as held in idea by the power of reason. 



174 LOGIC AND ITS RELATIONS. 

So too with logic. Treated as a separate 
science, it lias its abstruse forms, its subtle dis- 
tinctions, and its nice technicalities. It cannot 
exist without them. But when logic enters pro- 
perly into a science as its formative power and 
an essential element, these forms and technicali- 
ties have no place. They fall away naturally. 
The logical principle underlies, penetrates, and 
moulds the whole science, operating organically, 
not as a force from without directed simply by 
will, but as a force from within. It casts know- 
ledge thus into reason's own mould, and deter- 
mines the entire structure and form of a science. 
But that form is not the form of logic, separately 
considered ; it is the form which the objective 
entity assumes under the determinative force of 
the reason, active according to its own laws. It 
is the form which logic, considered as a living 
subjective power, gives to the matter of a sci- 
ence. The logical and the ontological become 
an organic unity; the one determining as to 
form, the other being determined. The form of 
any science is not, therefore, peculiar either to 
logic as such, or to the objective entity, but is 
the legitimate product of two factors which 
mutually demand and complete each other in 



RELATION TO THE SCIENCES. 175 

the sphere of thought. The proper form of a 
science is peculiar to the science itself. 

This we regard as the true relation of logic to 
a science. We call it inward and organic. Its 
operation is spontaneous, yet constant. The 
false relation is outward and mechanical. It 
springs from the will rather than from the 
reason. It operates as a force upon a science, 
rather than as an all-pervading principle in it. 
It determines the order of thought according to 
arbitrary rules, rather than allows the science to 
determine its own order according to its principle. 
This false relation is seen in the arrangement 
and formalities peculiar to logic, which are im- 
posed upon a science ; which obtrude themselves 
upon our view unnecessarily; mar the beauty of 
its structure ; and give it a stiff, affected air. 
Such arbitrary arrangement and logical for- 
mality do not render a science truly logical — do 
not indicate the presence and power of logic as 
really controlling the order and form of thought. 
Just the reverse. They betray the absence of 
the plastic power of logic ; and in consequence 
also, a want of logical discipline and scientific 
culture. The reason does not reproduce its ob- 
jects freely according to its inherent laws, but 



176 LOGIC AND ITS RELATIONS. 

acts under the direction of the will imposing a 
method of its own. The result is not an organic, 
but a mechanical unity. The form is not the 
product of the science ; the science does not put 
on its form as a tree puts on its leaves and 
flowers; the form is rather a garment, cut and 
manufactured according to measurement. We 
have a mechanism rather than a natural growth. 
The true relation of logic to science, excluding 
all mechanical arrangement and logical forma- 
lity, shows itself in the naturalness, symmetry, 
and perfection of the science. The science be- 
gins in a principle, unfolds its parts in due pro- 
portion and a natural order, moves along by an 
easy process of consistent reasoning, and com- 
pletes itself in a beautiful whole. Though the 
logical element underlies and pervades every part 
of the system as an essential formative power, 
yet it is nowhere seen as such, because it is the 
law, and becomes an actual constituent of the 
science. Using the word in its true sense, we 
may say, therefore, that no science, or essay, not 
even a poem, can be too logical in its construc- 
tion. The more logical any work is, whether of 
science or art, the more freely do the mere for- 
malities of logic recede from view; the more 



RELATION TO THE SCIENCES. 177 

natural and complete is the organic union of the 
object of thought with the laws of thought; and 
nothing is so prominent as the truth, beauty, and 
perfection of the thing itself — the product of two 
distinct but complemental factors. 

A good illustration is afforded by a work of art. 
Haydn's Creation, for example, or the statue of 
Apollo, is the embodiment and expression of a 
conception in an outward form, the one in sound, 
the other in marble. The artist studies and 
masters the principles and laws of his art; and 
they become a part of himself, pervade and 
mould the workings of his genius. He applies 
his skill to the marble block in the plastic power 
of the art living in himself. The result is the 
union of the conception and the material, wrought 
out in virtue of these principles and laws, and in 
entire conformity to them. But the rules of the 
art and the formalities of artistic skill, necessa- 
rily disappear. And they disappear just in the 
degree that the laws of art are an internal, neces- 
sary, and controlling power in the production of 
the work. The work is truly artistic in propor- 
tion to its artlessness. The conception itself 
addresses the eye through the material as its 
transparent medium, and rivets the attention o 



178 LOGIC AND ITS RELATIONS. 

the beholder. On the contrary, just in the de- 
gree that the laws of art sustain a merely external 
connection to a work of art, will the work ma- 
nifest the presence and mechanical influence 
of these laws, and be proportionably imper- 
fect ; because they are upon, rather than in the 
work — associated with it, rather than a consti- 
tuent part of it. A true work of art is a com- 
plete unity, that radiates its own peculiar glory. 

Precisely such is the concrete relation of logic 
to a science. Unseen, but all-pervading, the 
logical element reveals its presence and power in 
the clear, full, systematic, and forcible reproduc- 
tion and exhibition of the truth. 



§ 47. 

THE RELATION OP LOGIC TO THEOLOGY. 

It would be in place now to particularize ; to 
show how logic is related to the several depart- 
ments of philosophy, or to each branch of science, 
physical, intellectual, and moral, considered by 
itself. To follow out such a train of thought, 
however, would swell this Introduction to the 



RELATION TO THEOLOGY. 179 

Study of Philosophy beyond its proposed limits. 
We deem it proper, therefore, to confine our 
attention to but one branch, to Theology, the 
most sublime and important, and at the same 
time, the most difficult of the sciences. 

It has been said that Theology transcends the 
sphere of Logic ; and there is a sense, indeed, in 
which the assertion is true. The object of Theo- 
logy, or that with which Theology has to do, and 
which it seeks to reproduce, is a grand order of 
supernatural realities brought to view by means 
of divine revelation. This objective order is infi- 
nite in its nature and relations ; and consequently 
lies beyond the sphere of logical demonstration. 
The profoundest researches, and the most accu- 
rate and conclusive reasoning, cannot so esta- 
blish any fundamental fact in supernatural reve- 
lation as to make it the legitimate result of a 
process of proof, and thus bring it within the 
grasp of the logical understanding. The power 
of faith alone, the first and highest act of the 
human reason, can lay hold of infinite realities, 
and make them the basis of theological science. 
Hence the whole system, no matter how much 
clear and satisfactory reasoning it may involve, 
must rest ultimately upon a belief, rather than 



180 LOGIC AND ITS RELATIONS. 

upon a rational conclusion — a result that, to 
some minds, seems to be in conflict rather than 
in harmony with the science of Logic. 

Before proceeding any further, we would re- 
mark that, in this respect, Theology does not 
differ essentially from any other science. It may 
be said with equal propriety that any science, 
objectively considered, transcends the sphere of 
logic. Any sphere of objective being is far 
deeper and broader than the science of it at any 
stage of its progress. The constitution of the 
human soul, or of the living human body, is 
something different from the present state of 
Psychology, or of Physiology. The actual condi- 
tion and history of the earth is something dif- 
ferent from the science of Geology. So of other 
sciences. Hence the results of investigation, in 
any department of knowledge, a few sciences 
possibly excepted, are not commensurate with its 
corresponding object. The history of science in 
general is but the history of the human reason, 
struggling in all its might to transfer its objects, 
as they really are, to the sphere of thought; but 
at each step of joyous progress, like the astro- 
nomer observing the heavens with a telescope of 
greater magnifying power than any one that was 



RELATION TO THEOLOGY. 181 

ever used before, the profound scholar is over- 
whelmed with a sense of vast regions lying 
beyond his reach, whose teeming harvests have 
never been gathered into the granaries of mind. 

Not only, however, is a sphere of objective 
being deeper and broader than the corresponding 
science, but the science itself, at any stage of its 
progress, comprehends much more than the re- 
sults of logical reasoning. The results of logical 
reasoning in relation to science, are legitimate 
conclusions derived from a principle, or from 
certain fundamental facts. But this principle, or 
these facts, logic cannot prove. The reason 
assumes them to be true intuitively; and they 
constitute the basis upon which the reason, obey- 
ing the laws of thought, constructs a system. 
Physiology, for example, the science of the living 
human body, assumes the existence of the hu- 
man body, the presence of a life-power, and the 
operation of certain laws pervaded by this life- 
pOwer; and in the strength of this assumption 
or belief, logical thinking develops the science. 
The particulars included in the assumption are 
the immediate facts of consciousness ; or, we may 
say, the reason is cognizant of them by an act of 
direct vision. Their validity does not depend 

16 



182 LOGIC AND ITS RELATIONS. 

upon a process of proof; but, on the contrary, 
any process of proof which Physiology compre- 
hends, derives its validity from them. The 
foundation of the science, accordingly, lies be- 
yond the reach of a demonstration. 

What is true of Physiology is true also of Psy- 
chology, Ethics, etc. Every science rests ulti- 
mately not on a logical conclusion, but on what 
the reason by intuition assumes to be true ; and, 
in this sense, all scienee transcends the sphere of 
logic. It follows that Theology and natural or 
intellectual science stand on the same footing; 
what is true of the one, as regards logic, is true 
also of the other ; with this great difference, how- 
ever, that the objective order of facts which 
Theology seeks to reproduce is infinitely higher, 
and more excellent intrinsically than that of any 
of the subordinate sciences. 

There is a sense, however, in which the asser- 
tion that Theology transcends the sphere of logic, 
is not to be taken as true. The assertion implies, 
to say the least, an incomplete view of the sub- 
ject. It implies that logic is synonymous with a 
demonstration — that it consists in evincing the 
truth of a proposition by a process of syllogistic 
reasoning. But logic, considered as the science 



RELATION TO THEOLOGY. 183 

of the laws of thinking, is evidently much more 
than this. It includes, as we have endeavored to 
show, three essential elements : 1. A funda- 
mental proposition — a proposition the direct 
assumption of which the laws of thinking neces- 
sitate. 2. A regular process of deduction. 3. 
A conclusion derived by a legitimate process of 
reasoning from the fundamental proposition. 
Now, the first element is just as essential to 
sound logic as the second and third ; nay, much 
more so ; the assumption, in the form of a funda- 
mental proposition, is both the ground and the 
condition of legitimate reasoning, and of the 
conclusion which it establishes. It is part of 
logic, indeed, to prove a conclusion, but it is just 
as really a part of logic to lay down a funda- 
mental proposition without proof; the laws of 
thinking demanding the latter by the force of a 
stronger necessity than they do the former. 

The belief of a fundamental fact, or the as- 
sumption of a principle, is therefore the first 
necessity alike of particular sciences and of logic. 
To speak more accurately, it is the necessity of a 
science — of natural or moral science, or of Theo- 
logy, — because it is the first necessity of logic. 
Being the formative power and the subjective 



184 LOGIC AND ITS RELATIONS. 

element, as we have seen in § 46, of science, the 
logical gives shape and form to the reproduction 
of the ontological in the sphere of thought. It 
determines the structure of scientific knowledge 
in its beginning, in its process of development, 
and in its final results. This relation of the 
logical to the ontological in thought being neces- 
sary, it exists no matter how high or how low 
the sphere of objective being may be which the 
reason seeks to reproduce ; whether supernatural 
or natural, divine or human, spiritual or material. 
Taking this view of the subject, the Science ot 
Theology does not transcend the sphere of logic 
in any such sense as implies any want of the 
fullest harmony of the one with the other. On 
the contrary, the relation of Logic to Theology, 
rightly considered, is as real, as intimate, and 
full as its relation to any other science. The 
proper objects of Theology are God, a self-exis- 
tent, eternal Spirit, His attributes, and His rela- 
tions to man and the universe in creation, pro- 
vidence, and redemption. These constitute a 
sublime objective order of facts, which transcend 
the power of rational comprehension. ISTor can 
the unaided human reason, owing to the fall and 
the disordering influence of sin, discern them as 



RELATION TO THEOLOGY. 185 

they are in its own light. It needs a higher 
revelation than itself. But when such a higher 
or supernatural revelation is given in Christ, and 
these infinite realities are brought to view, the 
belief of them is logical ; that is, conformable to 
the laws of thinking, which, we repeat, require 
the assumption of some ultimate or irreducible 
truth as the basis of valid ratiocination ; not only 
conformable to these laws, but necessary, also, to 
a valid system of theological science ; just as con- 
formable to the laws of thinking as the belief of 
certain axiomatic truths pertaining to quantity; 
and just as necessary to satisfy the subjective 
demands of the reason in theological science, as 
the belief of axioms is in mathematics. 

If Theology is logical in its principle, which is 
Jesus Christ, the sum and substance of superna- 
tural revelation, it is easy to see that it must be 
logical also, in its method and conclusions. It 
conforms to the demands of logic throughout, 
just as philosophy does, or any particular science. 
In other words, Logic bears the same relation 
generically to Theology that it does to any other 
branch of science; it is the plastic power, the 
subjective condition, and an essential element of 
a scientific knowledge of God and divine things. 
16* 



186 LOGIC AND ITS RELATIONS. 

In affirming this as the true relation, we pro- 
ceed upon a principle which has already been 
laid down in the discussion on philosophy. The 
primary ideas and laws of the human reason cor- 
respond to the nature of every knowable object. 
Subject and object are complemental. The same 
principle is contained in the Mosaic account of 
the creation : man was created in the image, or 
in the likeness, of God. That is, the original 
constitution of man is adapted to a true know- 
ledge of God. Man, a finite creature, may know 
God, an infinite, absolute Being. It is a postu- 
late to say, on the one hand, that this knowledge 
must conform to the laws of knowledge, or that 
man must think of God according to the laws of 
thought ; and on the other, that God is knowable 
objectively according to the categories of the 
human reason. Hence, God does no violence to 
the capacities and powers of the human reason, 
when he requires Himself to be known as 
revealed in the person of Christ ; and the human 
reason does no violence to God and the objective 
nature of divine realities, when it holds these in- 
finite realities in idea, or transfers them to the 
sphere of thought, under a form which is con- 
formable to, and determined by the laws of 



RELATION TO THEOLOGY. 187 

thinking. The affirmation of a threefold rela- 
tion of logic to theology is based, therefore, on 
the nature of things, as taught both by philo- 
sophy and the Sacred Scriptures. 

Here, then, we find the most general condi- 
tions of a true system of Theology. It must 
meet a twofold demand : the ontological and the 
logical; and the one as really and fully as the 
other. A true Theology must rest upon a view 
of God as He is in Himself, and in all his rela- 
tions. If any assumption, or principle, or any 
supposed verity, is in conflict with the absolute 
truth, the system is false. The matter of Theo- 
logy must correspond to the objective order ot 
facts as supernaturally revealed. 

With equal necessity must a true Theology 
proceed according to the determinative force of 
the reason ; for the reason can have a true con- 
ception of an objective supernatural fact, only in 
the degree that it thinks in obedience to its own 
laws. The logical element is an essential ele- 
ment. An illogical Theology is therefore a false 
Theology, as really as a system that ignores 
supernatural revelation and proceeds on the basis 
of mere metaphysical speculation. But a logical 
Theology is not necessarily a true Theology. A 



188 LOGIC AND ITS RELATIONS. 

system may meet the logical without meeting the 
ontological demand ; but not the reverse. If it 
embody the objective fact, it is logical of neces- 
sity. 

In a true system, these conditions include each 
other. The ontological is conceived and known 
logically. As in philosophy, therefore, two dis- 
tinct but complemental elements become one in 
the sphere of thought, so here. The objective 
and the subjective, the supernatural and the 
natural, the divine reality and the human form of 
thought, are wrought into an organic unity in a 
true system of Theology. 



§ 48. 

THE RELATION OF LOGIC TO LANGUAGE. 

The object of logic is the categories and laws 
of thought. Logic is not concerned directly with 
the object of knowledge — with the soul as such, 
or with the body, with God, or with the material 
universe. So neither has it anything to do 
directly with language. Language is not its 
object. Yet logic bears a relation to language, 
just as it does to the science of the soul, or of the 



RELATION TO LANGUAGE. 189 

body, of God, or of any part of the universe. To 
understand this relation we must understand the 
philosophy of language. 

"We have already had occasion to speak of a 
word as the body of a conception, and of a con- 
ception as the soul of a word. The figure is 
appropriate. It illustrates the true connection ot 
thought and language. Language is not an arbi- 
trary expedient, composed of various signs com- 
bined in various ways, by means of which 
thought is expressed and communicated. It is 
not arbitrary in the choice of words, nor in the 
arrangement of words. It is not arbitrary in the 
choice of its principles, nor in the relative force 
or connection of its principles. IsTor is language 
something which the developed reason may use 
or not at pleasure; as though the reason could 
think as really without language as with it ; or as 
though the developed reason might, at one time, 
adopt language as its vehicle for a certain pur- 
pose, and at another, lay it aside; and yet be 
active normally in the one case as really as in the 
other. 

Man, as we have said, §§ 1 and 11, is a living 
unity. The body is as essential a part of him as 
the reason. lie is not himself truly without 



190 LOGIC AND ITS RELATIONS. 

either. Without the body, he would be a ghost ; 
without the reason, a gross animal. Only when 
both the reason and the body are properly un- 
folded, and are active as parts of a whole — when 
the reason is active in and through the body, and 
governs the body, and the body is active in due 
subordination to the behests of the reason — is 
man really and truly man. It follows that the 
normal activity of the reason is not conceivable 
in a state of separation from the normal activity 
of the body. Each demands the other. The 
proper functions and ends of the body demand 
the determinations of the reason ; and the proper 
functions and ends of the reason presuppose the 
powers and functions of the body. In other 
words, the reason is to the body what the body 
requires in order that it may perform its office ; 
and the body is to the reason what the reason 
requires in order that it may perform its office. 
Thus, the body and the reason complete each 
other mutually. The body is a true human body 
in virtue of the presence and influence of the 
reason ; and the reason is a true human reason in 
virtue of its vital connection with the body, 
which is the condition and the medium of its 
normal action. Yet the reason and the body are 



RELATION TO LANGUAGE. 191 

not co-ordinate. The reason is the higher, the 
body the lower entity. The reason appropriates 
the powers and functions of the body to its own 
proper ends, whilst the capacities and powers of 
the body are preadapted to such relative subordi- 
nation. 

There is, then, a correspondence of the organs 
of the body to the tendencies and wants of the 
reason. Here we find the key to language, or to 
the expression of thought in words. It is the 
tendency of the reason to utter itself in every 
member and organ of the body, and especially 
through the medium of the tongue. And to this 
tendency every organ of the body, and especially 
the tongue, or the organs of articulation, are 
adapted. Hence language, from lingua, or the 
direct utterance of the reason in single and con- 
nected words. The reason gives utterance to its 
thoughts in obedience to an inner impulse, but 
does it under an outward form which is deter- 
mined by the organs of speech. This is language. 

Language is, therefore, the embodiment of 
thought ; the verbal form under which thought 
obtains suitable expression. Its nature is, in 
consequence, determined both by the reason and 
by the body. The reason determines the matter 



192 LOGIC AND ITS RELATIONS. 

of language, or that which it contains ; not only 
what it expresses, but what it is internally. And 
the body, or the organs of speech, as affected 
by various circumstances, such as nationality, 
locality, etc., determine the form of its outward 
expression, namely, the formation and sound of 
letters, words, and whatever there is of lan- 
guage that addresses the sense, or serves to 
represent thought. Language, however, does 
not result from anything like a mechanical co- 
operation of the reason and the body. Its 
internal structure does not exist before the out- 
ward expression ; nor its outward expression 
before the internal structure. As the reason and 
the body are parts of an organic whole, the 
matter and the form of language are the simul- 
taneous product of a twofold force; the origin 
and progress of the one, the verbal expression, 
corresponding at all points to the origin and pro- 
gress of the other, the development of thought ; 
just as the life, strength, and properties of a tree, 
and its shape, size, and bulk, are the result of 
but one process of growth. Hence, the living 
language of a nation, and its intellectual and 
moral culture, rise and sink together. And 
what is true of a nation is true also of an indi- 



RELATION TO LANGUAGE. 

vidual. A savage does not rise who does not 
either acquire the language of a civilized nation, 
or develop his native tongue to a higher degree 
of perfection. And a scholar does not become a 
perspicuous and vigorous thinker who cannot 
command a perspicuous and vigorous language. 
Every peculiarity of thought, as well as thought 
itself, necessarily implies some corresponding 
form of expression. Language is a necessity of 
human nature. 

As the whole human family is but one species, 
there is, as regards their general nature, but one 
human reason, and but one human body. There 
is, in consequence, but one true Psychology, and 
but one true Physiology. A true system of 
either is true for all ages and nations. Either 
science may progress, indeed, may eliminate 
error and unfold new truth ; it may thus undergo 
great changes, and give rise to different systems ; 
but it can never, in any age or clime, ignore or 
transcend an established principle. And there is 
in consequence also but one language, and but 
one grammar. Particular languages may in- 
deed be as numerous as the leaves on the limbs 
of a forest oak; but, like them, they are one in 
having a common principle, a common order, 

17 



194 LOGIC AND ITS RELATIONS. 

and common essential elements. Some are 
higher and others lower, some richer and others 
poorer, some almost perfect and finished, like 
the Greek and Latin, and others very rnde and 
meagre, like the Esquimau; yet they are all 
identical as to that which constitutes each a 
language. For they are all modified embodi- 
ments of the categories and laws of thought, 
common to every race, nation, and individual of 
mankind, under a form which is determined by 
the same species of physical organism. 

The philosophy of language furnishes an an- 
swer to the question in hand. Logic, objectively 
considered, is the categories and laws of thinking 
as such — these as they lie in the constitution of 
the reason, irrespective of any conceptions of 
them which the consciousness may possess. Sub- 
jectively considered, it is the science, or the sci- 
entific knowledge, of these laws. There is, 
therefore, on the one hand, an internal relation 
between objective logic and the structure of 
language ; and on the other, between subjective 
logic and the science of language. 

Objective logic being the categories and laws 
of thought, as they are in themselves, and lan- 
guage being the direct utterance of the reason in 



RELATION TO LANGUAGE. 195 

single and connected words, logic is to be re- 
garded as the formative principle of language as 
such. The reason, uttering itself in a way that 
is determined by its own nature, impresses upon 
language its own forms of being. The categories 
of thought become the essential attributes or ele- 
ments of language ; and the laws of thought 
become the laws of language. Language derives 
thus its internal structure and all its funda- 
mental characteristics from the determining 
influence of objective logic, or from the forms 
under which the developed reason is active spon- 
taneously. 

It does not comport with the design of this dis- 
cussion to enter into full particulars. We shall, 
therefore, offer but a few brief illustrations. 

The reason conceives of the existence of an 
object, or of its being active, or of its relations. 
Parts of speech are accordingly reducible to 
three classes. Words name an object itself or 
its qualities ; they name the activity of an object ; 
or they <name the relations of an object, and of its 
activity. They do not name anything which 
cannot properly be concluded under one of these 
categories. The noun and the verb — noun, from 
nomen, the name, or emphatically the naming 



196 LOGIC AND ITS RELATIONS. 

word, and verb, from verbum, the word, or em- 
phatically the acting or working word — constitute, 
therefore, the framework of every single and of 
all connected expression. 

The reason conceives of an object as agreeing 
or disagreeing, as connected or not connected, 
with some quality, or with some other object. 
Hence, every verbal expression must have a sub- 
ject and a predicate ; and assumes the form of affir- 
mation or of negation. There can be no propo- 
sition that neither affirms nor denies. It can only 
do one of these two things ; though it may do 
either in a variety of ways. 

The reason evolves the category of time, and 
conceives of an object or activity, under one of 
its three divisions: past, present, and future. 
The verb has, therefore, three fundamental tenses 
in all languages, neither more nor less : a past, a 
present, and a future tense. The past and the 
future tense are subdivided more or less freely 
according to the genius of a people, in order to 
represent the subdivisions of time ; but however 
numerous the tenses of a rich language may be, 
they are at bottom but three. 

Similar illustrations of the internal relation of 
objective logic to the structure of language might 



RELATION TO LANGUAGE. 197 

also be given, as regards number, degrees of 
comparison, moods, etc. Ko essential peculi- 
arity of language, in general, or of any particular 
language, is arbitrary ; but is grounded in the 
nature of the human reason, or in the reason as 
modified by race or nationality. The necessary 
forms under which the reason thinks, are the 
necessary forms under which the reason speaks. 
Thought determines expression. 

The relation of subjective logic, or of the sci- 
ence of the laws of thinking, to the science of 
language, is parallel to the relation of objective 
logic to the internal structure of language. The 
one is the formative principle of language itself; 
the other must be the formative principle of the 
science of language. The science of language is 
philosophic grammar. A philosophic grammar 
exhibits the elements and laws of language as 
parts of an organic whole pervaded by the plastic 
force of one principle. That principle is what 
has already been stated ; namely, that human 
speech is the verbal form of human thought. 
On the basis of this principle, one who has 
mastered the science of Logic, may construct a 
grammar of a language corresponding, in every 
part, and as a whole, to what the language is in 
i 



198 LOGIC AND ITS RELATIONS. 

itself. The grammar represents the language 
according to the demands of logic ; and may be 
said to be a logical reproduction of the objective 
nature of language. 



§ 49. 

THE NECESSITY OF THE SCIENCE OP LOGIC. 

If logic be the science of the laws of thought, 
the laws according to which every legitimate pro- 
cess of reasoning is conducted ; if logic be a 
plastic power operating spontaneously in the 
development and construction of every science ; 
and if logic be embodied in the structure and 
fundamental characteristics of every language; 
whence the necessity of the science ? If the 
reason is inclined to think logically from a spon- 
taneous impulse of its own constitution; and 
logic is thus not a system adduced from without, 
and put upon the reason to control and guide its 
own activity, what good practical end is to be 
gained by teaching and studying logic? This 
objection has often been raised; and, to many 
minds, it comes with a great deal of force. Yet 
we must regard it as altogether gratuitous. 



THE NECESSITY OF LOGIC. 199 

The objection maybe met indirectly by a refer- 
ence to the science of physiology. Physiology 
unfolds the constituent elements and laws of the 
living human body, those laws to which all the 
functions of the body conform from a sponta- 
neous impulse. The life-power in the uncon- 
scious infant sets the whole system of the body in 
operation, and produces obedience to every law. 
Wherefore, then, construct and teach the science 
of the body ? If the body obeys its own laws, 
whether these laws be known or not, whence 
the practical utility in promoting a knowledge of 
them? These questions are pertinent. Yet no 
one doubts the value of the science of physiology, 
and the benefit to be derived from the study of 
it. The objection, however, against both sciences 
is in principle the same ; it has as much force 
when urged against the necessity of physiology, 
as when urged against the necessity of logic. 

In both cases, the objection overlooks a fixed 
fact in human nature. With the development of 
consciousness and will, there arises a strong ten- 
dency, and if not eradicated or overruled, a 
resistless tendency to violate all the laws of both 
body and mind. This tendency is the effect or 



200 LOGIC AND ITS RELATIONS. 

operation of the principle of moral evil, or sin, 
which, though foreign to the original constitu- 
tion of man, nevertheless, as a consequence of 
the fall, lies in the core of his being, and perverts 
the activity of all his powers. We say of all his 
powers; and the perverting influence is more 
manifest even in the higher, than in the lower 
powers ; more manifest in the mind than in the 
body ; yet there is no function, whether low or 
high, whether of the body or of the mind, which 
is not directly affected by the disordering force of 
this abnormal principle. 

The principle operates unconsciously as well as 
consciously. An infant, even, evinces disposi- 
tions and may contract habits which contravene 
the laws of its nature. A man may transgress the 
laws of bodily health when he endeavors to 
comply with them. So, too, of reasoning. A 
man may assume false instead of true premises, 
and reason from them without any sense of his 
error. He may not only, but he is liable to do 
bo continually. Or he may lay down true pre- 
mises, and then reason falsely, and draw a false 
conclusion, whilst he believes the process of 
deduction, and the result of the process, both to 
be legitimate. ISTay more. There is ground even 



TIIE NECESSITY OF LOGIC. 201 

to believe that fallacious reasoning is much 
oftcner practised unconsciously than consciously. 
Paralogy is more common than sophistry. 

That man violates the laws of his nature know- 
ingly, that he inflicts wilful injuries upon his 
body, and often endeavors to deceive by sophis- 
tical reasoning, is a fact so generally admitted 
that an attempt to establish it, or even a direct 
affirmation of it, is entirely superfluous. 

Hence the practical necessity of logic. The 
laws of thinking, and the legitimate process of 
deduction, must be thoroughly understood, and 
the mind itself undergo a logical discipline, in 
order that a man may both knowingly and in- 
stinctively conform to the demands of sound 
reasoning, and be able besides to detect errors in 
others, whether committed designedly or unde- 
signedly. A man of acute and well-balanced 
judgment may, indeed, acquire logical discipline 
of mind by the systematic and thorough study of 
language, of mathematics, and of the sciences in 
general, and thus become a correct reasoner, 
without studying the science of logic itself; yet 
he will be more or less at a loss when confronted 
by the subtle sophistry of those who have 
mastered the science, or when required to con- 



202 LOGIC AND ITS RELATIONS. 

firm the truth, of his own conclusions, or defend 
the validity of his own reasoning. 

The necessity of logic becomes apparent also 
under another view. The innate tendency of the 
reason to know scientifically is directed upon self 
under every aspect (§§ 8 and 11) ; not only upon 
body, soul, and spirit, not only upon the nature 
and relations of the reason, but upon the catego- 
ries and laws of its activity. The reason is irre- 
sistibly prompted to inquire concerning itself, not 
only what is it ? and whence is it ? but what is 
thinking ? and how does the reason think ? It 
seeks spontaneously to evolve a scientific know- 
ledge of the forms under which its legitimate 
processes are conducted. Kor can this tendency 
be resisted or suppressed without doing violence 
to rational nature. 

There must, therefore, be some system of logic 
— some method of thinking which is held to be 
right and proper, — whether men choose to make 
the reasoning process the subject of patient and 
thorough investigation or not. The question, in 
fact, is not whether there shall be a science of 
logic or not; but whether the system shall be 
false or true, crude or well-digested, floating in 
the general mind, or regularly wrought out and 



THE STUDY OP LOGIC. 203 

reduced to writing. This is the real issue. For 
the reason is so constituted that it cannot but 
have some method of thinking, which it assumes 
to be correct. 

Thus the necessity of logic arises, on the one 
hand, from the presence and perverting influence 
of the principle of moral evil, and, on the other, 
from the constitution of the human reason. 



§ 50. 

TnE STUDY Of LOGIC. 



The value of the science depends, however, 
upon the character of the system, and the man- 
ner in which it is studied. 

That a system of logic may answer its purpose, 
it must correspond to the demands of the reason. 
It must exhibit the elements, and the process of 
reasoning, from a right point of observation, and 
in a way that is determined, not by any arbitrary 
arrangement, or by any notions of convenience, 
but by the laws of thinking themselves. For the 
laws of thinking are both the object and the 
plastic power of a true system. Determined thus 
in all its parts, and as a whole, by the laws of 



204 LOGIC AND ITS RELATIONS. 

thinking, the system becomes a logical system of 
logic. And it is such a system only that is really 
valuable to the student; none other. An illo- 
gical system is rather a hindrance to right 
reasoning than a deliverance from the bondage 
of error. 

If, for instance, analysis and synthesis be se- 
lected, and the treatment of the subject be com- 
pressed within these categories, the system may 
indeed possess value, but it will be mechanical 
rather than legitimate and free; for there is a 
genesis of thought also ; a category which includes 
and unites analysis and synthesis ; and which can- 
not be ignored without involving a radical defect 
in the science of logic. "We may take a boy to a 
ship, give him a view of it as a whole, then take 
it apart piecemeal, and thus pass through the 
analytic process ; afterwards, we may set part to 
part regularly until the vessel is reconstructed 
and complete ; and thus pass through the syn- 
thetic process. Taken through this double pro- 
cess, the boy's knowledge may be valuable ; but 
he has not been made a ship-builder, nor has he 
become a competent judge of ship-building. In 
order to become either, he must be taken to the 
dock, and there taught to work the parts of the 



THE STUDY OF LOGIC. 205 

ship out of the rude material, and put them toge- 
ther in regular order, according to the approved 
principles of the art. If he possess the requisite 
ability, and pass through this course of produc- 
tive labor, he may become an excellent workman, 
and a competent judge of a ship. Not otherwise. 

Logic is a parallel case. "We may endeavor to 
give a student a view of logic as a whole, and 
then, resolving it into its constituent elements, 
may carry him through the process of analysis. 
TVhen this is done, we may approach the sub- 
ject synthetically, take up one element after an- 
other, and thus form the science, part by part, 
until the whole system is reconstructed. This 
double exercise may be of no little advantage ; 
but it cannot make a man a thorough logician ; 
and for two reasons. The first is, that the pro- 
cess is impracticable. An intelligent analysis 
presupposes a clear comprehension and some sci- 
entific knowledge of logic. This a beginner does 
not possess. Nor can he acquire it but by means 
of a thorough study of the subject. A learner 
cannot, therefore, begin the study of logic to real 
purpose by analyzing it. It is the teacher that 
may analyze ; the learner follows mechanically. 

Another and the principal reason is, that a 
18 



206 LOGIC AND ITS RELATIONS. 

system of logic which begins with the analytic 
process, does not correspond to the order of 
organic development, either in man or in any 
living thing. Nor does it correspond to the 
objective order of thinking. The reason begins 
to be in a germ, and develops itself in all its 
parts, in virtue of the power of its own life. It 
becomes a complete whole consisting of mani- 
fold powers, or faculties, as a consequence of its 
normal development. This, too, is the order 
of thinking as determined by the laws of the 
reason. The reason seeks first to lay hold of an 
object in its principle ; and then to reproduce its 
constituent parts in thought, and to know it, as 
a whole, under the determining influence of this 
principle. Until the reason has thus reproduced 
its object, it does not understand it. State some 
new fact to a child, and it inquires instinctively : 
why is this so ? I cannot understand it. The 
child speaks philosophically; it cannot under- 
stand, until it sees the thing in its principle, or 
cause, or ground — until it knows that on account 
of which the thing is what it is. Nor can the 
developed reason comprehend any object, nor 
understand any science or system, unless it sees 
the object or system in relation to the ground or 



THE STUDY OF LOGIC. 207 

principle from which it grows forth, and by 
which it is determined. Beginning with a prin- 
ciple, and following the order which that prin- 
ciple determines, the reason acquires clear and 
satisfactory knowledge, because the order of its 
activity corresponds to the demands of its nature. 

A system of logic, therefore, that, assuming a 
complete view of the subject, first treats it ana- 
lytically, and then synthetically, does not disci- 
pline the mind logically, for it contravenes the 
natural order of thinking, the order which the 
nature of the reason itself determines. It im- 
poses a method of thought which serves to 
shackle the free, legitimate activity of the reason, 
rather than to invigorate it and deliver it from all 
foreign influences. Hence it so often happens 
that men of strong minds break away from the 
forms they had learned in their youth, and adopt 
a method of thought which is their own, and 
better adapted to their inmost wants. 

A logical system of logic proceeds genetically. 
Beginning in a principle, it develops all the parts 
as the constituents of an organic whole. It is 
but a projection of the legitimate action of the 
normally developed reason into objectivity. The 
reason recognizes the counterpart of its own 



208 LOGIC AND ITS RELATIONS. 

spontaneous order in the system, and embraces 
it instinctively ; for it corresponds, in every part 
and as a whole, to what the life-power of the 
reason determines and requires. Such a system 
is not to the reason what manacles are to the 
hands and the feet, but what a strong frame- 
work of bone and a healthy muscular tissue is to 
the principle of life lodged in the human body — 
the product of its intrinsic energy, and the condi- 
tion of its most efficient action. 

The study of a logical system of logic does not, 
however, as a matter of course, produce a logical 
thinker. This result depends upon the manner 
in which a scientific system is taught and studied. 
It can answer no good purpose to study it me- 
chanically. The design of logic is not to supply 
forms of thought which are to be carefully trea- 
sured up in the memory and used profitably as 
occasion may require. But the design is to dis- 
cipline the mind to think agreeably to the laws 
of thinking. This design can be accomplished 
only by a thorough mastery of the science. It 
must not only be comprehended, but so well 
digested, and so entirely reproduced, that it be- 
comes identified with the spontaneous activity of 
the reason. Thus appropriated, a scientific sys- 



THE STUDY OF LOGIC. 209 

tern of logic contravenes the perverting tendency 
of the abnormal principle of sin, moulds the acti- 
vity of the reason according to the determinative 
force of its own laws, and imparts vigor and con- 
sistency to the power of legitimate ratiocination. 
It meets the wants of the reason as bread meets 
the wants of the body. And as the body uses its 
renewed strength and its invigorated muscles with 
the utmost freedom, so does the reason use its dis- 
ciplined powers and its acquired forms of thought, 
in fullest harmony with the demands of its own 
nature. 

Pursuing the study of a scientific system of 
logic according to this method, the mind of a 
learner receives a normal training ; and he 
acquires the habit of thinking logically on every 
subject. There is no sense of restraint; but he 
conforms both to the principles of the system and 
to the laws of the reason in simple obedience to 
the natural impulse to think. 



18* 



AN 

OUTLINE TREATISE 



LOGIC. 



THE GERMAN OP DR. JOSEPH BECK. 



TREATISE ON LOGIC. 



INTRODUCTION. 

§ 1. 

Logic is the science that unfolds the laws of 
thinking. 

The term Logic — koytxij sc. eiti<m\m or r^ — is 
derived from loyog, which means first word, and 
then the faculty of thinking, because a word is 
the expression of a thought. Among the ancients 
it was called Dialectics — diaXexTtxy. Aristotle may- 
be called the father of Logic viewed as a science, 
as he first treated the subject systematically in a 
work entitled Organon. 



§ 2. 

THE OBJECT OF LOGIC. 



The object of Logic is thinking. Thinking 
may be considered under a twofold aspect : 



214 TREATISE ON LOGIC. 

1. As it is in its own nature and according to its 
own laws. As such, it is abstracted from all con- 
tents or matter. This is pure thinking. 

2. As it is in its relation to the contents or sub- 
ject-matter to which forms of thought are applied. 
As such, it is applied thinking or knowledge. 

Notice the difference between formal think- 
ing and material thinking. Formal thinking is 
merely a process that corresponds to the laws of 
thought, but does not possess objective truth. 
Material thinking apprehends and reproduces ob- 
jective truth, or a reality, according to the laws 
of thought. 



§ 3. 

PURE AND APPLIED LOGIC. 

Hence Logic is divided into Pure Logic and 
Applied Logic. 

1. Pure Logic unfolds the laws of thinking 
without reference to any contents. 

2. Applied Logic unfolds the laws of thinking 
in their application to the object of consciousness, 
namely, to being in general ; and ascertains, ac- 
cordingly, what relation thinking sustains to its 



THE END OF LOGIC. 215 

contents ; in other words, it ascertains the origin, 
the conditions, and the limits of human know- 
ledge. 

The relation of Pure Logic to Applied Logic 
resembles the relation of pure mathematics to 
applied mathematics. Logic may likewise be 
divided into natural and artificial; theoretical and 
'practical ; analytical and synthetical, etc. 

Applied Logic is, in this sense, a part of the 
Doctrine of Knowledge (Erkenntnisslehre), in 
which it is treated according to the essential laws 
of being. 



§ 4. 

THE END OP LOGIC. 



The ultimate end of all thinking, and in con- 
sequence also, of all Logic, is truth. 

1. Truth is the conformity of thinking to its 
own laws : formal truth. 

2. Truth is the conformity of thinking to being : 
material truth. 

Pure Logic unfolds the laws of formal truth. 
Applied Logic unfolds the laws of material truth. 
The one teaches the laws which determine the 



216 TREATISE ON LOGIC. 

conformity of thinking to itself; the other 
teaches the laws and the limitations which deter- 
mine the conformity of thinking to being. 

In this discussion, being, viewed as the object 
of thinking, is always taken in its most general, 
and not in any specific sense. As something 
specific, it becomes the subject of particular 
sciences. 

Inasmuch as the laws of thinking and of being 
correspond to each other (a principle that may 
here be taken for granted), material truth is sub- 
ordinate to formal truth ; that is, nothing is true 
objectively which contradicts the laws of formal 
truth, and whatever conforms to these laws can- 
not be false objectively. But formal truth does 
not include the ground of material truth ; that is, 
whatever conforms to the laws of formal truth is 
not, for this reason alone, true objectively. 

The validity and the limitations of all human 
thinking depend upon these propositions. 



§ 5. 

THE RELATIVE POSITION OF LOGIC. 



As the science of Logic unfolds and establishes 



PURE LOGIC. 217 

the laws of human thinking, and of human 
knowledge, and thus exhibits the negative con- 
dition of all truth, it constitutes, 

1. The first part of philosophy in general, or of 
the science which treats of the original ground of 
things. 

2. It constitutes the requisite propaedeutics to 
all the particular sciences ; because the particular 
sciences depend on logic, both as to their proper 
treatment and their formal truth. 

"What has now been said illustrates the value 
and importance of logic. Logic serves to awaken 
a distinct consciousness of the laws of thinking; 
and thus teaches us to avoid errors ourselves, 
and to detect the incorrect and the false in the 
opinions and reasonings of others. It is, at the 
same time, the formal organ and canon of all 
other sciences. Viewed in this light, the eulogy 
of Cicero is true : Ars omnium artium maxima. 



§ 6. 

PURE LOGIC. 



The office of Pure Logic is twofold 
19 



218 TREATISE ON LOGIC. 

1. To develop the simple elements of thinking. 
The Doctrine of Elements. 

2. To unite these elements into "one whole, or 
to exhibit them in a systematically connected 
train of thought. The Doctrine of Method. 

Pure Logic is, therefore, naturally divided into 
two parts. 



PART FIRST. 

THE DOCTRINE OF ELEMENTS. 

§ T. 

DIVISION. 

The Doctrine of Elements, 

1. Sets forth the fundamental laws of think- 
ing; and, 

2. Applies these laws to the fundamental ope- 
rations of the mind ; namely, 

1. To Conceptions. 

2. To Judgments. 

3. To Reasoning. 



CHAPTER I. 

THE FUNDAMENTAL LAWS OF THINKING. 

§ 8. 

The fundamental laws of thinking, coming to 
view as the immediate facts of consciousness, and 
constituting the conditions upon which the legi- 
timate character of all reasoning depends, are the 
following : 

1. The Law of Identity. 

2. The Law of Contradiction. 

3. The Law of the Excluded Third. 

4. The Law of the Rational Ground. 



§ 9. 

THE LAW OP IDENTITY. 



The Law of Identity (principium identitatis) is 
expressed by the formula ; A is A, A=A. The 



THE LAW OF IDENTITY. 221 

letter A represents any object of thought or 
logical subject. 

The meaning of the formula is twofold: 

1. When A is taken, it must be considered as 
such distinctly, and not as if it were something 
else. This is the principle of affirmation. "Wash- 
ington (A), is Washington (A) ; A=A, and not 
Napoleon, B. 

2. A is identical with itself, and with the 
totality of its parts. (Principle of Identity.) If 
the particulars a-j-b-j-c are contained in the ob- 
ject A, then the object, a unity, and the parti- 
culars are identical : to affirm the one is to affirm 
the other also ; that is, to affirm the object is to 
affirm the particulars included in it. — Man (A) 
is a sentient (a) rational (b) creature (c), that is, 
A=a+b+c. 

As the law of identity is not only a law of 
thinking, but also a law of being, it contributes, 
in an especial manner, to the development and 
extension of human knowledge, and is suscep- 
tible of great variety of application. From it the 
following maxims may be deduced : a whole is 
identical with its parts; a subject with its quali- 
ties ; a conception with its attributes or marks ; a 
genus with its species, etc. 
19* 



222 lUNDAMENTAL LAWS OF THINKING. 

§ 10. 

THE LAW OF CONTRADICTION. 

The Law of Contradiction is expressed by the 
formula : A is not=non A. Principium contra- 
dictions. 

The law of identity and the law of contradic- 
tion are but different forms of the same principle; 
the latter, however, expresses the principle nega- 
tively, and involves the requisition : Do not let 
a contradiction have place in your manner of 
thinking. 

This law is accordingly the principle of nega- 
tion. It determines the correctness of any pro- 
position in a negative way ; that is, the contradic- 
tory opposite of that which has been accepted as 
truth on sufficient grounds must necessarily be 
not true ; in other words, it must be false. From 
the truth of a given thought we may, therefore, 
deduce the falsity of its contradictory. 



§ 11. 

THE LAW OF THE EXCLUDED THIRD. 

The Law of the Excluded Third is expressed by 



LAW OF THE RATIONAL GROUND. 223 

the formula : A is, or A is not. Principmm ex- 
clusi tertii. 

The sense of the formula is this : "Whenever the 
reason thinks, it either affirms or denies, it says 
that A is, or A is not. "No thought or proposi- 
tion can assume any other form. Nbn datur, 
exeluditur tertium. 

The law of identity and the law of contradic- 
tion are united in the law of the excluded third. 
Hence it of necessity determines every act of the 
reason, according to one or the other of the only 
two possible forms of thinking, that of affirma- 
tion or of negation. 

In virtue of the law of the excluded third, we 
may reason from the falsity of one proposition to 
the truth of its contradictory. 



§ 12. 

THE LAW OF THE RATIONAL GROUND. 

The Law of the Rational Ground — principium 
ration is — makes this demand: In thinking, do 
not allow any thought to be received as true 
without sufficient ground. The term ground is 



224 FUNDAMENTAL LAWS OF THINKING. 

used either to denote that which determines the 
understanding in accepting something as truth, 
under an affirmative or a negative form ; or to 
denote some given thought or proposition from 
which the understanding deduces whether some 
other thought or proposition is true or not true. 
The latter proposition is called a consequence, and 
the relation between ground and consequence is 
called logical connection, or logical sequence. 

"We must distinguish carefully between ground 
— ratio, the reason of knowledge — as principium 
cognoscendi, and cause — causa, the cause of real 
existence — as principium essendi. 



CHAPTER II. 

CONCEPTIONS. 

§ 13. 

DEFINITION OF CONCEPTION. 

A conception — notio, conceptus — is the idea, 
the subjective form, of the real nature of any 
object of the understanding ; or the apprehension 
of the unity of its essential attributes. We may 
consider a conception, 

1. As it is in itself, or 

2. In comparison with other conceptions. 

The word attributes — notse — denotes the consti- 
tuent parts or qualities of an object of the under- 
standing ; or, to speak more accurately, it signifies 
an apprehension or the cognitions of these con- 
stituent parts, the union of which, in a concep- 
tion, make a whole in the sphere of conscious- 
ness. 



226 CONCEPTIONS. 

SECTION I. 

A CONCEPTION AS IT IS IN ITSELF. 

§14. 

A CONCEPTION IN GENERAL. 

Every conception is a general term, which 
includes, on the one hand, a variety of attributes, 
and on the other, comprehends a variety of ob- 
jects. The attributes included are called the 
contents, and the objects comprehended, the ex- 
tent of a conception. Hence, we may consider a 
conception in regard to, 

1. Its Contents — intensive magnitude. 

2. Its Extent — extensive magnitude. 

3. Both Contents and Extent simultaneously. 



1. The Contents of a Conception. 
§ 15. 

CONTENTS OF A CONCEPTION DEFINED. 

The word contents — complexus — denotes that 
which a conception contains, that is, the sum 



CONTENTS OF A CONCEPTION. 227 

total of all the attributes belonging to an object, 
a knowledge of which we acquire by the process 
of abstraction. 

To the conception, expressed by the term body, 
belong the attributes of extension, weight, elas- 
ticity, etc. ; to that expressed by triangle, the 
constituent elements : a surface circumscribed by 
three lines. 



§ 16. 

ESSENTIAL AND ACCIDENTAL ATTRIBUTES. 

The attributes of a conception may be such as 
do necessarily, or such as do not necessarily, 
belong to it. They may be, 

1. Essential — notrc essentiales. "Without them, 
the conception, as the union of these attributes 
in the sphere of consciousness, cannot be formed : 
e. g., reason and sensibility are necessary to the 
conception, man. Or, they may be, 

2. Accidental — notae accidentales, denominated 
also modi, states or qualities. Without them, the 
conception, viewed as the union of these attri- 
butes, can be formed : e. g,, the attributes, refine- 
ment, virtue, or vice, arc not necessary to the 
conception, man. 



228 CONCEPTIONS. 

The correctness of a conception depends upon 
an accurate distinction between essential and 
accidental attributes. If we include accidental 
attributes, the conception becomes too narrow : 
e. g., man is a refined, sentient, rational creature. 
If we omit essential attributes, the conception 
becomes too broad: e.g., man is a rational and 
spiritual being. 

Attributes may also be divided into internal 
and external, general and particular, positive and 
negative. 



§ IT. 

SIMPLE OR COMPOUND CONCEPTIONS. 

A conception is also said to be simple or com- 
pound. 

1. It is simple when, by a process of continued 
abstraction, it is not possible to discover different 
attributes : e. g., being, nothing, thing. 

2. The conception is compound when it is pos- 
sible to distinguish its attributes from each other : 
e. </., man, animal, plant. 



extent of a conception. 229 

2. The Extent of a Conception. 
§ 18. 

THE EXTENT OF A CONCEPTION DEFINED. 

The extent of a conception denotes those things 
which it comprehends ; that is, the sum total of 
the objects to which it refers. 

The objects to which a conception refers are 
said to be subordinate to the conception. The 
conceptions, plant and animal, are subordinate to 
the more general conception, organic nature; 
tree and flower, to plant. 



§ 19. 

GENUS, SPECIES, AND INDIVIDUAL. 

As the extent of a conception may be more or 
less comprehensive, the following distinctions 
must be made: 

1. "When a given conception comprehends 
other conceptions mediately, it is a genus. A 
genus accordingly embraces certain conceptions 
to which others are in turn subordinate. 

2. When a given conception comprehends 

20 



230 CONCEPTIONS. 

other conceptions immediately, it is a species. A 
species accordingly embraces certain conceptions 
to which no others are in turn subordinate. 

3. Those conceptions to which no others are 
subordinate, are immediate, their objects being 
single things, or individuals. 

A genus is something relative, not absolute ; 
for a removal of attributes, by a process of con- 
tinued abstraction, enables us to rise successively 
from one genus to another, from a higher to a 
still higher one, until we arrive at the highest 
(all-comprehending) conception of all, than which 
a more comprehensive one cannot be formed. 
This last is the conception of absolute being. 



3. Comparison of the Contents and Extent 
of a Conception. 

§ 20. 

THE RECIPROCAL RELATION. 

A comparison of the contents and extent of a 
conception with each other, reveals the following 
reciprocal relation : 

The greater the contents, the smaller the extent. 



CONTENTS AND EXTENT COMPARED. 231 

and inversely, the smaller the contents, the greater 
the extent. 

The reason is this : to many different objects 
but few attributes belong in common; on the 
contrary, many attributes belong in common to 
but few different objects. 



§ 21. 

VARIATION IN THE EXTENT OE A CONCEPTION. 

The extent of a conception is lessened or cir- 
cumscribed by augmentation of its contents, that 
is, by the addition of an attribute. The concep- 
tion, book, becomes less comprehensive by the 
addition of printed. 1. A book; 2. A printed 
book. 

On the contrary, the extent of a conception is 
enlarged by the omission of one or more attri- 
butes. The conception, a wise tvhite man, be- 
comes more comprehensive by the omission of 
the attribute, wise or white, and still more so by 
the omission of both. 



232 CONCEPTIONS. 

§ 22. 

ADDENDUM. — DISTINCTNESS AND ACCURACY OF A 
CONCEPTION. 

Distinctness and accuracy are determined by 
the degree of onr knowledge in respect to the 
contents and extent of a conception. 

A conception is distinct when we have such a 
clear consciousness of its contents and extent in 
general that we can distinguish it, as a whole, 
definitely from all other conceptions. 

A conception is accurate when we have a clear 
consciousness of the particulars belonging both 
to its contents and its extent. 

Distinctness and accuracy, however, are sus- 
ceptible of various degrees of perfection. If both 
be very imperfect, a conception becomes dark 
and confused. 

"We may, therefore, explain a conception by 
analyzing its component parts : 

1. By analyzing its contents in order to distin- 
guish its attributes. Definition. 

2. By analyzing its extent in order to discover 
its species and individuals. Classification. 

The first analysis is a process of intensive, the 
second, a process of extensive, explanation. A 



COMPARISON OF CONCEPTIONS. 233 

simple conception may be explained extensively, 
but not intensively. 



SECTION II. 

COMPARISON OP CONCEPTIONS. 

§ 23. 

The comparison of two or more conceptions 
with each other, presents the following points for 
consideration : 

1. Identity and jSTon-Identity, or Difference. 

2. Agreement and Opposition. 

3. Subordination and Co-ordination. 



1. Identity and ^Ton-Identity, or Difference 



§ 24. 

"When we compare the contents of one concep- 
tion with those of another, we perceive that these 
contents are either the same — identical, or not the 
tame — non-identical. 

The contents of two conceptions arc the samo, 
20* 



234 CONCEPTIONS. 

or identical, when they possess the same attri- 
butes. If the conception A=a+b+c, and the 
conception B=a+b+c, then A and B are the 
same conceptions — conceptus identici. 

Such conceptions are also called equivalent — 
conceptus sequipollentes, or convertible — concep- 
tus reciproci, because they include the same par- 
ticulars, and can therefore be taken for each other 
mutually. 

No conceptions are perfectly identical ; for, 
should two or more include the same attributes 
precisely, it were impossible to distinguish the 
one from the other ; and the difference would, in 
consequence, pertain merely to' verbal expression : 
e. g., triangle and a three-sided figure; star and a 
heavenly body ; man and a sensuo-rational creature. 

Although synonyms are words which signify 
the same thing, they are nevertheless not per- 
fectly identical conceptions ; for they apprehend 
the same object under different aspects, and in 
different relations. 



§ 25. 

OF AFFINITY AND DIFFERENCE. 

All non-identical conceptions sustain to each 
other the relation of affinity or of 'difference : 



AFFINITY AND DIFFERENCE. 235 

1. Of affinity, when they have at least one 
attribute in common. 

2. Of difference, when there is at least one 
attribute which they have not in common. 

The terms affinity and difference, as applied to 
conceptions, have only a relative signification, 
inasmuch as the degree of either may be great or 
small: e. g., Let A=a+b+c+d, and B=a+b-|-c 
+f ; or let A=a-fb+c+d, and B— a+e+f-j-g. In 
either case A and B are both different and in affi- 
nity. 

Query. Are absolutely different conceptions 
possible ? 

Conceptions in affinity are called similar when 
those attributes which they have in common, 
exceed those in number which they have not in 
common: e. g., triangle and quadrangle. They 
are called homogeneous when they belong to the 
same genus, and heterogeneous when they belong 
to different genera: e. g., horse and camel are 
homogeneous, horse and robin heterogeneous 
conceptions. 

Conceptions in affinity are called cognate when 
they possess some essential attributes in com- 
mon : e. </., man and animal. They are called 
incocjnate when they possess no essential attri- 
butes in common : e. a., snow and linen. 



236 CONCEPTIONS. 



2. Agreement and Opposition. 

§ 26. 

Two or more conceptions are in agreement or 
congruous — conceptus congruentes — when they 
can together he predicated of the same suhject; 
on the contrary, they are in opposition or repug- 
nant — conceptus repugnantes — when they can- 
not thus he predicated. 

Smooth, white, transparent, brittle, may toge- 
ther be predicated of glass, but not of iron. 

Wisdom and kindness may together be predi- 
cated of a man, but not virtue and vice of Wash- 
ington. Thus, also, level and mountainous, round 
and square, rest and motion, triangle and quad- 
rangle, etc. 



§ 27. 

CONTRADICTORY AND CONTRARY OPPOSITION. 

The opposition of conceptions is twofold : 
1. It is purely negative when given conceptions 
sustain a relation to each other like A and non 
A ; that is, when one is the simple negation of 



SUBORDINATION AND CO-ORDINATION. 237 

the other. Contradiction — oppositio contradic- 
toria. 

2. It is positive when given conceptions sustain 
a relation to each other like A and non Ax ; 
that is, one conception is not merely the negation 
of the other, but possesses also some positive pro- 
perty peculiar to itself. Antagonism — oppo- 
sitio contraria. 

Contradictory conceptions are such as: white 
and not white, black and not black, rich and not 
rich, virtuous and not virtuous. 

Contrary conceptions are such as : white and 
black, rich and poor, virtuous and vicious, learned 
and ignorant, courageous and cowardly. 



3. Subordination and Co-ordination. 

§ 28. 

Subordination and co-ordination pertain to the 
relation which two or more conceptions bear to 
each other as regards their extent. 

Convertible conceptions are equal in extent ; 
hence they cover or involve each other mutually 
— se invicem involvunt — as e. g., a living being 
and an organic being. 



238 CONCEPTIONS. 

§ 29. 

SUBORDINATE CONCEPTIONS. 

Of two conceptions one is subordinate to the 
other when the second comprehends the first as 
a part of its extent. The subordinating concep- 
tion is called the superior, — conceptus superior — 
or more general, and the subordinate one, the 
inferior, — conceptus inferior — or less general, 
conception : e. g., quadruped is subordinate to 
animal. 

Take the conceptions tree and fir-tree. The 
former is superior and the latter inferior ; if the 
contents of the conception fir-tree be enlarged by 
the addition of the attribute black, then black fir- 
tree will be inferior, and fir-tree superior. 



§ 30. 

CO-ORDINATE CONCEPTIONS. 

Two or more conceptions are co-ordinate when 
they are subordinate to a superior conception in 
like degree; the superior, conception being, in 



CO-ORDINATE CONCEPTIONS. 239 

the same measure, the common attribute of the 
inferior conceptions. 

Oak, fir, ash, and pine, are co-ordinate concep- 
tions, because they are, in like degree, subordi- 
nate to the conception tree. But fir-tree and 
animal are not co-ordinate, because, although 
both are comprehended in the extent of the con- 
ception, organic being, yet they are subordinate to 
it in different degrees. Animal is co-ordinate to 
plant. 

Co-ordinate conceptions exclude each other; 
for this reason they are also called disjunctive. 
Circle and square are mutually exclusive ; neither 
comprehends the other; but both are compre- 
hended in the extent of the conception, figure. 
Husband and wife are disjunctive, but belong to 
the more general conception of humanity. 

Disparate conceptions are those which the 
mind cannot associate together as a pair: e. g., 
rationality and animality, hand and foot. 

Disjunctive conceptions constitute a contrary 
opposition among objects belonging to the extent 
of a conception. 

Disparate conceptions constitute a contrary op- 
position among objects belonging to the contents 
of a conception. 



240 CONCEPTIONS. 

§ 31. 

ART OF CLASSIFICATION. 

Upon these laws of subordination and co-ordi- 
nation depend the art of classification, to which 
the highest importance attaches ; as it enables the 
understanding to reduce the boundless mass of 
human knowledge to order and system, and thus 
to survey and become master of the whole. 



CHAPTER in. 

JUDGMENTS. 

§ 32. 

We may consider a Judgment, 

1. As it is in its own nature. 

2. In comparison with other Judgments. 



SECTION I. 

A JUDGMENT AS IT IS IN ITS OWN NATURE. 

§ 33. 

DEFINITION OF JUDGMENT. 

A judgment is an act of the understanding by 
which it connects a quality, mode, or state of 
being — property, activity, or passivity — with a 
particular subject, and thereby determines the 

21 



242 JUDGMENTS. 

mutual relation of both. The following ques- 
tions, therefore, require consideration : 

1. What relation does the predicate bear to 
the contents of the subject ? Quality. 

2. What relation does the predicate bear to 
the extent of the subject ? Quantity. 

3. In what manner does the understanding con- 
nect the predicate with the subject? Relation. 

4. In what manner does the object determine 
the understanding in the act of judging ? Moda- 
lity. 

The matter, or contents, of a judgment consists 
of the two conceptions which are united in it by 
the understanding. The manner in which the 
union is effected constitutes the form of a judg- 
ment ; the form is expressed by the copula. Of 
this it behooves Logic to treat. The logical for- 
mula of a judgment is : 

S=P. 

S-nP. 



1. Quality. 
§ 34. 

THE QUALITY OF JUDGMENTS. 

Quality pertains to the contents of the subject 



QUALITY OF JUDGMENTS. 243 

in their relation to the predicate. The two con- 
ceptions which the understanding unites in a 
judgment, may either be in agreement or in op- 
position. Thus arises a division of judgments 
into affirmative and negative. 

1. A judgment is affirmative — judicium affir- 
mans — when the copula asserts the agreement of 
the predicate with the subject. 

2. A judgment is negative — judicium negans — 
when the copula asserts the opposition of the pre- 
dicate to the subject. 

Negation, accordingly, does not lie in the pre- 
dicate, but in the copula. 

The following examples belong to a different 
category : Man is not mortal, and, man is im- 
mortal ; John is not wise, and, John is unwise. 



§ 35. 

A JUDGMENT, AFFIRMATIVE OR NEGATIVE. 

Every judgment must either be affirmative or 
negative. According to the law of the excluded 
third, a different case is impossible. 



244 JUDGMENTS. 

The so-called limiting or restrictive judgments 
are such as contain a negation in the predicate- 
conception. E. g., God is infinite. The human 
soul is immortal. In respect to their contents, 
they are negative ; hut in respect to form, they are 
affirmative. Logically considered, therefore, they 
helong to the class of affirmative judgments. 
These judgments are also called infinite or more 
properly indefinite, because, hy means of a predi- 
cate involving a negative, the subject is trans- 
ferred from the sphere of definite conception to 
that of indefinite conception, a sphere to which 
it does not belong. 



2. Quantity. 



THE QUANTITY OF JUDGMENTS. 

Quantity pertains to the extent of the subject 
in its relation to the predicate. As the predicate 
may refer to the whole extent of the subject, or 
to only a part of it, or to an individual, we get a 
division of judgments into general, particular, and 
individual. 



QUANTITY OF JUDGMENTS. 245 

1. A general judgment — -judicium universale, 
or, generale. E. g., All men are mortal. 

2. A particular judgment — judicium particu- 
lar, or, speciale. E. g., Some men are intelligent. 

3. An individual judgment — judicium singu- 
lars E. g., John is intelligent. 

In a logical point of view, individual judg- 
ments coincide with general judgments, because, 
in both cases, the predicate belongs to the whole 
extent of the subject; e. g., All men are fallible, 
and, Socrates is the wisest Greek. 

The words denoting quantity, or the signs — 
signa quantitatis — used in general judgments, 
are : all, each, every, and the like. 

The signs of particular judgments are: many, 
some, few, etc. 

The signs of individual judgments are either 
proper names, or some word, or words, used as 
their substitutes. 



§ 37. 

If judgments are considered both as to quan- 
tity and quality at the same time, they are called 
General Affirmative, and General Negative, Par- 
21* 



246 JUDGMENTS. 

icular Affirmative, and Particular Negative judg- 
ments. 



3. Belation. 
§ 38. 

THE RELATION OP JUDGMENTS. 

Relation pertains to the manner in which the 
understanding connects the predicate with the 
subject. As this connection may be uncondi- 
tional, conditional, or indifferent — neither con- 
ditional nor unconditional-^- we obtain a divi- 
sion of judgments into categorical, hypothetical, 
and disjunctive. 



§ 39. 

CATEGORICAL JUDGMENTS. 

A categorical judgment is one which expresses 
the internal connection, or synthesis, between 
the subject and the predicate, according to the 
law of identity, or of contradiction,- absolutely ; 
e. g., God is just. Man is not perfect. 

The term categorical is derived from xaryyopia, 



HYPOTHETICAL JUDGMENTS. 247 

and this from xaryyapeiv, which is equivalent to the 
Latin, predicare y or to the German, aussagen ) to 
predicate. 



40. 



HYPOTHETICAL JUDGMENTS. 



A hypothetical judgment is one which ex- 
presses the internal connection, or synthesis, 
between subject and predicate, according to the 
law of causation, or the law of the rational 
ground ; that is, the synthesis presupposes a con- 
dition in the judgment — bnoOeau- — as the ground 
upon which the synthesis rests; e. g., If God be 
just, He will reward the righteous and punish the 
wicked. 

A hypothetical judgment consists consequently 
of an antecedent and a consequent. 

1. The antecedent — antecedens, bicoOems, — con- 
tains the (conception of the) subject as the ground 
of the predicate. 

2. The consequent — consequens, thesis — con- 
tains the (conception of the) predicate as the conse- 
quence of the subject. 

These two grammatical members constitute 



248 JUDGMENTS. 

but one logical judgment. The verbal indica- 
tions of tliese members are generally, though not 
exclusively, the particles, if — then. 

The essential nature of a hypothetical judg- 
ment is based upon logical dependence, that is, 
upon the necessary connection between the two 
members of the sentence, viewed as ground and 
consequence. Hence, we must distinguish it 
carefully from such sentences as have merely the 
grammatical form, but do not possess the nature 
of a hypothetical judgment. Instead of logical 
dependence, the sentence may express only 
simultaneousness, or some other accidental rela- 
tion ; e. g., When the swallows return, summer 
comes. 

There is a sense in which categorical and hypo- 
thetical judgments are allied to each other: both 
predicate the contents of the subject, the former 
as finished, the latter as finishing. U. g. y The dili- 
gent student is rewarded. If a student be dili- 
gent he will be rewarded. 



§ 41. 

DISJUNCTIVE JUDGMENTS. 

A disjunctive judgment is one which expresses 



DISJUNCTIVE JUDGMENTS. 249 

the internal connection, or synthesis, between 
the subject and predicate, according to the law of 
the excluded third. It contains two or more 
members that mutually exclude each other — 
membra disjuncta; — but one member, not both 
or all, can be true. The disjunction may lie in 
the subject or in the predicate. 

1. The disjunction may lie in the subject. 
Several disjunctive subjects may stand connected 
with one predicate; e.g., The Greeks, or the 
Romans, or the Jews, were the most important 
nation of antiquity. 

2. The disjunction may lie in the 'predicate. 
The predicate contains the disjunctive members : 
e. g., Meteorolites proceed either from the atmo- 
sphere, or from the moon, or from mundane space. 

To avoid fallacious reasoning, it is necessary to 
notice the following particulars : 

1. The several members of a disjunctive judg- 
ment must exclude each other ; in other words, 
they must contain conceptions in opposition. 
The following sentence, therefore, is not a dis- 
junctive judgment : John is either rich or hand- 
some ; for he may be both. — The grammatical 
form is commonly indicated by the conjunctions: 
either — or. 



250 JUDGMENTS. 

2. The validity of a disjunctive judgment de- 
pends upon an accurate specification of all the 
possible members. 

3. A disjunctive judgment analyzes the extent, 
not the contents, of a conception. 

4. A hyp othetico-disjunctive judgment is not a 
distinct form of thought, specifically different 
from a disjunctive judgment; for the disjunctive 
relation of the members is the essential matter in 
both. The following propositions, for example, 
are equivalent : 

Hy.pothetico-disjunctive. If the earth be not a 
planet, it must be a fixed star, or a comet. 

Disjunctive. The earth is either a planet, or a 
fixed star, or a comet. 



§ 42. 

ADDENDUM. — PARTITIVE JUDGMENTS. 

It is necessary to draw a line of distinction 
between a disjunctive and a partitive, or divisive, 
judgment. A judgment is said to be partitive, 
because it sets the several species of a genus as 
predicates over against the subject. The genus 
constitutes the subject, and the several species, 



MODALITY OF JUDGMENTS. 251 

the predicates : e. </., Animals are either (partly) 
males or (partly) females. Figures are, some 
triangular, some quadrangular, some polyan- 
gular, and others circular. Plants, as well as 
animals, are living beings. 

A partitive judgment, it is true, bears some 
resemblance to a disjunctive judgment; but the 
resemblance pertains only to their form, not to 
their essential nature. In reality, the two are 
specifically different. The predicates, being co- 
ordinate conceptions, are equally exclusive in 
both ; but in a partitive judgment all the concep- 
tions are attributed collectively to the subject, 
whilst in a disjunctive judgment such an agree- 
ment of all the predicate-conceptions with the 
subject is denied. 

A partitive judgment is, strictly speaking, no- 
thing more than a compound categorical judg- 
ment. It asserts the agreement of several predi- 
cates with one subject under a disjunctive form. 



4. Modality. 
§ 43. 

THE MODALITY OF JUDGMENTS. 

Modality pertains to the manner in which the 



252 JUDGMENTS. 

understanding is determined by an object in the 
act of judging. As an object may determine the 
understanding to regard the synthesis or connec- 
tion between subject and predicate as only pos- 
sible, or actual, or necessary, we get a division of 
judgments into problematical, assertory, and apo- 
dictical. 



§ 44. 

PROBLEMATICAL, ASSERTORY, AND APODICTICAL 
JUDGMENTS. 

A problematical judgment, from npofaXXsw, is one 
which declares the agreement of the predicate 
with the subject to be possible. The gramma- 
tical form is : it may be ; e. g., The planets may be 
inhabited. 

An assertory judgment, from asserere, is one 
which declares the agreement of the predicate 
with the subject to be actual The grammatical 
form is : it is ; e. g., The earth is round. Man is 
fallible. 

An apodictical judgment, from dmodetxvovdc 9 is 
one which declares the agreement of the predi- 
cate with the subject to be necessary. The gram- 



COMPARISON OF JUDGMENTS. 253 

matical form is: it must be; e.g., God must be 
just. Every effect must have a cause. 



SECTION II. 

COMPARISON OF JUDGMENTS. 

§ 45. 
A comparison of two or more judgments per- 
tains to the peculiar relation they sustain to each 
other, in virtue of the contents and extent of the 
conceptions which they severally contain. Hence 
we are led to consider, 

1. The Identity and Difference of Judgments. 

2. The Agreement and Opposition of Judg- 
ments. 

3. The Coordination and Subordination of 
Judgments. 

4. The Conversion and Contraposition of Judg- 
ments. 



1. Identity and Difference. 
§ 46. 

IDENTICAL judgments. 
Two or more judgments are said to be idem 

22 



254 JUDGMENTS. 

tical — judicia iclentica — when they have the same 
matter and the same form. Yid. § 33. They un- 
fold the same thought, hut in different language, 
and for this reason are equivalent — judicia aequi- 
pollentia, paria. E. g. y God is almighty ; and, 
The Supreme Being can do all things. 

But identical judgments are not necessarily a 
tautology ; for, although the same thought lies in 
both, they express it under different aspects. Vid. 
§24. 



§ 4T. 

DIFFERENT JUDGMENTS. 

All non-identical judgments, that is, all judg- 
ments which are not the same as to form or 
matter, are different — judicia diversa. If the dif- 
ference be but partial, that is, if two judgments 
possess something in common, either as to mat- 
ter or form, they are called cognate or similar — 
judicia cognata, similia. Vid. § 25. E. g., Some 
men are virtuous. Some men are vicious. These 
judgments are different because the predicates 
are different as to matter; but similar, because 
the subjects are the same ; and the quality is the 
same, both being affirmative. 



contradictory opposition. 255 

2. Agreement and Opposition. 

§ 48. 

Two judgments are in agreement when they 
connect different predicate-conceptions with the 
same subject, and the truth of either judgment 
may be maintained without destroying the other ; 
e. g., John is poor ; and, John is happy. Agree- 
ment depends, consequently, upon the generic 
difference of the predicates. 

Two judgments are in opposition when, although 
they connect different predicate-conceptions with 
the same subject, the affirmation of the one is the 
denial of the other. The predicate-conceptions 
are exclusive reciprocally; e. g. f John is virtuous; 
and, John is vicious — judicia opposita, pug- 
nan tia inter se. The truth of both judgments is 
an impossibility. 



§ 49. 

CONTRADICTORY OPPOSITION. 

The opposition of judgments, like that of con- 
ceptions, is twofold: 1. Contradictory or nega- 
tive ; 2. Contrary or positive. Vid. § 27. 



256 JUDGMENTS. 

Two judgments are in contradictory opposition 
when the one simply denies what the other 
affirms. This takes place : 

1. "When they are of the same quantity, but of 
opposite quality; e. g., All men are mortal; and, 
All men are not mortal. Washington was a 
patriot ; and, "Washington was not a patriot. 

2. "When they are both of different quantity 
and of opposite quality ; e. g., Ail men are fallible ; 
and, Some men are not fallible. 



§ 50. - 

CONTRARY OPPOSITION. 

A contrary opposition of judgments occurs 
whenever the several predicate-conceptions, con- 
nected with the same subject, are themselves in 
contrary opposition. One judgment is not only 
a formal denial of the other, but at the same 
time affirms also some different positive attribute 
or quality; e. g. 7 This wall is white; and, This 
wall is black. Arnold was a patriot ; and, Arnold 
was a traitor. To say : this wall is not tvhite, is a 
simple negation. The proposition is true, though 
the wall be red, black, brown, or yellow ; no attri- 



INFERENCES FROM CONTRARY OPPOSITION. 257 

bute whatever is expressed. But to say : this wall 
is black, does not only deny the proposition : this 
wall is white ; but also asserts that a certain posi- 
tive attribute, different from white, belongs to 
the color of the wall. 



§ 51. 

INFERENCES FROM CONTRADICTORY AND CONTRARY 
OPPOSITION. 

From the nature of opposition, as exhibited in 
§ 27, the following principles are deducible : 

1. Two judgments in contradictory opposition 
can neither both be true nor both false; we 
may, therefore, infer the falsity of the one from 
the truth of the other, and the truth of the one 
from the falsity of the other. Take e. g. the pro- 
positions : 

1. John is a patriot. 

2. John is not a patriot. 

Both can neither be true nor false. Hence, if 
the first be true, the second must be false ; and if 
the first be false, the second must be true. In 
like manner, wo may reason from the second \o 
the first. 

22* 



258 JUDGMENTS. 

2. Two judgments in contrary opposition can 
likewise not both be true, but both may be false. 
We may, therefore, infer the falsity of the one 
from the truth of the other ; but we cannot do 
the reverse, that is, we cannot infer the truth of 
the one from the falsity of the other. Take e. g., 
the propositions : 

1. John is a patriot. 

2. John is a traitor. 

Both may be false, but both cannot be true. 
Hence, we may reason from the truth of the first 
to the falsity of the second, and from the truth of 
the second to the falsity of the first. But the 
truth of the first does not follow from the falsity 
of the second, nor the truth of the second from 
the falsity of the first ; for John may be neither a 
patriot nor a traitor. 



§ 52. 

SUBCONTRARIES. 

The subcontrary relation pertains to particular 
opposite judgments. One particular judgment is 
said to be subcontrary to another when both pos- 
sess the same contents, but are of an opposite 



CO-ORDINATION AND SUBORDINATION. 259 

quality ; that is, both are particular, and have the 
same subject and predicate, but one is affirmative 
and the other negative ; e. g., Some hoofed ani- 
mals are ruminant ; and, Some hoofed animals 
are not ruminant. In reference to subcontraries 
it is necessary to observe : 

1. That both may be true, because the same 
particular subject-conception may be connected 
with opposite predicate-conceptions; e.g., Some 
bodies are transparent ; and, Some bodies are not 
transparent. From the truth of a given proposi- 
tion, therefore, we cannot infer the falsity of the 
subcontrary. 

2. But both cannot be false; for the denial of 
a given subcontrary judgment is the affirmation 
of its contradictory opposite. Hence, we may 
reason from the falsity of the one to the truth of 
the other; e. g., If it be false that some men are 
perfect, then it must be true that all men are not 
perfect, and in consequence, also, that some men 
are not perfect. 



3. CO-ORDINATION AND SUBORDINATION. 

§ 53. 
The relation of co-ordination and subordin; 



260 JUDGMENTS. 

tion comes to view when we institute a compa- 
rison of judgments as to the extent of the concep- 
tions which they contain. 

Identical judgments are co-ordinate, because 
they are equal in respect to the extent of their 
conceptions. 

One judgment is subordinate to another when 
both are of the same quality, but of different 
quantity. They are related to each other as a 
generic and a specific judgment ; e. g., All men 
are fallible. Some men are fallible. 

Subordination is commonly called subaltema- 
tion ; and the propositions themselves, subalterns. 
The general proposition is called judicium subal- 
ternans, and the particular, judicium subalter- 
natum, — the subaltern ate.- 



§ 54. 

INFERENCES. 



If we examine the logical connection of two 
subordinate judgments — one subordinate to the 
other, — we discover that they are related as a 
genus and its species, that is, as a superior and an 
inferior conception. Yid. § 29. Hence it follows : 



INFERENCES. 261 

1. That we may deduce the truth of a parti- 
cular judgment from the truth of a general, but 
we cannot deduce the truth of a general from the 
truth of a particular; because the general com- 
prehends the particular, but the particular does 
not comprehend the general; e. g., if it be true, 
that man is a free rational creature, it is also true, 
that some men are free rational creatures. 

On the contrary, if it be true, that some men 
are learned, the general inference is not there- 
fore true also, that all men are learned. 

2. We may deduce the falsity of a general 
from the falsity of a particular, but not the falsity 
of a particular from the falsity of a general ; and 
for the same reason. If it be false that some 
plants are stones, then it is false also that all 
plants are stones. 

On the contrary, if it be false that all men are 
virtuous, it is not, therefore, false also that some 
men are virtuous. 

Hence the validity of the following rules : 

1. Ab universali ad particulare valet conse- 
quentia. / 

2. Ab particulari ad universale non valet con- 
sequential 



262 judgments. 

4. Transposition. Conversion and Contra- 
position. 

§ 55. 
conversion. 

To transpose the members of a judgment is to 
take the subject for the predicate, and the predi- 
cate for the subject. When such an exchange of 
conceptions occurs, the quality of the judgment 
remains the same, or it does not. In the first 
instance, the transposition is called conversion, in 
the second, contraposition. 

1. Conversion is 'pure — conversio simplex — 
when the quantity of both judgments remains 
unchanged. This is the case if the subject and 
predicate are equal in extent; e. g., Man is a 
finite rational creature. Converse: A finite ra- 
tional creature is man. 

2. Conversion is impure — conversio per acci- 
dens — when the quantity must be changed. This 
is the case in general affirmative judgments if 
the extent of the predicate is greater than the 
extent of the subject; e. g., All men are organic 
beings. Converse: Son\e organic beings are 



PROPOSITIONS. 263 

men. — All trees are plants. Converse: Some 
plants are trees. 



§ 56. 

CONTRAPOSITION. 



Contraposition is that species of transposition 
which takes the contradictory opposite of the 
predicate for the subject, and the contradictory 
opposite of the subject for the predicate; e. g., 
the judgment: Ail roses are flowers, becomes by 
contraposition : "Whatever is not a flower is not a 
rose. 



§ 57. 



ADDENDUM. — PROPOSITIONS. 



A judgment expressed in words is called a pro- 
position — propositio. Propositions receive dif- 
ferent names, and possess various scientific value, 
according to the immediate or mediate certainty of 
their contents or matter ; that is, according to 
the relation which their certainty respectively 
sustains to a fundamental fact. Hence, we get 
Fundamental and Derivative Propositions. 

1. Fundamental propositions are such as are 



264 JUDGMENTS. 

not deduced from anything, but are accepted as 
true immediately. In the sphere of science, they 
constitute the principles with which all logical 
processes of reasoning must commence. They 
are divided into Axioms and Postulates. 

Axioms are theoretical propositions the truth of 
which is self-evident. 

Postulates are practical propositions the prac- 
ticability of which the reason apprehends imme- 
diately. The perception of truth in one instance, 
and of practicability in the other, is intuitive. 

2. Derivative propositions. The certainty of 
these becomes evident mediately. They are de- 
duced from other propositions ; and are divided 
into Theorems and Problems. 

Theorems, or Doctrinal Propositions, contain a 
doctrine — thesis — the validity of which becomes 
evident by a process of proof— demonstratio. 

Problems involve a question — qusestio — that 
requires a solution — resolutio. To resolve a 
question is to exhibit the practicability of what is 
proposed. 

Propositions that are drawn or inferred from 
others immediately, and therefore require no 
further proof, are called inferences or conse- 
quences ; those that are assumed as principles of 



PROPOSITIONS. 265 

science, there being no sufficient reasons to esta- 
blish their validity, are hypotheses. 

The following propositions are, the first an 
axiom, and the second a postulate. A line is 
extension in but one direction. A line may be 
shortened or lengthened. 

Immediate derivatives receive different names : 
consequence, from consequi, to follow with ; corol- 
lary, from corona, because this proposition is 
hung like a chaplet upon another ; porism, from 
TcoptCetVy to- derive. 



23 



CHAPTER IV. 

REASONING, OR THE SYLLOGISM. 

§ 58. 

In the discussion of Reasoning or the Syllo- 
gism, it is necessary to consider : 

1. The essential nature of Reasoning. 

2. Its fundamental formula?, or the various 
species of Reasoning, their properties and laws. 

3. Its grammatical form, or the verbal ex- 
pression of Reasoning. This is properly the 
Syllogism. 

SECTION I. 

THE ESSENTIAL NATURE OF REASONING. 

§ 59. 

THE PRINCIPLE OF REASONING. 

The essential nature of reasoning — ratiocinari 



ESSENTIAL NATURE OF REASONING. 267 

— consists in unfolding the relation of two con- 
ceptions to each other by means of a common 
relation which they sustain to a third. The pro- 
cess rests on this principle: the general, as a 
ground, comprehends the particular as its conse- 
quence. 

Reasoning is therefore a process that deduces 
one judgment from another, by means of a third 
which is intermediate. 

A process of reasoning when stated in lan- 
guage, is called a syllogism. 



§ 60. 

THREE JUDGMENTS IN REASONING. 

Hence, every process of reasoning, as to its 
essence, consists of three judgments standing in 
logical connection. Logical connection implies 
that one, the intermediate, judgment contains 
certain particulars which belong also to the two 
others. 



§ 61. 

THE THREE JUDGMENTS. 

These essential judgments are the following : 



268 REASONING. 

1. The intermediate judgment. It contains the 
general law or principle in which the two others, 
as particular cases, are comprehended. Hence it 
is called the major proposition — propositio major. 

2. The immediate derivative. It is derived im- 
mediately from the major proposition. Hence it 
is called the mindr proposition — propositio minor, 
also, assumptio or subsumptio. 

3. The mediate derivative. It is derived from 
the minor proposition through the medium of 
the major. Hence it is called the conclusion — 
conclusio. 

The major and minor propositions, taken toge- 
ther, are called premises — propositiones prse- 
missae. 



§ 62. 

THREE TERMS IN REASONING. 

The three essential judgments united in the 
fundamental formula of reasoning, contain three 
leading conceptions, or terms, which constitute 
the matter of a syllogism ; and each one of these 
occurs twice. They are the Middle, Major, and 
Minor Terms. 



ESSENTIAL NATURE OF REASONING. 269 

1. The mean or middle term occurs as the sub- 
ject of the major, and as the predicate of the 
minor proposition. 

2. The major term occurs as the predicate of 
the major proposition, and as the predicate of the 
conclusion. 

3. The minor term occurs as the subject of the 
minor proposition, and as the subject of the con- 
clusion. 

The middle term may be designated by the 
letter M, the major by P, and the minor by S. 
The fundamental figure of a syllogism is there- 
fore the following : 

M = P. 
S =M. 

Therefore, S = P. 

All men (M) are fallible (P), 
The learned (S) are men (M), 
Therefore, The learned (S) are fallible (P). 



§ 63. 

The formulae of reasoning are determined by 
the manner in which the conclusion is derived 
from the premises. As this can be done in dif- 



270 REASONING. 

ferent ways, we get different formulae, or various 
species of reasoning. 



SECTION II. 

FUNDAMENTAL FORMULAE OF REASONING. 

§ 64. 

The form of every thought can be determined 
only by the Laws of Thinking. For this reason, 
there are but three fundamental formulae of 
reasoning : the Categorical, the Hypothetical, and 
the Disjunctive. 

1. The Categorical. — The conclusion is deduced 
from the premises according to the law of iden- 
tity, or the law of contradiction. 

2. The Hypothetical. — The conclusion is de- 
duced from the premises according to the law of 
the rational ground. 

3. The Disjunctive. — The conclusion is deduced 
from the premises according to the law of the 
excluded third. 

Logically speaking, there can therefore be no 
other formula or species of reasoning. 
Any other classification is not determined by 



CATEGORICAL REASONING. 271 

the essential nature of reasoning; but relates 
only to a difference of verbal expression. 



1. Categorical Eeasoning. 

§ 65. 

A categorical syllogism is one whose form is 
determined by the law of identity or the law of 
contradiction. In the major proposition, it con- 
tains a categorical judgment, the subject of 
which, being the intermediate conception, deter- 
mines what the other members of the syllogism 
must be. 



§ G<5. 

A categorical judgment is the foundation of all 
other judgments; hence, the categorical form of 
reasoning is the foundation of all other forms. 
The regular formula of a categorical syllogism is 
the fundamental one, as stated in § 62. 



272 REASONING. 

§ 67. 

THE PRINCIPLE OP CATEGORICAL REASONING. 

The fundamental principle of a categorical syl- 
logism is the following : Whatever may.be predi- 
cated of a genus, or of a whole, may also be predi- 
cated of its species, or of its parts, and whatever 
cannot be predicated of a genus, cannot be predi- 
cated of its species. 

Or, the principle may be stated thus : A predi- 
cate which is in agreement with a genus or a 
general, is also in agreement with its species or 
its particulars ; and a predicate which is in oppo- 
sition to a genus or a general, is also in opposi- 
tion to its species or its particulars. ' 

Hence, we may reason categorically either by 
position — modus ponens — or by removal — modus 
tollens ; that is, we may either affirm or deny. 

Ancient logicians expressed this principle in 
different ways : 

Nota notse est nota rei; and, nota repugnans 
notse repugnat rei. 

Prsedicatum preedicati est etiam prsedicatum 
subjecti. 

Dictum de omni et de nullo, or, quidquid valet 



CATEGORICAL REASONING. 273 

de omni, valet etiam de quibusdam et singulis, 
quidquid de nullo valet, nee de quibusdam nee 
de singulis valet. 

Quidquid valet de genere, valet etiam de specie, 
and, quidquid repugnat generi, repugnat etiam 
speciei. 



§ 68. 

THE FIRST PARTICULAR RULE. 

From what has been said of the nature of a 
categorical syllogism, we deduce the following 
particular rules : 

1. A categorical syllogism cannot have either more 
or less than three leading conceptions or terms — M, 
P, S ; for its essential nature consists in this, that 
two conceptions are determined by an interme- 
diate third conception. In consequence, it can 
contain but one middle term, or but one general 
principle ; otherwise a subordination of two con- 
ceptions to one would not be possible. The op- 
posite error is called quaternio terminorum ; e. g. y 

All passions arc evil. 

All men are capable of virtue. 

It is true, there may be apparently more than 



274 REASONING. 

three leading conceptions in a categorical syllo- 
gism ; but that conception only can be regarded 
as a terminus, which, when taken either by itself 
or connectively, constitutes an essential element 
of the syllogism. 



§ 69. 

THE SECOND RULE. 

2. The middle term cannot be a particular in both 
premises, but must always be a general in the major 
proposition. For, if the major be a particular 
judgment, it is not certain, logically speaking, 
whether the subject of the minor is one of the 
particulars which the major comprehends; e. g., 

Some men are kings, 
1 John is a man, 

Therefore, John is a king. 

As a matter of fact, however, the conclusion 
may be correct; e. g., 

Some plants are poisonous, 
The belladonna is a plant, 
Therefore, The belladonna is poisonous. 

But as, in this example, the conclusion does 



CATEGORICAL REASONING. 275 

not follow from the premises, the syllogism is 
not valid. 



§ TO. 



THE THIRD RULE. 



3. The premises cannot both be negative. For 
no conclusion can follow from mere negation. 
As to quality, therefore, the major proposition 
may be either affirmative or negative; but the 
minor must always be affirmative. For it is the 
office of the minor to place one conception, its 
subject, in subordination to another, the subject 
of the major ; or, iu other words, to affirm that a 
given particular is a part of some general. The 
minor term is affirmed to belong to the extent of 
the middle term. But the force of a negation 
would be, that S is no part at all of the extent of 
M ; e. g., 

A plant is not an animal, 
A bird is not a plant, 
Therefore, A bird is not an animal. 

The rules laid down in §§ 69 and 70 may be 
expressed briefly thus: ex propositionibus mere 
particularibus et negantibus nil sequitur. 



276 REASONING. 

§ 71. 

THE FOURTH RULE. 

4. As the conclusion derives its subject from 
the minor, and its predicate from the major pro- 
position, it follows that the quantity of the conclu- 
sion is regulated by the quantity of the minor, and 
the quality of the conclusion by the quality of the 
major. Accordingly, the conclusion must be 
affirmative if the major be affirmative, and nega- 
tive, if the major be negative. It must be par- 
ticular if the minor be particular, and singular 
if the minor be singular. 

Ancient logicians stated this rule thus : conclu- 
sio sequitur partem debiliorem (particularity) et 
deteriorem (negation). The conclusion must 
always correspond exactly to the premises. A 
violation of the rule gives rise to several errors : 

1. The conclusion may include more or less 
than the premises. The first case occurs when 
the major is enlarged; e. g., 

An artist deserves respect, 

This sculptor is an artist, 

Therefore, This sculptor deserves great respect. 

The second case occurs when the major is 
diminished ; e, g., 



CATEGORICAL REASONING. 277 

Every noble action is connected with peace of con- 
science and self-respect, 
This action is noble, 
Therefore, This action is connected with peace of conscience. 

2. The conclusion may contain the middle 
term, which is a violation of the fundamental 
formula ; e. g., 

Every enterprising artist is praiseworthy, 
John is an enterprising artist, 
Therefore, John is an enterprising and praiseworthy man. 



§ 72. 

THE FIFTH RULE. 

5. The words winch represent the terms of a syl- 
logism must always be used in the same sense. 
Otherwise ambiguity of expression arises; and 
we get four, instead of only three terms, a qua- 
ternio terminorum. 

The fallacious syllogisms belonging to this 
class are called : sophismata amphiboly, fallacur, 
also, quadrupedes, or vulpeculse. Among these 
we include particularly the Conclusio a dicto sim- 

24 



278 SEASONING. 

pliciter ad dictum secundum quid — the fallacy 
which, at one time, takes a conception in a 
general sense, and at another, with certain re- 
strictions; e. g., 

Every spirit is a person, 
The spirit of wine is a spirit, 
Therefore, The spirit of wine is a person. 

Animals are destitute of reason, 
Men are animals, 
Therefore, Men are destitute of reason. 



§ 73. 

THE FIGURES OF A SYLLOGISM. 

The fundamental figure of a syllogism, given 
in § 62, is susceptible of various modifications, by 
changing the position of the middle term rela- 
tively to the major and minor terms; we obtain, 
consequently, several subordinate figures — Tyrjuara. 

The different positions which it is possible for 
the middle term to have relatively to the other 
terms of a syllogism, are these : It may be the 
subject of the major, and the predicate of the 
minor proposition ; or it may be the predicate of 



FIGURES OF A SYLLOGISM. 279 

both ; or it may be the subject of both ; or it may 
be the predicate of the major, and the subject of 



the minor. 


Thus, we 


obtain four figures : 


i. 


ii. 


in. 


IV. 


M = P. 


P = M. 


M = P. 


P = M. 


S = M. 


S = M. 


M = S. 


M = S. 


S = P. 


S = P. 


S = P. 


S = P. 



Every virtue (M) is praiseworthy (P), 
Justice (S) is a virtue (M), 
Therefore, Justice (S) is praiseworthy (P). 

The first three syllogistic figures are denomi- 
nated Aristotelian, from Aristotle, who first sub- 
jected them to a thorough discussion ; and the 
fourth, Grdlenian, from CI. Galenus, the inventor, 
a physician and philosopher, who died A.D. 200. 
The first figure, logically speaking, must be re- 
garded as fundamental in its relation to the other 
three. It is therefore the criterion of the others ; 
and to it they are all reducible. 



2. Hypothetical Reasoning. 
§ 74. 

A hypothetical syllogism is one whose form 
is determined immediately by the law of the 



280 REASONING. 

rational ground. The conclusion does not only 
follow from the premises, but depends also upon 
a condition expressed in one of the premises 
themselves, namely, in the major proposition, 
which is a hypothetical judgment. 



§ 75. 

THE LAW OF HYPOTHETICAL REASONING. 

The fundamental law of a hypothetical syllo- 
gism is this : To affirm the condition or the ground 
is to affirm the conditional or the consequence, and to 
deny the conditional is to deny the condition. 

The reverse, however, does not hold true in 
either case. The denial of the condition is not 
the denial of the conditional ; and the affirmation 
of the conditional is not the affirmation of the 
condition. The office, consequently, of the 
minor, is to affirm the condition, or to deny the 
conditional. 

The ancient logicians expressed this twofold 
fundamental law as follows : A ratione ad ratio- 
natum valet consequentia ; and, A negatione ra- 
tional ad negationem rationis valet consequentia. 



HYPOTHETICAL REASONING. 281 

The reverse of this law does not hold true, be- 
cause the same effect may be produced by 
different causes; this, at least, may be regarded 
as true in view of the limited capacity of the 
human understanding, which, among a variety of 
conceivable causes, is not always able to discover 
the only one that is possible, and therefore real. 



§ 76. 

TWO MODES OF HYPOTHETICAL REASONING. 

It follows that a hypothetical syllogism involves 
two modes — modi — of reasoning : one by posi- 
tion — modus ponens — and the other by removal 
— modus tollens. The formula may be stated 
thus : 

If A is, then B is, 
Now A is, 
Therefore, B is. 

Or, 

If A is, then B is, 
Now B is not, 
Therefore, A is not. 

The modes are the same if the major proposi- 
tion be a negative. E. g., 
24* 



282 REASONING. 

If A is, then B is not, 
Now A is, 



Or, by removal, 

If A is, then B is not, 
Now B is, 
Therefore, A is not. 



§ 77. 

MODES OF REASONING CONTINUED. 

"We may reason, therefore : 

1. Modo ponente : from the truth of the ante- 
cedent, the condition or ground, which the minor 
proposition asserts, to the truth of the conse- 
quent, or the conditional. E. g., 

If the air be elastic it is compressible, 
Now the air is elastic, 
Therefore, The air is compressible. 

2. Modo tollente : from the falsity of the conse- 
quent, which the minor proposition asserts, to 
the falsity of the antecedent. U. g. y 

If this body be a magnet, it will attract iron, 
Now this body does not attract iron, 
Therefore, This body is not a magnet. 



HYPOTHETICAL REASONING. 283 

But we cannot reason in the reverse order. 
The reverse order can be valid only in case the 
antecedent involves the only possible condition 
or ground of the consequent. 

Hence, we cannot reason from the truth of the 
consequent to the truth of the antecedent. E. g., 

If John is virtuous, he does not steal, 
Now John does not steal, 
Therefore, John is virtuous. 

Nor can we reason from the falsity of the ante- 
cedent to the falsity of the consequent. U. g., 

If there be ghosts, we ought to be circumspect, 
Now there are no ghosts, 
Therefore, We ought not to be circumspect. 



§ T8. 

A HYPOTHETICAL SYLLOGISM, PURE OR MIXED. 

A hypothetical syllogism may be pure or 
mixed. 

1. It is pure, if both premises are hypothetical 
propositions. 

2. It is mixed, if the major only is a hypothe- 
tical proposition. 



284 REASONING. 

The conclusion of a pure hypothetical syllo- 
gism can never express an affirmative or com- 
pleted judgment; for, from two conditional pre- 
mises, none but a conditional conclusion can 
consistently be drawn. JE. g., 

If John lias done wrong, he ought to be punished, 
If John has transgressed a law, he has done wrong, 
Therefore, If he has transgressed, he ought to be punished. 



3. Disjunctive Eeasoning. 

§ 79. ■ 

A disjunctive syllogism is one whose form is 
determined by the law of the excluded third. 
It contains therefore at least one disjunctive judg- 
ment; and, as this is intermediate, it constitutes 
the major proposition. 



§ 80. 

TWO MODES OP DISJUNCTIVE REASONING*. 

The members of a disjunctive judgment affect 
each other reciprocally. To affirm one is to 



DISJUNCTIVE REASONING. 285 

deny the others, and to deny one is to affirm the 
others. Hence it is the office of the minor to 
affirm or to deny one or more members of the 
major. And there are, consequently, two modes 
— modi — of reasoning applicable to a disjunctive 
syllogism. 

1. From the position or affirmation of one or 
more disjunctive members in the minor, we rea- 
son to the denial of the rest in the conclusion — 
modus ponendo tollens. U. #., 

This bloodvessel is either an artery or a vein, 
Now it is an artery, 
Therefore, It is not a vein. 

2. From the removal or denial of one or more 
disjunctive members in the minor, we reason to 
the position or affirmation of the rest in the con- 
clusion — modus tollendo ponens. E. g., 

This angle is either a right, or an obtuse, or an acute 

angle, 
Now it is neither obtuse nor acute, 
Therefore, It is a right angle. 



286 REASONING. 

§ 81. 

RULES FOR DISJUNCTIVE REASONING. 

From these principles we deduce the following 
rules : 

The major proposition must always contain a 
disjunctive judgment. 

The minor may either be affirmative or nega- 
tive. 

But the quality of the conclusion must he op- 
posite to that of the minor; that is, the conclu- 
sion must be negative when the minor is affirma- 
tive, and affirmative when the minor is negative. 

The principal formulsB are these : 

A is either B or C, 
Now A is B, 
Therefore, A is not C. 

Or, 

A is either B or C, 
Now A is not B, 
Therefore, A is C. 



§ 82. 

THE LAW OF DISJUNCTIVE REASONING. 

The essential nature of a disjunctive syllogism 



PARTITIVE REASONING. 287 

is derived from this law : The position of one attri- 
bute is the removal of its contradictory opposite ; and 
vice versa. Its validity, in every instance, de- 
pends upon two things : 1. That all the disjunc- 
tive members be correctly enumerated in the 
major; and, 2. That the position or removal be 
correct in the minor. If these conditions are not 
met, a conclusion, correct as to its form, may be 
false as to its matter. 



§ 83. 

ADDENDA. 1. PARTITIVE REASONING. 

The partitive or divisive syllogism is one the 
major proposition of which contains a partitive 
judgment. Vid. § 42. As to its form, it belongs 
to the species of disjunctive reasoning. All the 
partitive objects comprehended within the extent 
of the subject, are set down in the predicate of 
the major proposition. The office of the minor 
is to affirm, or to deny, one or more of these par- 
titive objects. 

The formula, like that of the disjunctive syllo- 
gism, is determined by the law of the excluded 
third. The modes of reasoning are therefore the 
same. 



288 REASONING. 

1. We reason — modo ponendo tollente — from 
the position of one partitive member in the minor 
to the removal of the rest in the conclusion. 

2. Or, we reason — modo tollendo ponente — 
from the removal of all the partitive members 
but one in the minor, to the position of that one 
in the conclusion. 

The fundamental formulae are the following : 

A is partly B, partly C, partly D, 
Now this A is B, 
Therefore, This A is neither C nor D. 

Or, 

A is partly B, partly C, partly D, 
Now this A is neither C nor D } 
Therefore, This A is B. 

In order that this syllogism may be true in any 
given case, it is necessary to specify correctly, in 
the predicate of the major, all the partitive ob- 
jects comprehended in the extent of the subject. 



§ 84. 

ADDENDA. 2. THE DILEMMA. 

The Dilemma — dis h\p.p.a — is a mixed or hypothe- 
tic o-disjunctive syllogism. The major proposition 



THE DILEMMA. 289 

contains a Irypothetico-disjunctive judgment; the 
minor removes the disjunctive conditional, and 
by consequence the hypothesis is removed in the 
conclusion. The mode of reasoning is essen- 
tially by removal — modo tollente. The formula 
is: 

1. If A is, then either B or C must be, 
Now neither B nor C is, 
Therefore, A is not. 

If this body were charged with electricity, it would be 

either in a positive or negative state, 
Now it is neither in a positive nor in a negative state, 
Therefore, This body is not charged with electricity. 

2. If A is, then neither B nor C can be, 
Now both B and C are, 
Therefore, A cannot be. 

If the soul were matter, it could neither rise to the 

conception of the infinite, nor act freely, 
Now the soul can do both, 
Therefore, The soul is not matter. 



§ 85. 

A VALID DILEMMA. 



In order to the correctness of a Dilemma or hy- 

pothctico-disjunctivc syllogism, it is necessary : 



2 j 



290 REASONING. 

1. That the major proposition be consistent; 
that is, the second member must follow neces- 
sarily, as a consequence, from the first, as its 
ground. 

2. That all the disjunctive members be stated 
in the major proposition. 

3. That all these disjunctive members be 
entirely removed in the minor ; in other words, 
that the incompatibility of these members with 
the hypothesis, be fully stated. 

If these rules are disregarded, the Dilemma 
may easily be abused, and instead of exposing 
error, may subserve the purposes of a delusive 
sophistry. 

If there are three disjunctive members in the 
major proposition, this species of reasoning is 
called a Trilemma; if four, a Tetralemma ; if 
more than four, a Polylemma. 

The Dilemma, taken in a general sense, is also 
called syllogismus cornutus, or a horned syllo- 
gism. For it is, properly speaking, a syllogism 
which serves the purpose of indirect contradic- 
tion. Its disjunctive members turn, like horns, 
upon some given antagonistic proposition, to 
which they sustain the relation of consequence to 
ground. As one after another is refuted, the 



VERBAL EXPRESSION OF REASONING. 291 

proposition itself is thereby overthrown. Thus 
Leibnitz, in order to establish his doctrine con- 
cerning the optimity of the universe, refutes the 
opposite proposition, namely, that the order of 
things in the universe is not adapted to produce the 
most good, by employing the following Trilemma : 

If the present order of the universe is not the best 
order, then either God did not know what the 
best order is, or he did not will, or he was not 
able, to establish it, 

Now neither one of these alternatives can be main- 
tained in view of God's infinite wisdom, infinite 
goodness, and infinite power, 
Therefore, The present order of the universe is the best. 



SECTION III. 

THE VERBAL EXPRESSION OF REASONING. 

§ 86. 

THE SYLLOGISM. 

The verbal expression, or the language of rea- 
soning, is the syllogism. Syllogisms are divided 
into simple and compound. 



292 REASONING. 

1. A simple syllogism — monosyllogismus : the 
conclusion is derived from two premises only. 

2. A compound syllogism — polysyllogismus : 
the conclusion is derived from more than two 
premises. 

Each may be either complete or incomplete. 
It is complete, when it possesses all the essential 
elements of the syllogistic formula, and incom- 
plete, when it does not possess all these elements. 



1. The Simple Syllogism. 

§ 87. - 

THE COMPLETE SIMPLE SYLLOGISM. 

A simple syllogism is complete when no essen- 
tial constituent of the syllogistic formula is 
omitted; when, accordingly, it has a Major, a 
Minor, and a Conclusion. U. g., 

1. M==P, 

2. S=M, 

3. S=P. 

All transgressors merit punishment, 
John is a transgressor, 
Therefore, John merits punishment. 



THE SIMPLE SYLLOGISM. 293 

§ 88. 

THE INCOMPLETE SIMPLE SYLLOGISM. 

A simple syllogism is incomplete when the 
three judgments which it includes, are not all 
formally expressed in propositions. It is also 
called an abridged syllogism — syllogismus decur- 
tatus — and as such is either defective or contracted. 



§ 89. 

ENTHYMEMES. 



A defective syllogism — & Ou/mo — is called an En- 
thymeme, because but one of the premises is for- 
mally stated. Enthymemes are of two orders : 

1. They are of the first order, when the major 
proposition is suppressed. E. g. y 

S=M. 
S=P. 

John is a transgressor, 
Therefore, John ought to be punished. 

2. They are of the second order, when the 
minor proposition is suppressed. E. g., 

25* 



294 REASONING. 

M=P. 
S=P. 

Every transgressor ought to be punished, 
Therefore, John ought to be punished. 

Any species of reasoning may be reduced to 
the form of such an elliptical syllogism. And 
an elliptical syllogism can easily be resolved into 
a complete syllogism. The suppressed premiss is 
supplied by comparing the conclusion with the 
given premiss, because the minor and major terms 
always occur in the conclusion, and the middle 
term in the given premiss. If the subject of the 
conclusion is the subject of the given premiss, the 
"predicate of the given premiss is the middle term ; 
but if the subject of the conclusion is not the 
subject of the given premiss, then the subject of 
the given premiss is the middle term. If the 
middle term is the predicate of the given pre- 
miss, the major proposition is suppressed; if the 
middle term is the subject of the given premiss, 
the minor is suppressed. 



§ 90. 

CONTRACTED SYLLOGISM. 

An abridged syllogism is said to be contracted 



THE SIMPLE SYLLOGISM. 295 

when the middle term only is given as the reason 
for the truth of the conclusion. The conclusion 
may either precede or succeed the middle term ; 
from which the premises can easily be developed 
by reflection. E. g., 

Covetousness ought to be despised, because it is a vice, 
Or, Because covetousness is a vice, it ought to be despised. 



§ 91. 

IMMEDIATE SYLLOGISMS. 

The so-called Immediate Syllogisms constitute 
a species of Enthymeme ; and are derived from 
the relations which judgments sustain to each 
other as unfolded in §§ 44-54. They have only 
two terms. The major proposition must generally 
be supplied, and, generally also, in the form of a 
hypothetical judgment. From the identity and 
opposition, the subordination and transposition of 
judgments, we derive four species of Immediate 
Syllogisms, namely, Equipollent, Opposite, Sub- 
ordinate, and Transpositional. 

1. The Equipollent Syllogism. — One proposi- 
tion is deduced from another which embodies the 



296 REASONING. 

same thought expressed in different language. 
E.g., 

Therefore, Nothing is unknown to Him ; 

Or, 

He knows all things. 

2. The Opposite Syllogism. — One proposition is 
deduced from another in virtue of their mutual 
opposition. U. g., 

This angle is a right angle, 
Therefore, It is not obtuse. 

3. The Subordinate Syllogism. — One proposi- 
tion is deduced from another to which it is subor- 
dinate. U. g., 

Every virtue is praiseworthy, 
Therefore, Justice is praiseworthy. 

4. The Transpositional Syllogism. — One propo- 
sition is deduced from another by means of trans- 
position. U. g., 

No human being is irrational, 
Therefore, No irrational creature is a human being. 

In the Opposite Syllogism, we reason from the 
truth of one proposition to the falsity of the 
other, and from the falsity of one to the truth of 
the other. It is necessary, however, to notice the 



THE SIMPLE SYLLOGISM. 297 

nature of the opposition, as it may be either con- 
tradictory or contrary. Only when the opposi- 
tion is contradictory can we reason correctly from 
the truth of one proposition to the falsity of the 
other, and the reverse. E. g., Take the two pro- 
positions : 

This wall is black. 

This wall is not black. 

If the first be true, the second is false ; and if 
the first be false, the second is true. But if the 
opposition be contrary, we can only reason from 
the truth of the one proposition to the falsity of 
its opposite ; we cannot reason from the falsity of 
the one to the truth of the other. It would, 
therefore, not be valid to say : This angle is not 
obtuse ; therefore it is a right angle ; for it might 
be acute. 

As regards the Subordinate Syllogism we may 
proceed either synthetically or analytically: we 
ma}' reason from the general to the particular, or 
from the particular to the general. 

As regards the Transpositional Syllogism, the 
nature of conversion and contraposition must be 
borne in mind, as set forth in §§ 55 and 56. 



298 REASONING. 



2. The Compound Syllogism. 

§ 92. 

A syllogism is called compound when the con- 
clusion is derived from two or more simple syllo- 
gisms. These simple syllogisms constitute the 
premises of a compound syllogism or poly syllo- 
gism, and must therefore stand in logical connec- 
tion with each other. Logical connection implies 
the relation of one, as the ground, to the other, 
as its consequence. 

In discussing the nature of compound syllo- 
gisms, the more various we conceive the possible 
combinations of simple syllogisms to be, the 
easier is it to become lost in empty and far- 
fetched subtleties, which are foreign to actual 
thinking, and promote neither ordinary reflection 
nor scientific ratiocination. Hence, we will con- 
fine our discussion to the principal formulae. 



§ 93. 

POLYSYLLOGISMS, COMPLETE OR INCOMPLETE. 

Polysyllogisms, like simple syllogisms, are 



THE COMPOUND SYLLOGISM. 299 

either complete or incomplete. They are com- 
plete, if the simple syllogisms constituting the 
premises, are complete ; and incomplete, if the 
premises are incomplete. They may, likewise, 
conform to any logical formula of reasoning, 
whether categorical, hypothetical, or disjunctive. 



§ 94. 

THE SYLLOGISTIC SERIES. 

A complete, or manifest, compound syllogism is 
composed of at least two complete simple syllo- 
gisms ; and these are related to each other as 
ground and consequence ; thus they form a syllo- 
gistic series, or chain of syllogisms — series syllo- 
gistica. 



§ 95. 

PROSYLLOGISM AND EPI8YLL0GI8M. 

In a regular progressive series of sj'llogisms, 
the first is called the prosyllogism, because it con- 
tains the principle from which the series is de- 
duced. The conclusion of the prosyllogism con- 



300 REASONING. 

stitutes one of the premises of the succeeding syl- 
logism. 

The second syllogism is called the episyllogism, 
because it contains the consequence following 
from the first. One of the premises of the epi- 
syllogism is the conclusion of the preceding syl- 
logism. 

If the syllogistic series is composed of more 
than two simple syllogisms, each intermediate 
one may be regarded both as a prosyllogism and 
as an episyllogism ; for each one is in turn the 
consequence and the ground of another. It is an 
episyllogism in its relation to, the syllogism from 
which it is derived, and a prosyllogism in its re- 
lation to the syllogism which is derived from it. 



§ 96. 

PROGRESSIVE AND RETROGRESSIVE SERIES. 

The train of thought, and by consequence 
also, the verbal expression, of a syllogistic series 
is twofold : either progressive or retrogressive. 

1. The series is progressive — called also episyl- 
logistic or synthetic — when we begin with the 
prosyllogism, and from it derive the episyllogism. 



THE COMPOUND SYLLOGISM. 301 

In this case, we proceed from ground to conse- 
quence. 

2. The series is retrogressive — called also pro- 
syllogistic or analytic — when we begin with the 
episyllogism, and proceed from it to the prosyllo- 
gism. In this case, we pass from consequence to 
ground. 

Formula of a Progressive Series. 
1. 
A=P, Every organism is transitory, 

B=A, All plants are organic, 

B=P. Therefore, All plants are transitory. 

2. 
B=P, All plants are transitory, 

C=B, All trees are plants, 

C=P. Therefore, All trees are transitory. 

3. 
C=P, All trees are transitory, 

S=C, All oaks are trees, 

S=P. Therefore, All oaks are transitory. 

Formula of a Retrogressive Series. 
1. 

S=A, A virtuous man governs himself, 

A=B, . He who governs himself is stable, 

S=B. Therefore, A virtuous man is stable. 

2. 
S=B, A virtuous man is stable, 

B=C, II'' who is stable i.s tranquil, 

S=C. Therefore, A virtuous man is tranquil. 
20 



302 REASONING. 

3. 

S=C, A virtuous man is tranquil, 

C=P, He who is tranquil is happy 

S=P. Therefore, A virtuous man is happy. 



§ 97. 

INCOMPLETE POLYSYLLOGISMS. 

Polysyllogisms are incomplete when the pre- 
mises and conclusions of the simple syllogisms, 
of which they are composed, are not fully stated. 
For this reason, they are also called concealed syl- 
logisms. To this class belong the Sorites, or 
concatenated syllogism, and the Epichirema, or 
separated syllogism. 



§ 98. 



THE SORITES. 



A concatenated syllogism, or the Sorites, con- 
sists of a series of premises which are logically 
connected with each other, and have one conclu- 
sion common to all. 

The train of thought, and by consequence also, 



THE COMrOUND SYLLOGISM. 303 

the mode of reasoning, may be twofold : analy- 
tical or synthetical. 

1. It is analytical, when we ascend from the 
particular to the general, or from the conditional 
to the condition. 

2. It is synthetical, when we descend from the 
general to the particular, or from the condition to 
the conditional. 

The word sorites is derived from <rwpog y a heap ; 
hence, fftopstrrjS 6u)loyiG>wq, ratiocinium acervale. 
Strictly speaking, the Sorites is composed of a 
series of Enthymemes, each one of which is easily 
resolved into a complete simple syllogism. 



§ 99. 

ANALYTICAL SORITES. 

If the concatenated syllogism is analytical — 
called also Aristotelian, or common, — the predi- 
cate of the first or preceding premiss becomes the 
subject of the second or succeeding premiss, and 
the predicate of the second, the subject of the 
third, and so on. The mode of reasoning is 
therefore prosyllogistico-retrogressive. E. y., 



304 





REASONING. 


A=B, 


All oaks are trees, 


B=C, 


All trees are plants, 


G=D, 


All plants are organic, 


D=E, 


All organisms are transitory, 



Therefore A=E. Therefore, All oaks are transitory. 



§ 100. 

SYNTHETICAL SORITES. 

If the concatenated syllogism is synthetical, — 
called also G-oclenic or inverted, — the subject of 
the first premiss becomes the predicate of the 
second, and the subject of the second, the predi- 
cate of the third, and so on. The mode of rea- 
soning is therefore episyllogistico-progressive. 
E.g., 

D=E, All organisms are transitory, 

C=D, All plants are organisms, 

B=C, All trees are plants, 

A=B, All oaks are trees, 

Therefore A=E. Therefore, All oaks are transitory. 

The name G-oclenic is derived from Iiud. Gocle- 
nius, Professor of Philosophy at Marburg, who 
died in A. D. 1628. 



THE COMPOUND SYLLOGISM. 305 

§ 101. 

HYPOTHETICAL SORITES. 

The modes of reasoning stated in §§ 99 and 100 
refer to a categorical Sorites. But they are 
applicable also to a chain of hypothetical syllo- 
gisms ; a disjunctive chain would not be likely to 
occur. 

The formulas of an analytico-hy 'pothetical .Sorites 
are : 

1. Reasoning by position: If A is, then B is, 

If B is, then C is, 
If C is, then D is, 
Now A is, 

Therefore D is. 

2. By removal : If A is, then B is, 

If B is, then C is, 
If C is, then D is, 
Now D is not, 
Therefore A is not. 

The formulae of a synthetico-hypothetical Sori- 
tes are : 

1. Reasoning by position : If C is, then D is, 

If B is, then C is, 
If A is, then B is, 

Now A is, 
Therefore D is also. 
26* 



306 




REASONING. 


2. 


By removal 


If C is, then D is, 
If B is, then C is, 
If A is, then B is, 
Now D is not, 
Therefore A is not. 



§ 102. 

THE EPICHIREMA. 

The Epichirema, or separate syllogism, is a 
proposition which is annexed to either one or 
both premises for the purpose of establishing 
their truth. This confirmatory proposition is 
properly an enthymeme; and can be resolved 
into a complete monosyllogism. 

The formula is twofold : 

1. M=P, for M is x. 

S=M. 
S=P. 

The industrious merit respect, for the industrious per- 
form their duties, 
John is industrious, 
Therefore, John merits respect. 

If the annexed proposition : for the industrious 
perform their duties — be resolved into a complete 
syllogism, we have : 



THE COMPOUND SYLLOGISM. 307 

Those who perform their duties merit respect. 
The industrious perform their duties, 
Therefore, The industrious merit respect. 

2. M=P. 

S=M, for M is x. 
S=P. 

Unjust laws endanger the stability of Government, 
Laws which restrain the freedom of conscience are 
unjust ; for they require people to abandon their 
dearest concerns, 
Therefore, Laws which restrain the freedom of conscience en- 
danger the stability of Government. 

The name epicliirerna, derived from £->yjt t nr /l ua i 
and this from buzetpeiv, is a word which ancient 
logicians applied, in a general way, to argumen- 
tative reasoniog. 



PART SECOND. 

THE DOCTRINE OF METHOD. 
§ 103. 

METHOD. 

The Doctrine of Method constitutes the Second 
Part of Pure Logic. The term, method is derived 
from the Greek [isOodoq, and in its general applica- 
tion, signifies any process, determined according 
to certain principles, by which something is done, 
produced, or investigated. 

The Doctrine of Elements develops the funda- 
mental operations of the mind, Conceptions, 
Judgments, and Reasoning, as determined by the 
fundamental Laws of Thinking. Thus we be- 
come conscious of the general principles and 
single elements which enter into all sound ratio- 
cination. 

The Doctrine of Method continues the develop- 
ment of these Laws, but in their direct relation to 



UNION OF COGNITIONS. 309 

connected discourse. Connected discourse is the 
union, according to given principles, of single 
cognitions in a regular train of thought. United 
in this manner, single cognitions form one or- 
ganic whole ; and the understanding obtains a 
satisfactory insight into, and takes a comprehen- 
sive survey of, all its knowledge. 

It is the office of the Second Part of Pure 
Logic, therefore, to deduce the principles and 
rules from the fundamental Laws of Thinking, 
according to which the single operations of 
the understanding, Conceptions, Judgments, and 
Reasoning, are woven into one connected train of 
thought. 



§ 104. 

UNION OF COGNITIONS. 

The nature of any union of cognitions must he 
determined by the relation which these cogni- 
tions themselves sustain to each other. This re- 
lation may be twofold, either external or internal ; 
hence, a union of cognitions may also be either 
external or internal. 



310 THE DOCTRINE OF METHOD. 

§ 105. 

EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL UNION. 

An external union is determined by the ex- 
ternal relations of objects in space and time. In 
space, these objects of the understanding exist 
side by side ; in time, they come to view in suc- 
cession. Thus we get the Geographical and 
Chronological Method. 

An internal union is based upon the internal 
relations of things. These internal relations con- 
sist in the necessary reciprocal dependence of 
being or substance and attribute or accident, of 
cause and operation or effect, of condition and 
conditional, of end and means. A union of cog- 
nitions, determined by this necessary dependence, 
is the Logical Method. 



§ 106. 

THE LOGICAL METHOD. 

It is the fundamental tendency of the under- 
standing to refer its manifold conceptions or cog- 
nitions each to its own category, and thus reduce 



THE LOGICAL METHOD. 311 

tliem to unity, in order to comprehend them. In 
other words, it subordinates a particular to the 
general, a case to its rule, and an inference or a 
consequence to a universal proposition. Hence 
it is the Logical Method only which can satisfy 
the deepest wants of the human understanding. 



§ 107. 

A SYSTEM. 

An internal union of homogeneous cognitions 
constitutes a system. A system is an organic 
whole, all of whose parts are internally connected 
by the force of one determinative conception. If 
the cognitions and the determinative conception 
be true, the system is a science. 



§ 108. 

SCIENCE. 



Science is both objective and subjective. 
Objective science is science as such ; or the sys- 
tematic exhibition of homogeneous cognitions as 



312 THE DOCTRINE OF METHOD. 

derived from a general principle, the truth of 
which is immediately evident or certain to rea- 
son. 

Subjective science is the development and pos- 
session of such cognitions by the mind of the 
individual. 



§ 109. 

ANALYSIS AND SYNTHESIS. 

The method of developing the contents of a 
science is twofold : either analytical or synthe- 
tical. 

Analysis begins with the -facts or particulars 
which are given by experience, and from these it 
proceeds, by means of comparison and abstrac- 
tion, to form a conception of the general. 

Synthesis begins with the general conception, 
which is the result of induction from experience ; 
and then deduces the knowledge of particulars 
from given principles. The knowledge of particu- 
lars which the synthetic method furnishes, carries 
with it the conviction of necessary truth ; for it 
explicates them from the general, as belonging to 
it implicit e. 

Either one of these methods of investigation 



SYSTEM AN ORGANIC UNITY. 313 

employed separately, is inadequate to the produc- 
tion of science ; for each demands and completes 
the other. Science results from a logical process 
which unites both. 



§ no. 

SYSTEM AN ORGANIC UNITY. 

System, now, is the form of science, and the 
manifold cognitions which science includes are its 
contents. A system is, therefore, the reduction of 
these manifold cognitions to organic unity, which 
consists in the internal oneness of a variety of 
parts or members. These members, single and 
different, condition each other reciprocally, be- 
cause they grow forth from one principle, which, 
as a force from within pervading them all, deter- 
mines their relative position and action. Thus, 
in virtue of a common relation to a single force 
which binds them together internally, they con- 
stitute one whole of the highest order. 

The principle is the fundamental idea, the 
starting-point, of science, which, like a spirit 
penetrating all the parts, animates the whole. 

It is the office of method, when viewed as the 
27 



814 THE DOCTRINE OF METHOD. 

doctrine of the general form of every science, to 
teach the rules by which a scientific system can 
be constructed. Hence, it is called also Systema- 
tics or Architectonics. 



§ 111. 

CONSTRUCTION OF A SYSTEM. 

In order to construct a scientific system, it is 
necessary to possess a complete knowledge of the 
contents, extent, and truth of all the cognitions 
that are to be combined to form an organic 
whole. 

Such knowledge is acquired by means of Logi- 
cal Definition, Logical Division, and Argumenta- 
tion. 

Logical definition furnishes a clear and distinct 
insight into the contents of the conceptions and 
judgments, the single members of the system. 
Definitio. 

Logical division enables the understanding to 
take a complete survey of all the members ; that 
is, to get a view of the entire extent of each cog- 
nition entering into the system. Divisio. 

Argumentation serves to produce a conviction 



THE OFFICE OF METHOD. 315 



of the truth of each cognition, and of the whole 
chain of connected cognitions. Argumentatio. 



§ 112. 

THE OFFICE OF METHOD. 



The form of science, or system, results from 
this threefold activity of the understanding. 
The rules, therefore, which it is the office of the 
doctrine of method to develop, relate : 

1. To Definition. 

2. To Division. 

3. To Argumentation. 



CHAPTER I. 



OF DEFINITION. 



§ 113. 

Logical Definition consists in the complete de- 
velopment of the contents of a conception. This 
is accomplished by stating its essential attributes. 



§ 114. 

OFFICE OF DEFINITION. 

The essential attributes which it is the office of 
definition to unfold, are the genus-attribute and 
the species-attribute. 

The genus-attribute — genus proximum — desig- 
nates the genus to which the given conception is 
immediately subordinate ; and thus determines 
its relative position in the series of conceptions to 
which it belongs. 



OFFICE OF DEFINITION. 317 

2. The species-attribute — differentia speeifica — 
designates the species of the given conception ; 
and thus distinguishes it from all others that be- 
long to the same genus. 

To define a conception logically, means there- 
fore to give the genus to which it is immediately 
subordinate, together with a specific difference. 
Definitio fit per genus proximum et differentiam 
specificam. Aristotle says : 6 6p>.<7<j.oq ex yevooq -/.at 

d'.acnpa)'; earvj. 

The conception which is to be defined is called 
the definite; the genus-conception and the spe- 
cific difference constitute the definition. E, g., 
[Man is a finite — circumscribed or limited — ra- 
tional being. In this definition, " rational being" 
is the genus by which man is distinguished from 
all irrational creatures, and "finite" is the spe- 
cific difference by which he is distinguished from 
all other rational beings. 

From what has thus far been said we may 
decide also as to what is, and what is not, defi- 
nable. A simple conception is not susceptible of 
being defined, because there is no geims-concep- 
tion to which it is subordinate. Neither is the 
Infinite definable. A definition of the Infinite 
would be: the limitable Infinite, which would be 
21* 



318 DEFINITION. 

a contradictio in adjecto, and analogous to saying, 
a quadrangular circle : the predicate directly con- 
tradicts the subject. 



§ 115. 

FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF DEFINITION. 

The following is, therefore, the fundamental 
principle upon which a correct logical definition 
is to be constructed : 

A CORRECT DEFINITION MUST STATE THE NEXT 
HIGHER GENUS WITHIN THE EXTENT OF WHICH THE 
GIVEN DEFINABLE CONCEPTION LIES, AND THEN ADD 
THE ESSENTIAL ATTRIBUTE BY WHICH IT IS ACCU- 
RATELY DISTINGUISHED FROM ALL COLLATERAL AND 
SUBORDINATE CONCEPTIONS. 



§ 116. 

FIRST RULE FOR DEFINITION. 

From this general principle we deduce parti- 
cular rules by which a definition is constructed, 
and its correctness can be tested. 

1. A definition must be sufficient — definitio sit 



A CORRECT DEFINITION. 319 

adasquata, — that is, it must give the contents of a 
conception fully. This rule implies two things : 

1. A definition must include essential, and ex- 
clude accidental, attributes. 

2. A definition must be identical, in other 
words, the definite and the definition must be in- 
terchangeable. In consequence, they must not 
only possess the same contents, but also be of the 
same extent. 



§ 117. 



A CORRECT DEFINITION. 



In order to test the correctness of a definition, 
we apply two modes of transposition, namely, 
pure conversion and pure contraposition. If the 
proposition containing the definition is not sus- 
ceptible of either, the definition is not correct ; it 
is either too broad or too narrow. Vid. §§ 55 and 
56. 

1. A definition is too broad — latior suo definito 
— when it includes a genus which is too remote 
from the definite. The extent of the genus is 
greater than that of the definite, and the contents 
are smaller. The error is detected by means of 



320 . DEFINITION. 

pure conversion. The following definitions, e.g., 
are too broad : An animal is an organic being 
which is capable of moving from place to place ; 
A square is a quadrangle, all of whose angles are 
right angles. By pure conversion, they become : 
An organic being capable of moving from place 
to place, is an animal ; A quadrangle, ' all of 
whose angles are right angles, is a square. Both 
are false. The one includes man, the other a 
rectangle. 

2. A definition is too narrow — angustior suo 
definito — when it includes a specific difference 
which is lower than the definite. The extent of 
the specific difference is smaller than that of the 
definite, and the contents are greater. The error 
is detected by pure contraposition. E. g. 9 The 
definition; A parallelogram is an equiangular 
quadrangle, would be by contraposition : What- 
ever is not an equiangular quadrangle is not a 
parallelogram; which is incorrect. Again: A 
quadruped is an animal that chews the cud. The 
definition is defective, for it excludes all non- 
ruminating quadrupeds. The error becomes ap- 
parent at once by contraposition : An animal that 
does not chew the cud, is not a quadruped. 



THE THIRD RULE. 321 

§ 118. 

THE SECOND RULE. 

2. A definition can never describe a circle — ne 
fiat in orbem, — that is, the definite must not 
occur in the definition. A circle may be imme- 
diate or mediate. 

1. It is immediate when the definite occurs 
directly in the definition. E. g., Law is a legal 
rule. 

2. It is mediate when the definite does not 
occur directly, but in a subordinate explanation. 
E. g., Law is the expression of the will of a ruler ; 
a ruler is one who governs others ; and to govern 
others means to enact laws by which they are 
governed. 

A circle is manifest when the given conception 
recurs in the definition in the use of the same 
word ; it is concealed when the conception recurs, 
not in the use of the same, but of an equivalent 
word. 



§ 119. 

THE THIRD RULE. 

3. A definition cannot be a mere negation — ne sit 



322 DEFINITION. 

negans. Mere negation only says what a thing 
is not, but does not say what a thing is, and can- 
not consequently furnish any knowledge of its 
nature. E. g., Electricity is neither light, nor 
heat, nor magnetism. 

This rule, however, does not apply strictly to 
negative conceptions. In such cases, negation is 
the essential matter, inasmuch as the conceptions 
themselves signify the want of positiveness. 
JE. g., Cold, darkness, etc. 

The definitio per disjuneta, a species of defini- 
tion which introduces confusion in the order of 
expression, is as defective as mere negation. 
E. g., A proposition is a sentence that affirms or 
denies something of another person. 



§ 120. 

THE FOURTH RULE. 



4. A definition must be intelligible, simple, and 
short— definitio ne sit abundans, ambigua. It is 
necessary, therefore, to avoid figurative and ambi- 
guous language. 

Frequent violations of these rules in modern 
times, have done a great deal of injury to the 



NOMINAL AND VERBAL DEFINITION. 323 

cause of true science. Figurative expressions 
and ambiguous phraseology serve to conceal 
superficial knowledge, and the absence of pro- 
found logical investigation. 



§ 121. 

NOMINAL AND VERBAL DEFINITION. 

Every true definition is in its nature the expli- 
cation of some real or positive object — definitio 
realis ; — for, to state the essential attributes of a 
thing is really to explicate the thing itself. 

The explanation of words, or nominal defini- 
tion, as it is called, is therefore, strictly speaking, 
no definition ; for it merely explains the etymolo- 
gical signification of the name of a thing, whilst 
it furnishes no knowledge of the nature of a 
thing itself. 

Such etymological explanation, however, may 
be valuable, particularly in its bearing upon those 
sciences which borrow their technical termino- 
logy from foreign languages ; as it serves to pre- 
pare the way for proper definition. E. g., If it 
be said: Jurisprudence is the science of justice, it 
is proper to explain what justice is. 



324 DEFINITION. 

Many logicians distinguish between the expla- 
nation of words and the explanation of names, or 
between verbal definition and nominal definition. 
The former simply explains the derivation of the 
word, whilst the latter adds some distinguishing 
attribute of the thing itself. If it be said: the 
word loarable is derived from the Greek, TcapaPaMeiv, 
to compare, we have an example of verbal defini- 
tion. If it be added : the word parable signifies a 
particular kind of curve lines, we have an ex- 
ample of nominal definition. 



§ 122. 

ANALYTICAL AND GENETIC DEFINITION. 

The process of defining, and, as a consequence, 
a definition itself, may be analytical or genetic. 

1. A definition is analytical when it sets forth 
the essential nature of a thing by developing the 
attributes included in the conception of it. The 
conception itself being given, it is the office of 
analytical definition to resolve it into its neces- 
sary constituent elements. E. g., The circumfe- 
rence of a circle is a line terminating in itself, all 
the points of which are equally distant from one 



THOROUGH AND COMPLETE DEFINITION. 325 

particular point within. An eclipse of the moon 
is an obscuration of the moon's disk by the 
shadow of the earth. 

2. It is genetic when the necessary constituent 
parts of a thing are set forth in the order in 
which it comes to exist. Genetic or synthetic defi- 
nition begins with the origin of a thing, and then 
advances by adding one essential part after an- 
other until the complete conception has been 
produced. E. g., The circumference of a circle 
is formed by drawing a line around and at all 
points equally distant from a given fixed point, 
called a centre, until it meets the point of de- 
parture. We get an eclipse of the moon when- 
ever the earth occupies a position relatively to 
the sun, in which it casts its shadow upon the 
moon. 

Genetic definition is fundamental; analytical 
definition follows from it as a consequence ; the 
former is best adapted to philosophy, the latter, 
to the discursive sciences. 



§ 123. 

THOROUGH AND COMPLETE DEFINITION. 

If analysis be continued, and the definition is 

28 



326 DEFINITION. 

itself in turn denned, the process of explication 
becomes thorough. Thus we ascend or go back 
analytically from one definition to another, from 
the less general to the more general, until we 
reach certain conceptions which do not require 
any further reduction, and cannot be referred to 
any more general or certain than themselves ; and 
for this reason are called fundamental concep- 
tions. Such a conception is space in Geometry, 
or contraction and expansion in Natural Philo- 
sophy. 

But we may also reverse the order of the series 
of definitions. Beginning with these fundamen- 
tal conceptions, we may descend synthetically, 
from one definition to another, from the more 
general to the less general, until we reach the 
lowest or least general conceptions of the system. 
When this method is applied, the explication be- 
comes complete. The union of both methods, the 
analytical and synthetical, results in an exhaustive 
process of explication. 



§ 124. 

DESCRIPTION, EXPLANATION, LOCATION. 

To prepare the way for proper, definition, 



DESCRIPTION, EXPLANATION, LOCATION. 327 

ticularly as regards the empirical sciences, it is 
necessary to employ Description, Explanation, 
and Location. 

1. Description is as full a statement of the es- 
sential and accidental attributes of an object as is 
necessary, in order that the understanding may 
acquire a clear view or conception of it, and thus 
distinguish it definitely from all other objects. 
Vicl. § 22. 

2. Explanation — explanatio — consists in draw- 
ing an accurate distinction between the essential 
and accidental attributes of an object, and in a 
critical elucidation of both. It has reference, 
mainly, to such objects as are not accessible to 
the senses. 

3. Location — locatio — specifies the genus 
proximum of a conception, and thus assigns it its 
relative position in the particular category of cog- 
nitions to which it belongs. E. g., Imagination 
holds a place between sense and the understand- 
ing, and mediates both. A circle is a mathe- 
matical figure. 



CHAPTER II. 

OF DIVISION. 

§ 125. 

Definition relates to the contents of a concep- 
tion ; Division — divisio — to its extent. The one 
elucidates a conception intensively, the other, ex- 
tensively. 



§ 126. 

LOGICAL DIVISION. 

Logical Division consists accordingly in the 
complete development of the essential extent of a 
conception. Or, to divide logically, is to repre- 
sent the objects which a conception comprehends, both 
in their relation to each other, and in their relation 
to the conception itself. 



OFFICE OF LOGICAL DIVISION. 329 

§ 127. 

OFFICE OF LOGICAL DIVISION. 

Logical Division regards the conception to be 
divided, as a genus, and resolves it into its several 
species. 

Each species contains not only the genus-con- 
ception with all its attributes, but in addition, it 
includes also certain other attributes, which are 
peculiar to itself; in virtue of these peculiar attri- 
butes, it is distinguished from every other species. 
Thus, whilst the several species differ positively, 
they possess the attributes of the genus-concep- 
tion in common. Hence, considered in reference 
to the genus-conception, they are identical or 
subordinate conceptions ; but in reference to the 
attributes peculiar to each, in virtue of which 
they are different, they are opposite or co-ordinate 
conceptions. 

As to its form, therefore, logical division is a 
disjunctive judgment, though as expressed in a 
proposition, the disjunction is not always appa- 
rent. 

28* 



330 DIVISION. 

§ 128. 

ELEMENTS OF LOGICAL DIVISION. 

In consequence, Logical Division involves the 
following elements : 

1. A given conception that is to be divided, or 
the divisible whole — totum divisum, or, dividen- 
dum. 

2. A principle of division — principium, or, fun- 
damentum divisionis ; that is, some general attri- 
bute of the divisible whole, which determines the 
character of the division ; in other words, a point 
of observation, from which the understanding as- 
certains what the specific differences are that are 
concluded under the divisible whole. 

3. The members of the division — membra divi- 
dentia ; that is, the various particulars or specific 
differences concluded under the divisible whole, 
as determined by the principle of division. 

If the vessels or ducts of the human body are 
divided into bloodvessels, lymph ducts and excre- 
tory ducts, the principle of division is the mate- 
rial which they contain. Taking race as the 
principle of division, we divide mankind into 
Caucasians, Americans, Malays, Mongols, and 



COLLATERAL DIVISIONS. 331 

Africans. According to the system of Linneus, 
plants are divided into phanerogamic and crypto- 
gamic. 



§ 129. 

If a division has two members, it is called a 
dichotomy ; if three, a trichotomy ; if four, a te- 
trachotomy ; if more than four, a polytomy. 



§ 130. 

COLLATERAL DIVISIONS. 

As we may reflect upon a given conception 
from various points of observation, we discover 
in it different principles of division. And the 
conception is susceptible of as many different 
divisions as there are different principles dis- 
coverable. Thus we get collateral divisions — co- 
divisiones. 

We may, for example, divide granite into pri- 
mary and secondary, when we consider it as to 
its origin ; or into fine-grained and coarse- 
grained, when we consider it as to its constitu- 
tive parts. Man may also be variously divided. 



332 division. 

If we take nationality as the principle of division, 
we have English, French, Germans, Greeks, 
Italians, etc. ; if morality, we have the virtuous 
and vicious ; if sex, males and females ; if strength 
of mind, we have docility or simple capacity, 
talent and genius ; if the objects upon which mind 
is instinctively directed, we have poets, musi- 
cians, sculptors, philosophers, mechanists, etc. ; or 
if we take religion, we have Pagans, Mohamme- 
dans, Jews, and Christians. In each division the 
given conception is the same, but we get a par- 
ticular set of members of division for every prin- 
ciple we adopt. 



§ 131, 

SUBDIVISIONS. 



The division, however, may be carried still fur- 
ther. Each member of a division may itself be 
regarded as a divisible whole, from which, in 
consequence, a subordinate division may be un- 
folded. Each member, again, of the subordinate 
division may, in turn, be subjected to the same 
dividing process ; which may be continued to an 
indefinite extent. Thus we get subdivisions — sub- 



FUNDAMENTAL DIVISION. 333 

divisiones. That division to which any subdivi- 
sion is immediately subordinate, is called, a supe- 
rior division. 

As each member of a subdivision may be sub- 
jected to a dividing process, it follows that the 
same division may be both a subdivision and a 
superior division : a subdivision in its relation to 
a higher, and a superior division in its rejation to 
a lower division. E. g., All creatures are either 
rational or irrational. Irrational creatures are 
either organic or inorganic. Organic creatures 
are either animate or inanimate. The second 
division is a subdivision in its relation to the first, 
but a superior division in its relation to the third. 



§ 132. 

FUNDAMENTAL DIVISION. 

The division which comprehends all the dif- 
ferent series of subdivisions, is called the funda- 
mental or primary division — divisio fundamen- 
tals, or, primaria. If a fundamental division be 
conducted through all collateral divisions and 
subdivisions, until it comprehends the lowest or 



334 division. 

ultimate species of objects, the result is a com- 
plete classification, or a comprehensive outline of 
a whole, to which all its parts are related as 
members of an organism. As an illustration, we 
continue the example of § 131. Irrational or- 
ganic creatures are either animate or inanimate. 
Irrational animate creatures are either insects, 
reptiles, t fishes, birds, or quadrupeds. Quadru- 
peds are either granivorous or carnivorous ; each 
of which are < again divided into various families. 
Thus we may subdivide and resubdivide, quad- 
rupeds, birds, fishes, etc. ; then inanimate crea- 
tures; then inorganic creatures; and then rational 
creatures ; until we reach all the ultimate species 
of every possible subordinate series. The funda- 
mental division is the first one : all creatures are 
either rational or irrational ; and a superior divi- 
sion is any one to which a subdivision is imme- 
diately subordinate, as, e. g., quadrupeds are 
either granivorous or carnivorous, in its relation 
to any subdivision that may follow. The whole 
classification constitutes a systematic view of 
creation, or a general idea developed according 
to the laws of thinking. 



FIRST RULE FOR DIVISION. 335 

§ 133. 

ORDER OF DIVISION. 

The foregoing principles determine the general 
order of division. In the first place, elucidate 
the given conception or the divisible whole, by a 
complete definition ; secondly, settle the principle 
of division, which must be an essential attribute 
of the given conception ; next, determine by this 
principle the several species of the divisible 
whole ; then, take each species in turn as a divi- 
sible whole, again settle a principle of division, 
and determine its several subordinate species; 
and thus advance, step by step, until the process 
of division and subdivision is complete. The 
process is complete when we can discover no ad- 
ditional species in the extent of the given concep- 
tion. 



§ 134. 

FIRST RULE FOR DIVISION. 

From the nature of division, we deduce the 
following particular rules : 

1. Every division must have a 'principle — divisio 
ne careat fundamento. This principle is derived 



336 division. 

from some constituent or essential aspect of the 
divisible whole, and must be held firmly as the 
only divisive force throughout the entire process 
of division. 

If this rule is not observed ; if some false view, 
or accidental attribute, be taken as the principle 
of division ; or if different principles are assumed, 
the result will not be a real, but an apparent, or 
a superficial, or confused division. 



§ 135. 

SECOND RULE. 



2. The members of the division must be in opposi- 
tion, and thus mutually exclude each other — formse 
sint repugnantes ; membra sint opposita. Other- 
wise the disjunction is not real, but only appa- 
rent. A violation of this rule is most liable to 
occur when one well-defined principle of division 
is not held firmly, and applied consistently 
throughout the entire process. If, e. g., we 
divide human actions into good and useful, the 
division is false; for the members are concep- 
tions in agreement, and therefore not mutually 
exclusive. Both may be predicated of the same 
action, 



FOURTH RULE. 337 

§ 136. 

THIRD RULE. 

3. The division must be regular — divisio fiat in 
membra proxima. It must begin with those 
members which are derived immediately from the 
divisible whole, and then advance to such as, 
next in order, are derived mediately. A violation 
of this rule is called a leap — saltus in dividendo. 
E. (/., To divide nature into animals, plants, and 
minerals, is a saltus in dividendo. Nature should 
first be divided into organic and inorganic ; then, 
the former into plants and animals, and the latter 
into minerals, fluids, etc. The received division 
of angles into right, obtuse, and acute, is open to 
a similar criticism ; for, strictly speaking, it takes 
a leap, obtuse and acute being a subdivision of 
oblique angles. 



§ 137. 

FOURTH RULE. 



4. The division must he adequate — divisio sit 
ada'^uata. All the members of the division 

21) 



338 division. 

taken together, must be equivalent to the divi- 
sible whole, and thus exhaust it. 

If not equivalent, the division is either too 
broad or too narrow — aut latior aut angustior suo 
divisio. It is too broad when it comprehends 
more members than are to be found in the extent 
of the divisible whole ; and too narrow, when it 
does not comprehend as many. E. g., The 
division of extension into bodies, planes, lines, 
points, etc., or of plants into grass, trees, polyps, 
etc., is too broad ; that of poisons into mineral 
and vegetable, or of modem nations into Italians, 
Greeks, and Germans, is too narrow. 



§ 138. 

FIFTH RULE. 



5. Division must observe a proper measure — ne 
fiat nimia ; — that is, it is not allowable to recog- 
nize trivial and non-essential differences ; for it is 
the design of division, not to descend to unim- 
portant minutise, but to furnish a distinct and 
comprehensive view of a system ; hence the ne- 
cessity of the rule. 

The tendency of excessive division is rather to 
produce confusion than clearness and compre- 



PARTITION AND NOMINAL DIVISION. 339 

hensiveness of conception. Seneca says : Idem 
enim vitii habet nimia, quod nulla divisio. Simile 
confuso est, quidquid usque in pulverem sectum 
est. 

§ 139. 

PARTITION AND NOMINAL DIVISION. 

It is necessary to distinguish logical division 
from partition and nominal division. 

1. Partition — partitio — analyzes the constituent 
parts of a whole, its design being to produce a 
knowledge of the particulars belonging to the 
contents of a conception. E. g., Man is com- 
posed of body and bouL It approaches the 
nature of definition, and frequently takes the 
place of it, particularly when its objects are sen- 
suous, as, e. g., A tree consists of roots, trunk, 
and top. Yet partition and definition are not 
identical ; for partition does not comprehend the 
proximate genus. 

2. Nominal division or disti?iction — distinctio — 
pertains to the variable import of language ; that 
is, to the different significations of the same word 
in different connections, its design being to spe- 
cify the sense in which it is used in a- given i 
Such words, e. g., are world, court, band, lock, 
church, etc. 



CHAPTER III. 



OF ARGUMENTATION. 



§ 140. 

Definition unfolds the specific contents, and 
division the complete extent, of the cognitions 
which enter into the construction of a scientific 
system. But these results do not fully satisfy the 
tendencies of the understanding; it demands a 
perception of the truth, not only of the principle, 
but also of all the parts or cognitions of a system. 
Hence arises the necessity of argumentation, or 
proof, whose office it is to evince the truth of 
single and of a concatenated series of cognitions. 
This is done by showing how a given particular 
is included in a known general. 

Argumentation presupposes definition and divi- 
sion ; for a demonstration of the truth of a con- 
ception depends upon a knowledge of what the 
conception itself is, both as to its contents and 
extent. 



FORM OF PROOF. 341 

§ 141. 

NATURE OF PROOF. 

Argumentation, or proof, — argumentatio, de- 
monstrate, probatio — accordingly, consists in de- 
ducing the truth of a given judgment from other 
judgments known and acknowledged to be true. 
Or, to prove, signifies to establish the truth of a 
proposition by arguments. 



§ 142. 



FORM OF PROOF. 



Every demonstration or process of proof is, 
therefore, as to its form, a syllogism, and in this 
respect may vary as much as the syllogistic for- 
mula itself; for the essential nature of proof un- 
derlies all the principles and rules which have 
been developed in relation to syllogisms. 

Proof is an application of the syllogistic for- 
mula in order to establish the truth of a given 
judgment. The design of formal reasoning, or 
of the syllogism, is simply logical sequence, but 
that of proof, is truth. 

29 



342 ARGUMENTATION. 

§ 143. 

ELEMENTS OE PROOF. 

Every demonstration involves the following 
elements : 

1. A thesis — a given judgment, the truth of 
which is to be established. 

2. A ground of proof, or arguments — argu- 
menta. These are certain judgments, the truth 
of which involves the truth of the thesis. 

3. The poiuer of proof — nervus probandi — 
which consists in the logical connection between 
the thesis, as a conclusion, and the arguments, as 
premises. The first premiss, or major proposi- 
tion, is a general or a containing whole; the 
second premiss, or minor, affirms that the subject 
of the given judgment is included as a particular 
in the general, or that it is a part of the contain- 
ing whole : hence, the truth of the conclusion 
must follow, by necessary consequence, from the 
truth of the premises ; or, to affirm the truth of 
the arguments is to affirm the truth of the thesis, 
in virtue of their logical connection ; for what- 
ever predicate agrees with a general subject, 
agrees also with each particular belonging to it. 



VALIDITY OF PROOF. 343 

The thesis and the arguments together consti- 
tute the matter of proof. 



§ 144. 

VALIDITY OF PROOF. 

The validity of argumentation depends mainly 
upon the truth of the arguments. This is either 
immediate or mediate. 

1. The truth of the arguments is immediate if 
they are axioms or postulates, that is, self-evident 
propositions; which constitute the fundamental 
facts or the first principles in which the different 
sciences begin, and from which they are deve- 
loped by different processes of reasoning. 

2. The truth of the arguments is mediate when 
they are not self-evident, but must themselves be 
established by other arguments. Their truth 
being thus derived from other propositions, they 
do not themselves establish the truth of the 
thesis, but are only the medium by which some 
more general truth establishes it, — a fink in the 
chain of proof. To satisfy the demands of 
science it is necessary, in this case, that the order 
of argumentation go back step by step, descend 



344 ARGUMENTATION. 

from less general to more general, from less cer- 
tain to more certain arguments, until it reaches 
ultimate propositions or principles. 



§ 145. 

THE ORDER OF PROOF. 

From the truth of arguments as being either 
immediate or mediate, it follows that the order 
of proof is, like a poly syllogism, either retrogres- 
sive or progressive. 

1. The order of proof is retrogressive or analy- 
tical, when, commencing with that which has 
been logically established, the thesis, we pass to 
that by which the thesis has been established, the 
arguments. The arguments then become theses 
which are in turn to be logically established ; and 
thus we go back regularly — regressus a princi- 
piatis adprincipia — searching for the principles of 
arguments, until we reach self-evident proposi- 
tions. The analytical order begins, accordingly, 
with the proposition to be demonstrated, and, re- 
solving it into its component parts, passes on to 
a proposition that is ultimate, and therefore pos- 
sesses the strongest demonstrative. force. 



DIRECT AND INDIRECT PROOF. 845 

2. The order of proof is progressive or synthe- 
tical, when we begin with first principles, and 
then, in virtue of the necessary connection be- 
tween ground and consequence, deduce those 
truths from them which they condition and 
involve — progressus a principiis ad principiata. 
The synthetical order, accordingly, regards phe- 
nomena as consequences, and evolves a general 
principle into its particulars. 



§ 146. 

DIRECT AND INDIRECT PROOF. 

As to its form, proof is of two kinds, direct 
and indirect. 

1. Proof is direct or ostensive, when the truth 
of the thesis or conclusion is deduced imme- 
diately from the truth of the arguments. 

2. Proof is indirect or apagogical, when the 
truth of the thesis is inferred from the falsity of 
its contradictory opposite. 

The union of both kinds of proof constitute an 
apodictical demonstration ; that is, their united 
force convinces the understanding that the conclu- 
sion is true of necessity ; it cannot be false. 



346 ARGUMENTATION. 

§ 147. 

INDIRECT OR APAGOGICAL PROOF. 

An apagogical demonstration begins with the 
contradictory of the thesis; then deduces from 
this contradictory, certain propositions which 
violate admitted truths and principles ; and, rea- 
soning by removal, or modo tollente, infers the 
falsity of the contradictory from the falsity of its 
unavoidable inferences. Hence called also de- 
ductio in absurdum. The truth of the thesis then 
follows from the falsity of its contradictory ac- 
cording to the Laws of Opposition. E. g., To 
prove the thesis indirectly: "Washington was a 
patriot, we assume its contradictory : "Washington 
was not a patriot, from which, in view of his long, 
arduous, and various labors in the service of his 
feeble country, it must follow that he was ambi- 
tious of civil and military power, was covetous, 
sought self-aggrandizement, etc. ; but as these 
unavoidable inferences contradict admitted facts, 
they are false ; if they are false, the antecedent 
or the contradictory must be false ; and if the 
contradictory, must be false, we infer that the 
thesis must be true. 



USE OF APAGOGICAL PROOF. 347 

Aristotle says : a-aycupj eiq to dOuvarov. 

An apagogical demonstration is based upon the 
Law of the Excluded Third (§ 11), in connection 
with the principles of opposition. Vid. §§ 27 and 
51. Hence it most commonly takes the form 
of a dilemma. 



§ 148. 

USE OF APAGOGICAL PROOF. 

Apagogical proof is particularly adapted to the 
purposes of criticism and polemics, as it enables 
a defender of truth to present a striking refuta- 
tion of erroneous and untenable positions, by 
showing that these involve direct contradictions, 
and thus destroy themselves. 

But it is necessary to restrict the use of this 
kind of proof; for, 

1. If employed by itself, ostensive proof being 
neglected, it is liable to great abuse ; it may 
easily degenerate into sophistry or mere trickery. 
The opposite of the thesis assumed, may be a 
concealed contrary instead of a contradictory. 
Or the incomprehensible or mysterious, may be 
taken for the impossible. 

2. Apagogical proof does, indeed, not allow 



348 ARGUMENTATION. 

the understanding to admit the truth of the given 
thesis, but this does not suffice. The nature of 
science requires a kind of proof that will not only 
lead us to believe that a proposition is true, but 
also enable us to understand the reason — princi- 
pium cognoscendi — why it is true ; why it is 
what it is, and not something else. Vid. § 12. 
Hence the necessity of ostensive proof; for it 
alone can give us an insight into the reason or 
ground of truth. 



§ 149. 

OBJECTIVE AND SUBJECTIVE PROOF.' 

As the validity of arguments may be general 
or particular, we get another division of proof 
into objective and subjective. 

1. A demonstration is objective, or, xar' dXrjOecav, 
when the arguments possess general validity, and 
thus evince the thesis to be perfectly certain, the 
very possibility of its opposite being excluded. 
The demonstrative force is in the nature of the 
arguments, and does not therefore depend upon 
any time, place, or individual, or any other acci- 
dental circumstances. • • •• 



PROBABILITY. 349 

2. A demonstration is subjective, or xar avOpw-w, 
or ex-concessis, when the arguments are valid 
only in their application to particular cases, and 
the thesis possesses only relative certainty. The 
demonstrative force is not in the nature of the 
arguments, but is derived from the concessions of 
an individual. 

Strictly considered, however, this division lies 
outside of the sphere of science ; for none other 
than objective proof, or a demonstration ad veri- 
tatem, possesses scientific value. Subjective proof, 
or a demonstration ad hominem, has its proper 
place in the affairs of practical life, and serves the 
purpose of persuasion rather than of conviction. 



§ 150. 

PROBABILITY. 



Apodictical proof alone is strictly scientific, be- 
cause, by excluding the possibility of the truth of 
its opposite, it convinces the understanding of 
the absolute certainty of the thesis. It is neces- 
sary, therefore, to distinguish it also from pro- 
bable proof, which includes Analogy and Induc- 

30 



350 ARGUMENTATION. 

tion. The nature of the arguments serves to 
determine the mind in favor of, rather than 
against, a given proposition, but they do not 
necessitate the acceptance of it as certainly true ; 
because the impossibility of its opposite is not 
evident. 

If the arguments relating to a given proposi- 
tion, preponderate in favor of its truth, it is pro- 
bable. The reasons for its truth possess more 
force than those for its falsity. 

If, on the other hand, the preponderance of 
the arguments is against the acceptance of a 
given proposition, it is improbable. The reasons 
against it possess more force than those for it. 

If the arguments for and against it, are equal, 
both as to number and force, the proposition is 
said to be doubtful. 

Probable proof possesses more or less force, as 
it approximates to, or is remote from, an actual 
demonstration. 



§ 151. 

ANALOGY. 

Analogy — argumentatio analogica — compares 



ANALOGY. 351 

the points of resemblance between different ob- 
jects belonging to the same species or genus, and 
then infers that these objects are themselves 
alike. It is based upon the following principle : 
If certain known properties or qualities of 
two or more objects belonging to the same spe- 
cies are alike, then the remaining unknown 
properties or qualities are alike also. 

If the conceptions, A and B, are of the same 
species ; and if the attributes a, 5, c, d, e, belong 
to A, and the attributes, a, b, c, to B, we conclude 
from this partial resemblance upon an entire re- 
semblance — from the identity of some, upon the 
identity of all the attributes ; in other words, we 
infer, that the attributes, d and e, belong to the 
conception B. 

Ancient logicians very properly regarded 
Analogy as Proportion ; for it is a process of 
reasoning which proceeds upon a comparison of 
objects, and concludes upon unknown attributes 
from those which are known. Thus we conclude 
upon the nature of the moon from the nature of 
the earth, and upon the flattening of the earth, at 
the poles, from the effects produced upon a soft 
body by a rapid rotary motion. Thus also the 
attraction of gravitation led to the discovery of 



352 ARGUMENTATION. 

the law which regulates the motion of the 
heavenly bodies. 



§ 152. 

INDUCTION. 



Induction — argumentatio per inductionem — 
adduces a number of particulars, known as the 
marks or properties of an object, and then from 
these infers the nature of the object itself. It is 
based upon this principle : That which is true 

0E MANY, OR A MAJORITY OF, INDIVIDUALS OR OB- 
JECTS BELONGING TO A GIVEN SPECIES OR GENUS, IS 
TRUE ALSO OF THE SPECIES OR GENUS ITSELF. 

The process of inductive proof may be reduced 
to a formula, as follows : 

a, b, c, d, e, are C. 
A comprehends a, b, c, d, e. 
Therefore, A is C ; or all A's are C's. 

Analogy respects the contents of a conception ; 
but Induction pertains to its extent, or to the ob- 
jects which it comprehends ; for it is a process by 
which we reason from single individuals belong- 
ing to a species or genus, to the nature of a 



ANALOGY AND INDUCTION. 353 

whole class of objects. Thus, from the illusions 
of the eye and the ear, we conclude upon the de- 
ceptive character of impressions made on all the 
senses. 



§ 153. 

ANALOGY AND INDUCTION. 

Neither Analogy nor Induction, however, can 
produce entire certainty, or the conviction of ne- 
cessary truth. They can produce probability 
only; but this approaches the nature of certainty 
in proportion as the proof becomes complete ; 
that is, in the case of Analogy, as the number of 
known qualities or attributes ; in the case of In- 
duction, as the number of known things, marks, 
and phenomena, increases. 

In their bearing upon the empirical sciences, 
both kinds of proof are very important, and fer- 
tile means of advancing knowledge ; for expe- 
rience convinces us more fully from day to day, 
that the essential nature of genera and species, 
comes to view as much in similar as in different 
phenomena. 



354 ARGUMENTATION. 

I 

§ 154. 

FIRST RULE FOR ARGUMENTATION. 

From the nature and design of Argumenta- 
tion, we deduce the following rules by which to 
determine its validity both as to matter and form. 

1. Do not substitute a foreign proposition for the 
thesis. — The proposition to be established must 
be kept fully and distinctly in view. This rule 
is violated whenever the conceptions of the thesis 
are exchanged for others which it does not con- 
tain. The error is called ^r&^aaiq el? aXXo yivoq or 
irepZoTjTyfftq — mutatio seu ign-oratio elenchi — a 
misapprehension of the question. 

.Two cases of violation may arise : the process 
of proof establishes too much or too little, when- 
ever the arguments are not entirely commensu- 
rate with the conceptions contained in the thesis. 
In order to avoid these errors, it is necessary to 
determine the conceptions of the thesis very accu- 
rately, both as to contents and extent. 

1. The process of reasoning proves too much 
whenever, in addition to the thesis, some false 
proposition follows from the premises. The ex- 
tent of the premises is greater than the extent cvf 



THIRD RULE. 355 

the thesis. And the rule applies: qui nimium 
probat, nihil probat. 

2. The reasoning proves too little whenever a 
part only of the thesis follows from the premises. 
The extent of the premises is less than the extent 
of the thesis. As regards that part of the thesis 
which follows from the premises, the process of 
proof may be valid, but it is not as regards the 
whole of it. 



§ 155. 

SECOND RULE. 



2. A process of proof must begin ivith funda- 
mental principles, or be reducible to such. The op- 
posite error is called ptetitio principii, or, a begging 
of the question ; and occurs when some proposi- 
tion is assumed as an argument, the truth of 
which has itself not been established. 



§ 156. 



THIRD RULE. 



3. No proposition can be used as an argument, 
the truth of which is not the ground or principle 



356 ARGUMENTATION. 

upon which the thesis rests, but only a consequence 
following from the truth of the thesis itself. A vio- 
lation of this rule is called (xrzepov Ttporepov. The 
consequence is taken for the principle. JEJ. g., 
To infer the freedom of human action from 
moral accountability. 



§ 157. 

FOURTH RULE. 



4. The truth of the conclusion having been 
deduced from the truth of the -premises, we can- 
not in turn infer the truth • of the premises from the 
truth of the conclusion; in other words, we cannot 
infer the truth of the conclusion and the pre- 
mises from each other reciprocally; A from B, 
and B from A. To violate this rule is to argue 
in a circle — circulus seu orbis in demonstranclo. 
This fallacy is allied to that of hysteron proteron, 
but they are not identical. It would be arguing 
in a circle, e. g., to conclude upon the truth of 
Revelation from the existence of God, and then 
endeavor to prove the existence of God from 
Revelation . 

The fallacy of hysteron proteron takes as an 



FIFTH RULE. 357 

argument a proposition, the truth of which fol- 
lows from the conclusion as its principle ; that of 
a circle first infers the truth of a conclusion, from 
an assumed proposition, as an argument, and 
then endeavors to establish the truth of this pro- 
position by the conclusion. 



§ 158. 

FIFTH RULE. 



5. There must be a logical connection between the 
several arguments themselves, and between all the 
arguments and the thesis. A violation of the rule 
constitutes a flaw, a chasm, or leap — saltus in de- 
monstrando — in the syllogistic series in which 
the process of demonstration consists. Some 
link in the chain, some necessary intermediate 
member of the series, is omitted, and it becomes 
difficult to understand the logical connection of 
the arguments, or appreciate the force of the con- 
clusion. 

It is necessary to distinguish the saltus in de- 
monstrando from the so-called saltus legitimus of 
Enthymemes. 



358 ARGUMENTATION. 



§ 159. 

FALLACIES. 

A process of proof that violates the laws of 
thinking, or any of the foregoing rules, is called 
a fallacy. If, from want of knowledge or disci- 
pline of mind, a fallacy is perpetrated uninten- 
tionally, it is a paralogism. If perpetrated with 
the design to deceive — to present an error in the 
garb of truth — it is a sophism., A sophism, ac- 
cordingly, endeavors to conceal a false proposi- 
tion under the logical form of sound reasoning, 
in order to give the appearance and authority of 
truth to error. 

A fallacy may easily be detected and exposed 
by a careful application of the laws and rules of 
Logic to the matter and form of conceptions, 
judgments, and reasoning. 

We conclude by giving the names of the more 
common forms of sophistical reasoning : 
1. Sophisma amphibolise seu fallacia ambiguitatis. 
To this class belong : 

a. Fallacia sensus compositi et divisi. 



FALLACIES. 359 

b. Fallacia a dicto secundum quid ad dictum 

simpliciter. 

c. Fallacia figurae dictionis. 

2. Sophisma fictse universalitatis. 

3. Sophisma falsi medii ; also, fallacia non causae 

ut causae. To this class belong : 

a. Sophisma cum hoc, vel post hoc, ergo prop- 

ter hoc. 

b. Sophisma pigrum seu ignava ratio. 

c. Sophisma polyzeteseos, seu fallacia qusestio- 

nis multiplicis. 

d. Sophisma heterozeteseos, seu fallacia quaes- 

tionis duplicis. 



6 12 



* y 




Deacidified using the Bookkeeper proc 
Neutralizing agent: Magnesium Oxide 
Treatment Date: Sept. 2004 

PreservationTechnologies 

A WORLD LEADER IN PAPER PRESERVATION 

1 1 1 Thomson Park Drive 
Cranberry Township, PA 1 6066 






(724)779-2111 



























• 




















. 

















































































HI 

■r 



IL 



■III 



UliHSP 

■ Mm 




LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 





